《即将到来的美国利率收紧周期—一帆风顺或波澜不断》（节选）翻译项目报告.pdf

'———＇—－皆八体？據六璋■＊＞巧译专业学位硕生论文■、．Ｖ《＾？）婿巧未４６義巧满率化荣用期、？＞一化成化我化彌禾斯》ｒ爭达＾４？々巧《振周雁洁指巧巧巧，巧巧ｆｌＵｓｍ专化名巧：巧译巧女巧巧向曰巧？．英巧论义巧义时巧：２０１６年４月：．一＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿？一＂＂■—．■■■Ｉ—Ｉ＂■■■—‘，‘．（论义巧辩时闻２０１６！：年５月ｉ论义编々Ｓ２０１６４２５ SichuanInternationalStudiesUniversityATranslationProjectReportofTheComingU.S.InterestRateTighteningCycle:SmoothSailingorStormyWaters?(Excerpts)byZhouYanjieAthesissubmittedtotheGraduateSchoolinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofTranslationandInterpretingunderthesupervisionofProfessorTaoLixiaChongqing,P.R.ChinaMay2016 《即将到来的美国利率收紧周期——一帆风顺或波澜不断》（节选）翻译项目报告摘要本文是一份翻译项目报告。翻译项目所选原文《即将到来的美国利率收紧周期——一帆风顺或波澜不断》（TheComingU.S.InterestRateTighteningCycle:SmoothSailingorStormyWaters?）是由世界银行集团于2015年9月发布于其官网上的一份政策研究报告（PRN）。原文全面分析了自削减恐慌以来全球金融局势的变化、分析了美国加息可能引发的风险、分析了这些风险对新兴经济体和前沿市场经济体（EFEs）的影响，同时也为这些国家提供了政策选择。本翻译项目选译文本为该报告的概要、第一章、第二章和第三章。原文语言严谨、用词正式、内含大量的金融术语，因此本翻译项目的难点在于对翻译策略的选择以及对术语的专业化翻译。译者选取了功能翻译理论中的文本类型理论、翻译行为理论和目的论作为翻译指导，成功地解决了上述问题。在三个理论的指导下，译者对原文译文进行分析对比后确定了翻译目的，并根据翻译目的确定了直译意译相辅的翻译策略，保证了术语翻译的准确性和专业性。关键词：美国利率；政策研究报告；功能翻译理论；术语翻译ii ATranslationProjectReportofTheComingU.S.InterestRateTighteningCycle:SmoothSailingorStormyWaters?(Excerpts)AbstractThisisaTranslationProjectReportofTheComingU.S.InterestRateTighteningCycle:SmoothSailingorStormyWaters?.ReleasedonitsofficialwebsitebytheWorldBankGroupinSeptember,2015,thesourcetextisaPolicyResearchNote(PRN).Thesourcetextanalyzesthechangesinglobalconditionssincethetapertantrum,riskscausedbytheincreasingoftheU.S.interestrateandthepotentialinfluencesontheemergingandfrontiermarketeconomies(EFEs)andofferssomepolicyoptionsforthesecountries.Thetranslatedversionofthesourcetextinthetranslationprojectincludesitsexecutivesummary,ChapterI,IIandIII.ThedifficultiesintheprocessoftranslationincludechoosingtheappropriatetranslationstrategyandhowtotranslatetheterminologiesproperlybecausethesourcetextiswrittenwithstronglogicandinformalEnglish.ThetranslatorovercametheaforementioneddifficultiesbychoosingthetheoriesofFunctionalism,namely,thetheoryofaction,theSkopostheoryandthetheoryoftexttypes,astheguidingtheories.Guidedbythesetheories,thetranslatoranalyzedandcomparedthesourcetextandthetargettextbeforedecidingonthetranslationproject’spurposebasedonwhichthetranslatorconsideredthattheappropriatetranslationstrategyshouldbeacombinationoffreeandliteraltranslationandmanagedtotranslatetheterminologiesproperly.Keywords:U.S.interestrate;PRN;Functionalism;terminologiestranslationiii AcknowledgementsFirstandforemost,Iwouldliketoexpressmyheartfeltgratitudetomysupervisor,ProfessorTaoLixia,bothforherintellectualguidanceandherthoroughrevisionsduringtheprocessofwritingthisprojectreport.Withpatienceandprudence,shelaboredthroughdraftsofthisreportandpointedoutdefectstherein.Therefore,Ioweallthemeritsinthisreport,ifany,toher,thoughIamfullyawarethatitmightstillcontainsomemistakes,forwhichIbearthewholeresponsibility.Iamalsodeeplyindebtedtomyclassmateswhosehelpmakesthistranslationprojectpossible.Lastbutnotleast,bigthanksgotomymotherandfatherwhohavesupportedmeduringthewritingandIhopetheycansharemyhappinessinfinallyfinishingthisthesis.iv CONTENTS摘要.....................................................................................iiAbstract……………………………………………………………………………iiiAcknowledgements…………………………………………………………………ivChapter1IntroductiontotheTranslationProject……………………….……………11.1DescriptionoftheTranslationProject……………………….……………11.1.1PreparationsfortheTranslation...………………………………….11.1.2TranslationTools…….…………………………………………....11.2SignificanceoftheProject……………………………………….………..11.3ObjectivesoftheProject…………………………………………………21.4StructureoftheReport……………………………………………………2Chapter2IntroductiontotheSourceText………………………...……….…………32.1Authors,PublishingFactsandMainContent……………..…………….…32.2AnalysisoftheSourceText…………………………….……..……..……32.2.1AddressesoftheSourceText……………………...………………32.2.2IntendedFunctionoftheSourceText………..…………………32.2.3TextTypeandLinguisticCharacteristicsoftheSourceText…….4Chapter3TheoreticalBasis,Difficulties,ProblemsandTheirSolutions………..….63.1TheoreticalBasis……………….………………….………………………63.2TranslationDifficultiesandProblems…………………………….……..63.3StrategiesandMethodsEmployedintheProcessofTranslation……….73.3.1CombinationofFreeandLiteralTranslation………….………73.3.2SequentialTranslation…………………….……………………83.3.3Substitution……………………………….………..……………93.3.4Conversion………………………………………………………103.3.5RearrangementofInformation…………….………..……………123.3.6Division………………………………………………..…………123.3.7StepsofTranslatingTerminologies...………………….…….……13Chapter4Summary……………………………………………………………..164.1LessonsLearnedfromtheTranslationPractice…………………………164.2ProblemtobeSolved……………………………………………………16References…………………………………………………………………………17AppendixISourceText…………………………………………………………18AppendixII中文译文……….……………………………………………………...48v Chapter1IntroductiontotheTranslationProject1.1DescriptionoftheTranslationProjectThesourcetext,TheComingU.S.InterestRateTighteningCycle:SmoothSailingorStormyWatersisafinancialreportwhichcontainsmanyacademicanalysesandterminologies.Notranslatedversionofithasbeenfound,whetheronlineorinreallife,andthetranslationprojectcoversitsexecutivesummary,chapterI,IIandIII,frompage5topage24.Whiletranslatingit,thetranslatorovercametwomajordifficulties,includingdecidingtheappropriatetranslationstrategyandhowtotranslatetheterminologiesproperly,byapplyingthetheoriesofFunctionalism.1.1.1PreparationsfortheTranslationThetranslatorstudiedthetheoriesofFunctionalismthoroughlybeforethetranslationsoastobetterutilizethemtotacklethetranslationproblems.Inaddition,sincethesourcetextisafinancialreport,thetranslatorreadalotoffinancialbooksandnewsinordertoaccumulateasmuchfinancialexpertiseaspossibleandgetfamiliarwiththestyleoffinancialwritings.1.1.2TranslationToolsBoththepaperdictionaries,suchasOxfordAdvancedLearner’sEnglish-ChineseDictionary,andtheonlinedictionaries,suchasTheFreeDictionary.com,wereusedduringthetranslation.Moreover,thetranslatoralsoresortedtosomesearchenginestosearchforfinancialnewsandtocheckiftherightcollocationwasusedinthetargettext.1.2SignificanceoftheProjectThissourcetextisofimportancetothefinancialindustryofChinabecausefirst,itofferspolicyoptionstoemergingandfrontiermarketeconomies(EFEs)andcontainsacomprehensiveanalysisofthechangesinglobalconditionssincethetapertantrum,risksofdisruptionsduringtheupcomingU.S.FederalReservetighteningcycleandthepotentialinfluencesonEFEsandsecond,itwasreleasedinSeptember,1 2015,containingsomeofthelatestdataandanalyses.Therefore,itishelpfultoofferitsChineseversiontothepolicymakersandbusinessmeninChinafortheirreference.1.3ObjectivesoftheProjectThetranslationprojecthastwoobjectives:ThefirstoneistooffertheChineseversionoftheoriginaltexttoChina’spolicymakersandbusinessmensincethereisnotranslatedversionofitavailable.Thesecondoneistodetectproblemsduringthetranslationandconcludeusefulcopingtacticsbasedontheguidingtheorysoastoaccumulateexperienceforfuturetranslating.1.4StructureoftheReportThetranslationreportconsistsoffourchapters.Thefirstchapterbriefsthereadersonthepreparationforthetranslationprojectanditssignificance,objectivesandstructure.Thesecondchapterintroducesandanalyzesthesourcetext.Thethirdchapterintroducesthetheoreticalbasisofthetranslationproject,analyzesthetargettextandliststhetranslationdifficulties,problemsandtheirsolutions.Thefourthchapterconcludeswiththelessonslearnedfromthetranslationpracticeandtheproblemstobesolved.2 Chapter2IntroductiontotheSourceText2.1Authors,PublishingFactsandMainContentTheComingU.S.InterestRateTighteningCycle:SmoothSailingorStormyWatersiswrittenbyCarlosArteta,M.AyhanKose,FranziskaOhnsorgeandMarcStocker.CarlosArtetaisaLeadEconomistinandM.AyhanKoseistheDirectoroftheDevelopmentProspectsGroupoftheWorldBank.FranziskaOhnsorgeisamemberoftheEconomicMonitoringTeamoftheWorldBankwhileMarcStockerisaSeniorEconomistintheDevelopmentProspectsGroup.Thesourcetext,writteninEnglish,isreleasedontheofficialwebsiteoftheWorldBankGroupinSeptember,2015.ThesourcetextcontainsacomprehensiveanalysisofthechangesinboththedevelopedeconomiesandtheEFEssincethetapertantrum,risksofdisruptionsduringtheupcomingFedtighteningcycle,potentialinfluencesonEFEsandtheirpolicyoptions.2.2AnalysisoftheSourceTextThoughFunctionalismmainlyfocusesonthetargettext,itdoesn’tmeanthatthesourcetextisirrelevant,because“thesourcetextprovidestheofferofinformationthatformsthestartingpointfortheofferofinformationformulatedinthetargettext”(Nord,2002,p.62).2.2.1AddressesoftheSourceTextAccordingtotheWorldBank,PRNs“areaimedatabroadaudienceinterestedineconomicpolicy”(Artetaetal.,2015,p.2).ThereforetheintendedaddressesoftheSourceTextarethosewhocanreadinEnglishandareinterestedineconomicpolicy.2.2.2IntendedFunctionoftheSourceTextThesourcetextisaPolicyResearchNote(PRN).PRNs“combineanddistillexistingandnewresearchtoinformdiscussionontopicalpolicyissues.”(Artetaetal.,2015,p.2).Morespecifically,basedonitscontent,theintendedfunctionofthesourcetextistoinformthereadersofthecurrentglobalcondition,thediscussionsonthecoming3 U.S.tighteningcircleandthepolicyoptionsforEFEs.Mostchaptersofthereport(fromchapterIandIV)presentthestatisticsanddiscussionsconcerningtheupcomingtighteningcycletothereaders,hencethemainfunctionoftheoriginaltextintheprojectistoinformthereadersoftheinformationmentionedabove.2.2.3TextTypeandLinguisticCharacteristicsoftheSourceTextThefunctionofthesourcetextistoinformthereadersofthecurrentglobaleconomicsituation,discussionsonthecomingtighteningcircleetc.Thereforethesourcetextisaninformativefinancialreport.PeterNewmarkclassifiesthetextswithinformativefunctionintofourcategoriesbasedontheirlanguagevarietiesandthesourcetextbelongstothefirstcategory:“(1)aformal,non-emotive,technicalstyleforacademicpapers,characterizedinEnglishbypassives,presentandperfecttense,literallanguage,latinisedvocabulary,jargon,multi-nouncompoundswith‘empty’verbs,nometaphors(Newmark,2009,p.40)”.Thefollowingsarethespecificlinguisticfeaturesofthesourcetextthatthetranslatorpaidextraattentiontointhetranslationprocess.2.2.3.1SyntacticalCharacteristicLongcompoundsentenceswhichinmostcasescontainparallelstructure,clauses,nonfiniteverbsetc.areoftenutilizedtoexplainacomplicatedfinancialsituationinthisfinancialreport.Example1:Reflectinginparttheasynchronousnatureofmonetarypolicystancesamongmajorcentralbanks,theU.S.dollarhasappreciatedmorethan15percentinnominaleffectivetermssincemid-2013,whiletheeuroandyendepreciatedsignificantlyoverthesameperiod(Artetaetal.,2015,p18).Anonfiniteverbandparallelstructureareusedintheexample,allowingtheauthorstoexplainthemovementsoftheU.S.dollar,euroandyeninonesentence.2.2.3.2LexicalCharacteristicsAsafinancialreport,thesourcetextcontainsmanyfinancialandmathematic4 terminologiesandnewly-coinedwordsinthefinancialindustryandemploysfrequentlynominalization.Alargenumberoffinancialterminologiescanbefoundinthesourcetext,forexample,“termspread”,“assetvaluation”,“creditdefaultswap”etc.Moreover,theemploymentofstatisticsandastructuralvectorautoregressionnaturallybringsmanymathematicterminologiesintothesourcetext,forinstance,“a100basispointjump”,“signrestriction”etc.Thesourcetextalsocontainssometermsthatarenewlycoinedbythemedia,forexample,“tapertantrum”and“liftoff”,andthesetermsmightnotbefamiliartotheintendedChinesereaders.Anothercharacteristicofthesourcetextisthefrequentuseofnominalization.Nominalizationreferstotheuseofawordwhichisnotanounasanounorastheheadofanounphrase,withorwithoutmorphologicaltransformationanditisatypicalfeatureintheESP(Englishforspecialpurpose)texts.Example2:Similarly,thepersistenceofslowerproductivityandpotentialoutputgrowthcouldleadmarketstoanticipateamorerapidnarrowingoftheoutputgap,justifyingafasternormalizationofpolicyrates(Artetaetal.,2015,p14).“Thepersistenceofslowerproductivity”and“amorerapidnarrowingoftheoutputgap”aretheexamplesoftheapplicationofnominalizationinthesourcetext.5 Chapter3TheoreticalBasis,Difficulties,ProblemsandTheirSolutions3.1TheoreticalBasisFoundedinthe1970sinGerman,Functionalismisoneofthemostinfluentialschoolsoftranslationtheoryintheworld.TheoriesofFunctionalism,namely,thetheoryofaction,theSkopostheorieandthetheoryoftexttypesareappliedinthetranslationproject.Thetheoryofactionbelievesthattranslatingisacommunicativeactionandthusconsiderstheintendedtarget-textreceiverasadecisivefactorintheproductionofthetargettext.TheSkopostheorybelievesthat“theprimeprincipledetermininganytranslationprocessisthepurpose(Skopos)oftheoveralltranslationalaction”.(Nord,2002,p.27)Moreover,thecoherenceruleoftheSkopostheoryspecifiesthat“atranslationshouldbeacceptableinasensethatitiscoherentwiththereceivers’situation”(Nord,2002,p.32)andthefidelityrulerequiresthatthetargettextbearsarelationshipwiththesourcetext.AccordingtotheSkopostheory,intertextualcoherenceissubordinatetointratextualcoherenceandbotharecontrolledbytheSkoposrule.Asforthetheoryoftexttypes,accordingtoReiss,textscanbeclassifiedintothreetypesbasedontheirdominantcommunicativefunctions.Thethreetypesincludetheinformative,expressiveandoperativetext.Ontheotherhand,“textgenresorvarietiesareclassifiedaccordingtothelinguisticcharacteristicsorconventions(likethoseofreferencebook,lectures,satiresoradvertisements)”(Nord,2002,p.37).3.2TranslationDifficultiesandProblemsThemajordifficultiesthatthetranslatormetintheprocessoftranslationarefirst,choosingtheappropriatetranslationstrategyandsecond,translatingtheterminologies.Everytranslationprojectrequiresanappropriatetranslationstrategytoguidethetranslatorwhileheorsheistranslating.Thetranslatortookintoconsiderationthe6 intendedaddressees,theintendedfunctionsandthetexttypesofboththesourcetextandtargettextbeforeshedecidedontheappropriatestrategyanditwashardtoidentifytheseelementscorrectly.Thesourcetextisafinancialreportwhichcontainsmanyterminologies.Thetranslationofthoseterminologiesisverydifficultforthetranslatorduetoherlimitedfinancialexpertise.ThetranslatoralsofoundithardtosearchforthecorrecttranslationsofsometerminologiesonlinebecausetheInternetcontainsalotofinformationthatisnotnecessarilycorrect.3.3StrategiesandMethodsEmployedintheProcessofTranslation3.3.1CombinationofFreeandLiteralTranslationAcombinationofbothfreeandliteraltranslationservesasthetranslationstrategyoftheproject,because,accordingtotheSkopostheory,whetherasourcetextshouldbetranslatedfreelyorliterallyoranythingbetweenthesetwoextremesdependsonthepurposeforwhichthetranslationisneeded.TodecideontheSkoposofthetranslationproject,thetranslatorfirstlookedattheintendedaddresses,Skoposandtexttypeofthetargettext.ThetranslatorconsiderstheChinesewhoareinterestedineconomicpolicyastheintendedreceiversofthetargettext.Theremightbeadifferencebetweenthesourcetextandtargettextaddressees.SomeoftheintendedChinesereadersmightnotbefamiliarwiththenewly-coinedfinancialtermsthatappearinthesourcetext,forexample,“tapertantrum”.AsforitsSkoposofthetargettext,itistoinformthetarget-textreadersofthechangesinglobalconditionssincethetapertantrum,becauseonlytheexecutivesummary,chapterI,IIandIIIweretranslatedinthisproject.BasedonitsSkopos,thetargettextshouldbeaninformativefinancialreport.Therefore,theSkoposofthetranslationprojectistoproduceaninformativefinancialreportwhoseSkoposistoinformtheChinesewhoareinterestedineconomicpolicyofthechangesinglobalconditionssincethetapertantrum.7 Moreover,Reissbelievesthatthetexttypeofthetargettextcanhelpidentifythetranslationstrategyneededfortheproject.“Inatranslationwhereboththesourcetextsandthetargettextsareoftheinformativetype,thetranslatorshouldattempttogiveacorrectandcompleterepresentationofthesourcetext’scontentandshouldbeguided,intermsofstylisticchoices,bythedominantnormsofthetargetlanguageandculture(Nord,2002,pp.37-38)”.SomescholarsdistilledthedifferentstrategiestowardthedifferenttexttypesproposedbyReissasfollows:信息功能的文本：译文应充分传达原文的指代及观念内容，翻译应直白易懂，无累赘现象，必要时需要将原文显化(Informativetext:thetranslationshouldfullyconveythereferentialandconceptualcontentofthesourcetext.Thetranslationshouldbeplainandeasytounderstandwithoutanyredundanciesandtheexplicationofthesourcetextisacceptablewhennecessary)(李长栓,2014,p.11)。Basedonthesetheories,mostofthesourcetextshouldbetranslatedfreelyinplainChinesesoastomakeiteasyfortheintendedreaderstounderstandtheinformationitcontainsandmaintaincoherence.Ontheotherhand,thesourcetextis,afterall,aninformativefinancialreportsothattheliteraltranslationstrategycanbeappliedsometimestomakesuresomeinformationistranslatedcorrectlyandcompletely.3.3.2SequentialTranslationWhenthelinguisticformsofsomeEnglishsentencesareconsistentwiththoseoftheChinese,suchsentencescanbetranslatedintoChineseinitsoriginalwordorder.Example3:ST:ThisforcedmanyEFEstotightenmonetarypolicy,interveneincurrencymarkets,and,insomecases,introduceexceptionalmeasurestopreventcapitaloutflows(Artetaetal.,2015,p10).TT:这迫使很多新兴前沿经济体收紧货币政策、干预货币市场，一些国家甚至出台了非常规措施防止资本外流。8 Thesubject-verb-objectstructureoftheEnglishsentenceinthisexampleisinaccordwiththeChinesegrammarrulesandthuscanbetranslatedsequentially.Example4:ST:Theseexternalandcurrency-relatedvulnerabilitiesinEFEssuggestthatrapidshiftsincapitalflowsandcurrencymarketscanleadtosignificantpressuresontheirexternalbalances(Artetaetal.,2015,p18).TT:新兴前沿经济体的这些外部脆弱性和与货币有关的脆弱性表明：资本流动和货币市场快速变化可以给这些国家的外部均衡造成很大的压力。EnglishishypotacticwhileChineseisparatactic,therefore,someEnglishwords,especiallytheconjunctions,canbeomittedinatranslationprojectthataimstotranslatefromEnglishtoChinese.However,intheexample,theword“related”isretainedtomakesurethatthephrase“currency-relatedvulnerabilities”istranslatedcorrectly.3.3.3SubstitutionSomephrasesandwordswhichhavenodirectequivalentinChineseshouldbesubstitutedwithotherwordsorsometimesevensentencesthatconveythesamemeaningyetreadnaturalinChinesesoastomakesurethattheChinesereadersreceivethesameinformationasthereadersofthesourcetextandmaintainintratextualcoherence.Example5:ST:Financialmarketvolatilityduringthetighteningcyclecouldpotentiallycombinewithdomesticfragilitiesintoaperfectstormthatcouldleadtoasharpreductionincapitalflowstomorevulnerablecountries(Artetaetal.,2015,p5).TT:在利率收紧周期期间，金融市场动荡很可能与国内脆弱环节结合起来，演变成一场灾难，导致流向更多脆弱国家的资本流动大幅减少。Thephrase“perfectstorm”is“anexpressionthatdescribesaneventwhereararecombinationofcircumstanceswillaggravateasituationasituationdrastically”(The9 FreeDictionary.com).Literally,itcanbetranslatedinto“完美风暴”,aphrasethatisnotequivalentto“perfectstorm”.Ofcourse,atranslatorcouldtranslateitliterallyandthenexplainitsmeaninginafootnote.However,thesourcetextisafinancialreportwithaninformativeSkoposandthuswhatintendedreadersofthetargettextwanttolearnformthereportshouldbefinance-related.Thereforeitisunnecessarytotranslatethephraseliterally.A“free”versionofit(intheexample:“灾难”)ismorethanenoughtoconveywhattheauthorsintendedtoexpress.ZhuangYizhuan(2012,p.251)summarizedthatEnglishtendstoavoidrepetitionbysubstitutinganEnglishwordwithapronounwhenitneedstoberepeatedinonesentenceorutilizingothermeans.Ontheotherhand,itisquitecommoninChinesetouseacertainphrasecontinuously.Therefore,accordingtothe“coherentrule”,someEnglishpronounsshouldbesubstitutedwiththenameofwhatitreferstoinChinese.Example6:ST:Sincetheglobalfinancialcrisis,thepolicyaccommodationbytheU.S.FederalReservehashelpedsupportactivity,bolsteredassetvaluations,andreducedriskpremia.Inaddition,ithasbeeninstrumentalinloweringlong-terminterestratesintheUnitedStatesandotheradvancedeconomies(Artetaetal.,2015,p10).TT:自全球金融危机爆发以来，美国联邦储备系统宽松的货币政策帮助刺激了经济活动、提振了资产估值、降低了风险溢价。此外，美联储的宽松政策在降低美国和其他发达经济体的长期利率方面也发挥了重要作用。Intheexample,“it”referstothe“thepolicyaccommodationbytheU.S.FederalReserve”mentionedintheprevioussentence.Itistranslatedas“美联储的宽松政策(thepolicyaccommodationbyFed)”insteadof“它”toensurethetargettextreadsnaturalinChineseandthatthereadersareinformedofthecorrectmessage.3.3.4Conversion“英语倾向于多用名词，因而叙述呈静态，汉语倾向于多用动词，因而叙述呈动态(EnglishisstativeinthatittendstousenounswhileChineseisdynamicinthatittendstouseverbs)”(连淑能,1993,p.104).Someofthenominalizedwordsorphrasesinthesourcetextshouldbetranslatedintoverbswhentheyimpairthe10 interculturalcoherenceofthetargettext.Example7:ST:Moreover,deeperintegrationofEFEsininternationaldebtmarkets,andashiftfromcross-borderbanklendingtorecordbondissuancebysovereignsandcorporates,appeartohaveheightenedthesensitivityoflong-terminterestratesinEFEstoglobalbondyields(Artetaetal.,2015,p18).TT:此外，新兴前沿经济体更深一步地融入了国际债务市场；银行跨境借贷风光不再，而主权国家和公司发行债券的数量创历史新高，这些似乎加强了新兴前沿经济体长期利率对全球债券收益率的敏感性。ThenounphrasesintheexamplearealltranslatedfreelyintoverbstoconformtothesyntacticalrulesofChinese.Iftheyweretranslatedliterally,itwouldbelike:“此外，新兴前沿经济体在国际债务市场中的进一步融合以及从银行跨境借贷到由主权国家和公司的创历史新高的债券发行的转变，这些似乎增加了新兴前沿经济体的长期利率对全球债券收益率的敏感度”.SuchtranslationisweirdinChineseanditishardfortheChinesereaders,whoare,accordingtothetheoryofaction,thekeyfactordecidingtheproceduresoftranslation,tounderstand.Inthiscase,thetranslationfailstofulfilltheinformativeSkopos.Sometimesevenwhena“faithful”translationofthenounphrasesisacceptableinChinese,itisstillbettertotranslatethemintoverbs,becausebasedonthetheoryoftexttypes,translatorshouldbeguidedbythedominantnormsofthetargetlanguageandcultureintermsofthestylewhentranslatinganinformativetargettext.Example8:ST:However,afurtherstrengtheningoftheU.S.dollar,decliningoilpricesandconcernsaboutgrowthintherestoftheworldmaintainedU.S.longterminterestratesathistoricallylowlevels,hoveringinarangeofbetween2to2.2percent(Artetaetal.,2015,p15).TT:但是，美元进一步走强，油价持续下跌，世界其他国家的经济发展状况让人忧心忡忡，这使得美国长期利率保持在历史最低位，在2%到2.2%这一区间内浮动。Theexamplecouldbetranslatedas“但是，美元的进一步走强、不断下跌的油价以及对世界其他国家的增长的担忧让美国长期利率保持在历史最低位，在22%到2.2%这一区间内浮动”.However,suchtranslation,thoughcomprehensibletotheintendedreaders,stillreadsunauthenticinChineseandcan’tbecountedasquality11 translation.3.3.5RearrangementofInformationThelogicofChinesediffersfromthatofEnglishduetothedifferentthoughtpatternsofthetwocultures,hencethelogicorinformationarrangementofsomeEnglishsentencesmustbereconstructedtoconformtothelogicofChinese.Example9:ST:However,thereisariskthatU.S.long-termyieldssuddenlyspike,eitherdrivenbyanabruptriseintermpremiaorbyaclosingofthegapinpolicyrateexpectationsbetweenmarketsandFedpolicymakers(Artetaetal.,2015,p8).TT:但是，风险溢价或许会突然上涨，或者市场与美联储政策制定者对于政策利率的期待有望逐步统一，二者皆可让美国长期收益率有突然激增的风险。TheresultisusuallyputinfrontofthereasoninEnglishwhileitistheotherwayaroundinChinese,thereforethetranslatorreconstructedthesourcetexttomakeitaccordwiththelogicofChinese.3.3.6Division“连动句、流水句、短句是汉语的特点[Serialverbsentences(SVS),sentenceswritteninchroniclestyleandshortsentencescharacterizeChinese]”while“长句、复合句、复杂句是英语的特点(long,compoundandcomplexsentencescharacterizeEnglish)”(唐义均,2015,p.20).Thelong,compoundandcomplexsentencesinthesourcetextshouldbedividedintoshortersentencesinserialverbstructureorchroniclestyleinordertomakethetranslationauthenticandeasyforthereaderstounderstand.Example10:ST:The“tapertantrum”episodeofMay–June2013isapainfulreminderthatevenalong-anticipatedchangeinFedpoliciescansurprisemarketsinitsspecifics,andleadtosignificantfinancialmarketvolatilityanddisruptivemovementsincapitalflowstoEFEs(Artetaetal.,2015,p10).TT:2013年5、6月的“削减恐慌”依旧在残酷地提醒着人们：即使早已预期到美联储的政策会发生变化，但是改变一旦真正发生，其细节仍会让市场措手不及，进而导致金融市12 场剧烈动荡，新兴前沿经济体的资本流入出现波动。“没有标点符号的一气呵成的类似英语的那种长句在汉语里是不正常的（例如本句）(UnlikeEnglish,longsentenceswithoutbeingdividedbypunctuationsareabnormalinChinese)”(连淑能,1993,P.64).Iftheexamplewastranslatedas“2013年5、6月的削减恐慌依旧残酷地提醒着人们早已预期到要发生变化的美联储政策的细节依旧会让市场措手不及，进而导致严重的金融市场动荡和新兴前沿经济体资本流入的波动”,itwouldviolatethecoherenceruleoftheSkopostheoryandmightconfusethereaders.Example11:ST:ThejumpinU.S.yieldswasquicklyfollowedbyaspikeinfinancialmarketvolatilityinEFEs.TT:美国国债收益迅速大增，随后，新兴前沿经济体金融市场动荡加剧。Divisioncanbeemployedtotranslatenotonlythelongsentencesbutalsotheshortsentencestomakethetranslationbetter.3.3.7StepsofTranslatingTerminologiesAnotherdifficultyinthetranslationprojectisthetranslationofterminologies.ComparedwithEnglishforgeneralpurpose,oneofthemainfeaturesofEnglishforfinancialpurposeisthatitcontainsalargenumberoffinancialterminologiesanditisreflectedinthefollowingthreeaspects:first,somewordsthatarefrequentlyusedinEnglishforgeneralpurposehavespecialmeaningsinfinancialEnglish,forexample,share（股份、股票）andfutures（期货）,second,financialphrasesandacronymsarefrequentlyusedinthefinancialsourcetexts,forinstance,SDR(specialdrawingright)andthird,mathematicterminologiescouldalsoappearinfinancialEnglishsometimes.SuchterminologiesmustbetranslatedcorrectlysoastodelivercorrectandcomprehensiveinformationtotheintendedreadersoftheChineseversion.Hence,thetranslatormustmakesurethatboththeterminologiesandtherelatedcollocationare13 translatedcorrectly.Toachievethisgoal,atranslatorshouldaccumulateasmuchfinancialknowledgeaspossibleduringthepreparationforthetranslationproject.Inaddition,thefollowingprocedurescanalsoofferaninsightintohowtorealizethegoal:1.LookintoanEnglishfinancialdictionarytogetthemeaningofacertainterminology.2.LookintoanEnglish-Chinesedictionary,beitanonlineoneorapaperone,togettheChinesetranslationoftheterminology.3.Ifanonlinedictionaryisusedduringthetranslation,thetranslatorshouldbemindfulofthefactthatthesearchresultsofferedbyitarenotnecessarilycorrect,therefore,itisimperativethatthetranslatordouble-checktheresultsbyreadingasmanyresultsaspossibleandchoosingtheChinesetranslationsofferedbytheauthoritativewebsites.4.OnceaChinesetranslationoftheterminologyislocated,typeitintoasearchenginetosearchforallthenewsorinformationwritteninChinesesoastogetfamiliarwithitsChinesecollocation.Example12:ST:Sincetheglobalfinancialcrisis,thepolicyaccommodationbytheU.S.FederalReservehashelpedsupportactivity,bolsteredassetvaluations,andreducedriskpremia.TT:自全球金融危机爆发以来，美国联邦储备系统宽松的政策帮助刺激了经济活动、提振了资产估值、降低了风险溢价。Theword“bolster”meansto“improvesomethingormakeitstronger”(OxfordAdvancedLearner’sEnglish-ChineseDictionary,2004,p.176).However,inthiscase,itcannotbetranslatedas“提高”or“改善”.ItwouldbeconfusingtotheChinesereaderssincethecorrectcollocationshouldbe“提振资产估值”.Example13:ST:moreover,inflationinoilimportershasgenerallyfallen,allowingcentralbanksinsomecountriestoreducemonetarypolicyratestosupportgrowth.TT:此外，石油进口国的通货膨胀率普遍下降，这让一些国家的央行可以减少货币政策利率，支持发展。14 Iftranslatedliterally,“inflationinoilimportershasgenerallyfallen”shouldbe“石油进口国的通货膨胀下降”.ItmightbecomprehensibletotheChinesereaders,butthemorefrequentlyusedcollocationis“通货膨胀率下降”.Therefore,thesourcetextshouldbetranslatedinto“石油进口国的通货膨胀率普遍下降”eventhoughtheword“rate”isnotcontainedinthesourcetext.15 Chapter4Summary4.1LessonsLearnedfromtheTranslationPracticeThetranslatorlearntthefollowinglessonsthroughthistranslationproject:first,encyclopediaknowledgeisessentialtotranslation.Atranslatorshouldtrytoaccumulateasmuchencyclopediaknowledgeaspossibleinordertodelivercorrectandqualitytranslationtargettexts;second,asatranslatorlivingintheinformationera,oneshouldknowhowtousealltheonlinetoolsandresourcestoassisthimorher,forexample,inthistranslationproject,thetranslatorresortedtoYoudaoonlinedictionary,Wikipedia,Investopediaetc.;third,translationtheoryisfundamentaltoatranslationproject.Thetranslationtheoryguidingatranslationproject,ifselectedappropriately,canhelpthetranslatorovercomealmostallthedifficultiesduringtranslating;forth,atranslatorshouldknowandbefamiliarwiththedifferencebetweenChineseandEnglishbeforeheorshecanproducetranslationworksthatarewritteninnaturalandauthenticChineseandfifth,atranslatorshouldconstantlyreviewandimprovehisorherworksuntilthelastminutebygoingoverthetranslationmultipletimesoraskingforotherpeople’shelp.4.2ProblemtoBeSolved.Despitethetranslator’sgreatefforts,thetargettextstillfallsshortofperfectionandtherearestillsomeproblemstobesolved.First,thetranslatormayfailtotransliterateproperlythenamesofsomeauthorsandofficialswhoseworksorstatementsarecitedinthetextbecausesomeofthesenamesarenotwritteninEnglish,forexample,“Gruić”.16 ReferencesArtetaC.,Kose,M.,OhnsorgeF.&StockerM.(2015).TheComingU.S.InterestRateTighteningCycle:SmoothSailingorStormyWaters?(p.2).Washington:WorldBankGroup.Curry,J.E.(2009).InternationalEconomics.Shanghai:ShanghaiForeignLanguageEducationPress.MundayJ.(2001).IntroducingTranslationStudies:TheoriesandApplications.NewYork:RoutledgeNewmark,P.(2009).ATextbookofTranslation(p.40).Shanghai:ShanghaiForeignLanguageEducationPress.Nord,C.(2001).TranslatingasaPurposefulActivity:FunctionalistApproachesExplained(pp.27~.62).Shanghai:ShanghaiForeignLanguageEducationPress.NorvingerTracy.(2001)InterculturalCommunication:aPracticalGuide.Austin:UniversityofTexasPress.OxfordAdvancedLearner’sEnglish-ChineseDictionary(2014).Beijing:TheCommercialPress&OxfordUniversityPress.TheFreeDictionary[on-line],November,2015.Available:http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/perfect+storm.冯长甫.(2007).金融英语翻译探讨.上海翻译，2007（3），21-22.李长栓.(2004).非文学翻译理论与实践（11）.北京：中国对外翻译出版社公司.李长栓&施晓菁.(2012).理解与表达——汉英翻译案例讲评.北京：外文出版社.连淑能.（1993）.英汉对比研究（64-104）.北京：高等教育出版社.刘香琼.（2012）英语名词化的特点及翻译.学科教育学报，2012（2），116-117.唐义均.（2015）.汉英翻译技巧示例（20）.北京：外文出版社.庄绎传.（2012）.英汉翻译简明教程（251）.北京：外语教学与研究出版社.17 AppendixⅠ:SourceTextTheComingU.S.InterestRateTighteningCycle:SmoothSailingorStormyWaters?EXECUTIVESUMMARYContext:along-anticipatedevent,butstillwithsubstantialrisks.Sincetheglobalfinancialcrisis,theexceptionallyaccommodativemonetarypolicystanceoftheU.S.FederalReserve(Fed)hashelpedsupportactivity,bolsteredassetvaluations,andreducedriskpremia.Inaddition,ithasbeeninstrumentalinboostingcapitalflowstoemergingandfrontiermarketeconomies(EFEs).AstheU.S.economyimproves,theFedisexpectedtostartraisingpolicyinterestratesinthenearterm(aneventwidelyreferredtoas“liftoff”)andthuscommenceatighteningcycleforthefirsttimeinnearlyadecade.Themid-2013“tapertantrum”episodeisapainfulreminderthatevenalong-anticipatedchangeinFedpoliciescansurprisemarketsinitsspecifics,andleadtosignificantfinancialmarketvolatilityanddisruptivemovementsincapitalflowstoEFEs.RecentdebateshavefocusedonthepotentialimpactoftheliftoffonEFEs,buttherearealsosignificantrisksassociatedwiththepaceofsubsequentrateincreases,whichiscurrentlyexpectedtobeverygradual,butcouldaccelerateatatimewhenEFEpolicybuffersareeroding.ThisPolicyResearchNotepresentsacomprehensiveanalysisofthechangesinglobalconditionssincethetapertantrum,risksofdisruptionsduringtheupcomingFedtighteningcycle,potentialimplicationsforEFEs,andpolicyoptions.Specifically,itaddressesthefollowingquestions:Howhavegrowthprospectsandpoliciesinadvancedcountrieschangedsincethetapertantrum?HowhavegrowthprospectsandvulnerabilitiesinEFEschangedsincethetapertantrum?WhatarethemajorrisksassociatedwiththetighteningcycleforEFEs?WhatpolicyoptionsareavailableforEFEstocopewiththepotentiallyadverseeffectsofthetighteningcycle?18 Gradualhealinginadvancedeconomies.ActivityintheUnitedStatescontinuestopickup,andlabormarketsarestrengthening.Whiletherecoveryremainsfragileinothermajoradvancedeconomies,ithasgraduallyfirmedsince2013(Figure1).Despitetherecentvolatility,globallong-terminterestratesremainlow,andtheEuropeanCentralBankandtheBankofJapanarecontinuingtoemployexceptionallyaccommodativemonetarypolicies.GrowingvulnerabilitiesinEFEs.Sincethetapertantrum,EFEgrowthprospectsandcreditworthinesshavedeteriorated,whilevulnerabilitieshaveriseninmanycountries(Figure1).Domesticvulnerabilities.ActivityhasslowedinmanyEFEs,andgrowthin2015isexpectedtobetheweakestsincethefinancialcrisis.Onaverage,privatedebthasincreasedandfiscalpositionshavegenerallydeteriorated.Externalvulnerabilities.Currentaccountbalancesamongseveraloilimportingcountrieshaveimprovedsomewhatbuttheyhavedeterioratedamongmanyoilexporters.EFEswithhighlevelsoftotalexternaldebtorwithalargeshareofshort-termexternaldebthavemadeonlylimitedprogressinreducingsuchvulnerabilities.ForeigncurrencyexposuresremainelevatedinsomeEFEs.Corporatedebthasincreasednotablyinseveralcountries,withasignificantsharedenominatedindollars.Baseline:asmoothtighteningcycle.TherearemultiplereasonstoexpectasmoothtighteningcyclewithonlymodestimpactonEFEs:Thetighteningcyclehaslongbeenanticipatedandwillmostlikelyproceedverygradually.ItwilltakeplaceinthecontextofarobustU.S.economy,which,accordingtoavectorautoregressionanalysis,willhavepositiverealspilloverstoEFEs.ThetermspreadintheUnitedStatesislikelytoremainnarrowashappenedduringsomeofthepasttighteningepisodes.Othermajorcentralbanksareexpectedtocontinuepursuingexceptionallyaccommodativepoliciesthatwouldshoreupgloballiquidityandhelpkeepglobal19 interestrateslow.Significantrisksaroundthebaseline.Thetighteningcyclecarriessignificantrisks.FivefactorsheightentheriskofvolatilityinfinancialmarketswithadverseimplicationsforactivityinEFEs:UncertaintyabouttheunderlyingstrengthoftheU.S.economycreatesambiguityabouthowfartheFedactuallyisfromachievingitsdualobjectives.U.S.termpremiaarewellbelowtheirhistoricalaverageandcouldcorrectabruptly.MarketexpectationsoffutureinterestratesarebelowthoseoftheU.S.FederalOpenMarketCommittee.Marketliquidityconditionsarefragile.AnincreasinglychallengingexternalenvironmentiserodingEFEresilience:globalgrowthissoft,worldtradegrowthissubdued,andcommoditypricesremainlow.Riskofalargedeclineincapitalflows.MovementsinU.S.yieldsplayasignificantroleindrivingfluctuationsincapitalflowstoEFEs.IfthetighteningcyclewereaccompaniedbyasurgeinU.S.long-termyields,ashappenedduringthetapertantrum,thereductionincapitalflowstoEFEscouldbesubstantial(Figure2).Accordingtoavectorautoregressionmodel,a100basispointjumpinU.S.long-termyields(asoccurredduringthetapertantrum)couldtemporarilyreduceaggregatecapitalflowstoEFEsbyupto2.2percentagepointoftheircombinedGDP.SuchalargedropincapitalflowscouldcreatesignificantpolicychallengesforvulnerableEFEs.Aperfectstorm?FinancialstressinglobalmarketstendstodisproportionatelyaffectthoseEFEsthathaveweakgrowthprospects,sizablevulnerabilities,andchallengingpolicyenvironments.Financialmarketvolatilityduringthetighteningcyclecouldpotentiallycombinewithdomesticfragilitiesintoaperfectstormthatcouldleadtoasharpreductionincapitalflowstomorevulnerablecountries.Overtime,thisriskcouldintensifyasmodestgrowthprospectsbecomeentrenchedandvulnerabilitieswideninsomemajorEFEs.Furthermore,anabruptchangeinriskappetiteforEFEassetscouldleadtocontagionaffectingcapitalflowstomanycountries,evenif20 theyhavelimitedvulnerabilities.ThiscouldturnamanageableslowdownincapitalinflowstoEFEsintoanepisodeofmultiplesuddenstops,withsignificantadverseimplicationsforgrowthandfinancialstability.AneventstudyexercisesuggeststhatgrowthinEFEsdeclines,onaverage,almost7percentagepointsinthetwoyearsfollowingsuchsuddenstopepisodes.Policyoptions:hopingforthebestbutpreparingfortheworst.EFEsshouldprioritizemonetaryandfiscalpoliciesthatreducevulnerabilitiesandstrengthenpolicycredibilityandstructuralpolicyagendasthatcanimprovegrowth.Incountriesfacingelevatedinflation,buttressingmonetarypolicycredibilitymaybeapriority.Bankswithlargeforeigncurrencyliabilitiesmaymeritclosemonitoring.Fiscalpolicycansupportgrowthifsufficientfiscalspaceisavailable.Althoughthebenefitsofstructuralreformstaketimetomaterialize,decisiveactionstoimplementambitiousreformagendassignallikelyimprovementsingrowthprospectstoinvestors.Intheeventthatriskssurroundingtheupcomingtighteningcyclematerialize,exchangerateflexibilitycouldbuffershocksinsomecountriesbutmayneedtobecomplementedbymonetarypolicymeasuresandtargetedinterventionstosupportorderlymarketfunctioning.Emergingandfrontiermarketeconomiesmayhopeforthebestduringtheupcomingtighteningcyclebut,giventhesubstantialrisksinvolved,theyneedtopreparefortheworst.21 Figure1.AchangingglobaleconomiclandscapeDespiterecentvolatility,globallong-terminterestratesremainlow.U.S.economyactivitycontinuestopickupandU.S.labormarketsarestrengthening.Conditionsinotheradvancedeconomiesarealsoimprovingbutremainfragile.Ontheotherhand,growthprospectsandcreditworthinessinemergingandfrontiermarkets(EFEs)havedeteriorated,whilebothdomesticandexternalvulnerabilitieslinger.Source:IMF,Haver,WorldBank.A.Averageof10-yeargovernmentbondyieldsofG3countries(EuroArea,Japan,andUnitedKingdom)weightedbyGDP.BluebarshowsthetapertantrumperiodinMay-June2013.Lastobservation:September,2015.C.G3GDPgrowthreferstoaggregateGDPgrowthintheEuroArea,Japan,andUnitedKingdom.2015isforecast.D.Thesovereignratingiscalculatedbasedonthesimpleaverageoflong-termforeign-currencycreditratingsofcountriesbyStandard&Poor’sRatingService.AdeclineintheEMcurrencyindexdenotesadepreciation.E.F:barsstandformedianvaluesacross24EFEsaslistedinFigure9and10.Latestvaluesare2014H2forprivatedebt,2015estimatesforgovernmentdebt,2015H1forcurrentaccountbalances,2014forexternaldebt.22 Figure2.RisksaroundthetighteningcycleShouldthetighteningcycleproceedsmoothly,theU.S.termspreadcouldremainnarrowasinsomepastepisodes,butcurrenciesinEFEswouldlikelystayunderpressure.However,thereisariskthatU.S.long-termyieldssuddenlyspike,eitherdrivenbyanabruptriseintermpremiaorbyaclosingofthegapinpolicyrateexpectationsbetweenmarketsandFedpolicymakers.AsurgeinU.S.yieldscouldleadtoasubstantialdropinEFEcapitalflows,increasingtheriskofsuddenstopsinvulnerablecountries.Source:IMF,HaverAnalytics,Bloomberg,FederalReserveBankofNewYork,WorldBank.A.Termspreaddenotesthedifferencebetween10-yearU.S.Treasuryand6-monthT-billyields.B.Adeclinedenotesadepreciationofthenominaleffectiveexchangerate.Thex-axisshowsthenumberofmonhtsbeforeandaftert=0,wheret=0isFebruary1994,June1999,June2004,andMay2013.C.TermpremiumestimatesobtainedfromthemodeldescribedinAdrian,Crump,andMoench(2013b).Lastobservation:August2015.D.The100bpshockontheU.S.termspreadwasappliedtotheVARmodelassumingarangeofpass-throughratestoEuro23 Area,U.K.andJapanesebondyields,fromzeroto100percent.Greyareashowstherangeofestimatedeffectsoncapitalinflowsdependingonpass-throughrates(thelowerboundcorrespondstoazeropass-throughrate,implyinga40basispointsshocktoglobalbondyields,whiletheupperboundcorrespondstoa100percentpass-throughrates,ora100basispointsshocktoglobalbondyields).Inthemediancase,globalbondyieldsincreaseinitiallyby70bp,whichcorrespondstotheobservedpass-throughrateduringthetapertantrum.E.F.BluelinedenotesaveragesforEFEsthatexperiencedsystemicsuddenstops.Redandorangelinesdenote75thand25thpercentiles.Asystemicsuddenstopisaperiodwhencapitalflowsfallonestandarddeviationbelowtheirhistoricalmeanand,atthesametime,theVIXindexsurpassesbyonestandarddeviationitshistoricalmean.Thecalculationsinclude21nonconsecutivesystemicsuddenstopepisodesfor58EFEsin1995-2014.F.Adeclinedenotesadepreciation.24 “Wefaceariskthatlonger-terminterestrateswillrisesharplyatsomepoint.”(BenBernanke,formerFederalReserveChair,March1,2013a)“Amorepracticalsolution,atleastfornow,wouldbeforsource-countrycentralbankstoreinterprettheirmandatestoconsiderthemedium-termeffectsofrecipientcountries’policyresponses,suchassustainedexchange-rateintervention.”(RaghuramRajan,GovernoroftheReserveBankofIndia,April28,2014a)“WhiletighteningcyclesbytheFedcanposechallengesforemergingmarketeconomies(EMEs),theseneednotbedisruptive.”(WilliamDudley,FederalReserveBankofNewYorkPresident,April20,2015)“Long-terminterestratesareatverylowlevels,andthatwouldappeartoembodylowtermpremiums,whichcanmove,andcanmoveveryrapidly…”(JanetYellen,FederalReserveChair,May6,2015a)“IftheeconomycontinuestoimproveasIexpect,Ithinkitwillbeappropriateatsomepointthisyeartotaketheinitialsteptoraisethefederalfundsratetarget.”(JanetYellen,FederalReserveChair,May22,2015)“Theactualraisingofpolicyratescouldtriggerfurtherboutsofvolatility,butmybestestimateisthatthenormalizationofourpolicyshouldprovemanageablefortheEMEs.”(StanleyFischer,FederalReserveViceChairman,May26,2015)“Ithinktheanticipationoftheliftoffiscreatingmorevolatility[thantheeventitself].Ithinkwhenitactuallyhappens,conditionswillstabilize.”(ZetiAkhtarAziz,GovernoroftheBankNegaraMalaysia,August7,2015)“We…needtobemindfulthattheuncertaintiessurroundingtheUSFederalReserve"smonetarypolicynormalization…couldheightenfinancialmarketvolatilityathomeandabroad.”(JuyeolLee,GovernoroftheBankofKorea,June12,2015)“[T]heFed’sexitfromzeropolicyrateswillcauseseriousproblemsforthoseemergingmarketeconomiesthathavelargeinternalandexternalborrowingneeds,largestocksofdollar-denominateddebt,andmacroeconomicandpolicyfragilities.”(NourielRoubini,ChairmanofRoubiniGlobalEconomics,June29,2015)“Inahighlyuncertainworld,theFedcannotbebothdatadependentandpredictablewithrespecttoitsfutureactions.Muchbetterthatitstickwithdatadependencethanthatitputitscredibilityatriskby25 seekingtomitigateacurrentrashactionbytryingtoreassurewithrespecttofuturesteps.”(LawrenceSummers,FormerU.S.TreasurySecretary,September9,2015)26 Ⅰ.INTRODUCTIONSincetheglobalfinancialcrisis,thepolicyaccommodationbytheU.S.FederalReservehashelpedsupportactivity,bolsteredassetvaluations,andreducedriskpremia.Inaddition,ithasbeeninstrumentalinloweringlong-terminterestratesintheUnitedStatesandotheradvancedeconomies.Asinvestorssearchforhigheryields,thispolicyaccommodationhasalsocontributedtoanincreaseincapitalinflowstoemergingandfrontiermarketeconomies(EFEs—roughlyspeaking,developingcountrieswitheithersubstantialorpartialaccesstointernationalcapitalmarkets).Asaresult,borrowingconditionsinEFEshaveremainedparticularlyfavorable.AstheU.S.economyimproves,theFedisexpectedtostartraisingpolicyinterestratesinthenearterm(aneventwidelyreferredtoas“liftoff”)andthuscommenceatighteningcycle.ThiswouldbethefirstincreaseinU.S.policyratessince2006.SincethetighteningcyclehasbeenwidelyanticipatedandwilltakeplacegraduallyinthecontextofarobustU.S.economy,itisexpectedtohaveabenignimpactoncapitalinflowstoEFEs(Fischer2015).However,thetimeframeofthetighteningcycleremainsuncertainandvulnerabilitiesinmanyEFEshavebeenrisingespeciallyoverthepasttwoyears.The“tapertantrum”episodeofMay–June2013isapainfulreminderthatevenalong-anticipatedchangeinFedpoliciescansurprisemarketsinitsspecifics,andleadtosignificantfinancialmarketvolatilityanddisruptivemovementsincapitalflowstoEFEs.Thisepisodewassparkedbyastatementthatbecameknownas“tapertalk,”whenFedChairmanBenBernankementionedthepossibilityoftheFedslowingitsassetpurchases“inthenextfewmeetings”onMay22,2013(Bernanke2013b).Whilefinancialmarketshadexpectedsuchanactionatsomepointinthefuture,theyweresurprisedbythementionofanapproximatetimeframe.Withinacouplemonthsoftheinitialtapertalk,U.S.10-yearTreasuryyieldsincreasedby10027 basispoints.ThejumpinU.S.yieldswasquicklyfollowedbyaspikeinfinancialmarketvolatilityinEFEs.Specifically,EFEcurrenciesdepreciated,bondspreadsrosesteeply,foreignportfolioinflowstoEFEbondandequityfundsfellsharply,andliquiditytightened,whilethevolatilityinbondmarketsandcapitalflowsintensified.ThisforcedmanyEFEstotightenmonetarypolicy,interveneincurrencymarkets,and,insomecases,introduceexceptionalmeasurestopreventcapitaloutflows.TheupcomingtighteningcyclewilltakeplaceinachallengingenvironmentforEFEs,markedbyweakglobalgrowth,subduedworldtrade,andlowcommodityprices,aswellasheightenedfinancialmarketvolatilityandconcernsaboutgrowthprospectsinmajoremergingmarkets.Inthiscontext,thepotentialimpactofthetighteningcycleoncapitalflowstoEFEsdependsonboth“push”factors(economicandfinancialconditionsinadvancedeconomies)and“pull”factors(country-specificprospects,vulnerabilities,andpolicies).Pushfactors.AsgrowthprospectsimproveinadvancedcountriesrelativetoEFEs,investmentreturnsarelikelytoriseandadvancedcountrymonetarypolicieswillbecomegraduallylessaccommodative.AlthoughpositivegrowthspilloversfromadvancedcountrieswouldsupportactivityinEFEs,higherinterestrateswouldlikelyshifttherelativereturndifferentialonfinancialassetsinfavorofadvancedcountries.Pullfactors.WhileEFEsasagroupcontinuetogrowfasterthanadvancedeconomies,prospectshavesoftenedandseveralEFEsfacesignificantvulnerabilities.Insomeofthem,uncertaintyaboutpolicydirectioniselevatedandweighingoninvestorsentiment.ThesefactorsincreasethelikelihoodofasuddenmarketreappraisaloftheinherentriskinessofEFEfinancialassets.ThisPolicyResearchNotepresentsacomprehensiveanalysisofthechangesinthemajorpushandpullfactorssincethetapertantrum,risksofdisruptionsduringtheupcomingFedtighteningcycle,potentialimplicationsforEFEs,andpossiblepolicyoptions.Specifically,itaddressesthe28 followingfourquestions:Howhavegrowthprospectsandpoliciesinadvancedcountrieschangedsincethetapertantrum?HowhavegrowthprospectsandvulnerabilitiesinEFEschangedsincethetapertantrum?WhatarethemajorrisksassociatedwiththetighteningcycleforEFEs?WhatpolicyoptionsareavailableforEFEscopewiththepotentiallyadverseeffectsofthetighteningcycle?Ⅱ.GROWTHPROSPECTSANDPOLICIESINADVANCEDCOUNTRIESSincethetapertantrum,therehavebeennotablechangesineconomicconditionsinadvancedeconomiesandinthepolicystanceofsomemajorcentralbanks.A.AchangingeconomiclandscapeAdvanced-economygrowth,monetarypolicy,andbroaderfinancialconditionsarekeyglobalpushfactorsdrivingcapitalflowstoEFEs.Theeconomicandpolicycontextinadvancedcountrieshasevolvednotablysincethetapertantrum(Figure3).29 Figure3.ConditionsinadvancedcountriesLong-terminterestratesacrossmajoradvancedeconomiesremainathistoriclows.GlobalfinancialmarketshavebeenbolsteredbyaprolongedperiodofmonetarypolicyaccommodationintheUnitedStates,followedrecentlybymoreexpansionarymonetarypoliciesbytheEuropeanCentralBankandBankofJapan.TheU.S.economyisstrengthening,withlabormarketshealingandcreditconditionsimproving,whileotheradvancedeconomiesareexperiencingamorefragilerecovery.Reflectingincreasinglydivergentmonetarypoliciesacrossmajorreservecurrencies,theU.S.dollarhasappreciatedmarkedlysincemid-2014.20082009201020112012201320142015Jan-2013May-2013Oct-2013Apr-2014Aug-2014Jan-2015Jun-2015Source:Bloomberg,Haver,WorldBank.A.Averageof10-yeargovernmentbondyieldsofG3countries(EuroArea,Japan,andUnitedKingdom)weightedbyGDP.BluebarshowsthetapertantrumperiodinMay-June2013.Lastobservation:September8,2015.B.Greyareashowstheforecastperiod.Lastobservation:August,2015.C.G3GDPgrowthreferstoaggregateGDPgrowthintheEuroArea,Japan,andUnitedKingdom.30 D.BluebarshowsthetapertantrumperiodinMay-June2013.Lastobservation:August2015.E.AverageofcreditstoprivatesectorsofG3countries(EuroArea,Japan,andUnitedKingdom)weightedbyGDP.Lastobservation:July2015.F.Lastobservation:September,2015a)Persistentlylowinterestrates.Policyratesofmajorcentralbanksremainatornearzero—and,insomecases,belowzero(WorldBank2015b).DespitetheapproachingtighteningcycleintheUnitedStates,long-terminterestratesinmajoreconomiesarestillexceptionallylow.TheselowrateshavebeenaccompaniedbyfurtherpolicyaccommodationbytheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB)andtheBankofJapan,whichcontinuetoseekasignificantexpansionoftheirbalancesheets.MonetarystimulusmeasuresbythesecentralbanksshouldcontinuetoshoreupgloballiquidityandhelpkeepglobalinterestrateslowevenastheU.S.startsraisingpolicyrates.b)GatheringmomentumfortheU.S.economy.Since2013,theU.S.economyhasfurtherstrengthened,withgrowthaboveitsaverageofthepast15yearsandcontinuingtooutperformotheradvancedeconomies.U.S.labormarketshaveimprovednotablysincethetapertantrum.ThissuggeststhatfulfillmentoftheFed’s“fullemployment”mandatedoesnotstandinthewayofanearingliftoff(Yellen2015c).c)Anongoingbutfragilerecoveryinotheradvancedeconomies.Althoughtherecoveryinothermajoradvancedeconomiesfirmedsince2013—supportedbyaccommodativemonetarypolicy,currencydepreciation,lowoilprices,andslowingfiscalconsolidation—itremainsfragile,assuggestedbyrecentindicatorsfromtheEuroAreaandJapan.Moreover,banklendingconditionsandcredittonon-financialcorporationsandhouseholdshaveexperiencedonlymodestimprovementsacrossothermajoradvancedeconomies.Oneofthemostremarkabledevelopmentssincethetapertantrumhasbeenthesharprun-upofthevalueofthedollaragainstmostmajorcurrencies.Reflectinginparttheasynchronousnatureofmonetarypolicystancesamongmajorcentralbanks,theU.S.dollarhasappreciatedmorethan15percentinnominaleffectivetermssincemid-2013,whiletheeuroandyendepreciatedsignificantlyoverthesameperiod.Totheextentthatthebroad-baseddollarappreciationreflectsstronggrowthintheUnitedStatesandprospectsofsuccessfulmonetarypolicyaccommodation31 intheEuroAreaandJapan,developmentsacrossmajorreservecurrenciessince2013shouldbesupportiveofglobaleconomicrecovery(WorldBank2015b).However,thereisariskthatthedollarappreciationismorethanwarrantedbyimprovedU.S.growthprospects,orthataweakeningEuroandYendonotre-invigorateactivityintheEuroAreaandJapanasexpected.Inthiscase,astrongdollarmighthampergrowthamongadvancedeconomies.AswediscussbelowinSectionIII,itmayalsoaddconsiderablechallengestoEFEs.B.ShiftingdriversofU.S.longtermyieldsGoingforward,ariseinU.S.long-termyieldscouldreflecteithercontinuedimprovementsintheU.S.economy,withpotentiallypositivegrowthspilloversfortherestoftheworld,oralternativelyreflectchangesinmarketexpectationsregardingU.S.monetarypolicyormedium-terminflationrisks.ContinuedimprovementsinU.S.activity(afavorable“realshock”),especiallyifsurprisinglyrepeatedontheupside,couldbolsterequityvaluationsandwouldreducetheneedforthehighlyaccommodativemonetarypolicystance.Intandemwithrisingreturnsonequity,bondpricescouldfallandyieldscouldriseonmarketexpectationsofnearingmonetarytightening.Alternatively,financialmarketscouldbesurprisedbyevenamodestlylessaccommodativestanceofmonetarypolicy:itcouldappearasanacceleratedtighteningtoinvestorsiftheirviewsabouttheU.S.economydifferfromtheFed’s(anadverse“monetaryshock”).Similarly,thepersistenceofslowerproductivityandpotentialoutputgrowthcouldleadmarketstoanticipateamorerapidnarrowingoftheoutputgap,justifyingafasternormalizationofpolicyrates.Astructuralvectorautoregression(VAR)modelisemployedtodisentanglethecontributionofrealandmonetaryshockstomovementsinthelong-termU.S.yields:thoseassociatedwith32 changesinU.S.growthprospects(proxiedbytheS&P500index),andthosereflectingchangesinmarketperceptionsofU.S.monetaryconditions(proxiedbythe10-yearsovereignbondyield).Theexerciseassumesthatanadversemonetaryshock(suchasperceivedacceleratedmonetarytightening)increasesyieldsandreducesstockpricesintheUnitedStates,whileafavorablerealshock(suchasonereflectingbettergrowthprospects)increasesbothyieldsandstockprices(seeBox1fortechnicaldetails).Theresultssuggestthattheinitialincreaseinlong-termyieldsafterMay2013largelyreflectedunfavorablemonetaryshocks:againstthebackdropofconcernsaboutthestrengthoftheU.S.economy,financialmarketsperceivedthetaper-talkassignalinganacceleratedtighteningofmonetaryconditions(Figure4).Inearly2013,economicdatareleasessurprisedonthedownsideandprovidedlittleindicationthatsuggestedsufficientlystrongU.S.growthmomentumtowarrantrisinglong-termbondyields.Asaresult,realshockscontributedlittletomovementsin10-yearU.S.bondyields.Sincethetapertantrum,however,perceivedmonetaryshocks,reflectingbothdomesticandexternalfactors,haveturnedincreasinglyfavorable.FinancialconditionsremainedhighlyaccommodativeevenasFedassetpurchaseswereunwoundbetweenDecember2013andOctober2014,revealingthattheexpectedimpactoftaperinghadbeenalreadypricedin.Inlate2014,perceivedmonetaryshocksbegantopushyieldsbelowMay2013levels.FollowingECBPresidentMarioDraghi’sspeechinJacksonHoleinAugust2014,marketspeculationintensifiedandwaseventuallyprovenrightabouttheuseofECB’squantitativeeasing.ThedeclineinEuroArealong-termbondyieldsalsospilledovertoU.S.long-termbondyields.33 Figure4.MovementsinU.S.bondyields:monetaryandrealshocksThesuddenriseinU.S.longtermyieldsafterMay2013wasmainlyduetoadverse“monetaryshocks,”asmarketsinterpretedtapertalkassignalingacceleratedmonetarytightening.Sincethen,marketexpectationsofaverygradualtighteningcyclecontributedtokeepingyieldslow,offsettingupwardpressurefrompositive“realshocks”reflectingthestrengtheninglabormarketsandimprovingrealU.S.activity.20132014201420142014201520152015ygypNovFebMaAuNovFebMaSeSource:Haver,WorldBankestimates.A.Long-terminterestrateisthe10-yearU.S.TreasuryyieldandstockpricereferstotheS&P500.Lastobservation:September2015.B.Basedonestimatesfromthemodel,identifyingmonetaryandrealshocksusingsignrestrictions.Allshocksexcepttheshockinfocusareshutdownbysettingthemtozerosandthemodelisusedtotraceoutthecounterfactuallongrate.Theexerciseisperformedseparatelyformonetaryandrealshocks.Theorange(green)counterfactualshowshowlongrateswouldhaveevolvedonlywiththeestimatedmonetary(real)shocks.Numbersshownareinpercentagepoints.Lastobservation:September2015.C.D.ThesearethetimeseriesofmonetaryandrealshocksasestimatedfromtheVARmodel.Numbersshownareincumulativepercentages.Theshocksignsaresuchthatwheneverpositive,theyresultinaanincreaseinthelongrate.Lastobservation:September2015.Atthesametime,indicationsofanincreasinglyrobustlabormarketscontributedtopositiverealshocksthatexertedupwardpressureonlong-termyields.Sincereachingamultiyearlowof1.6percentinJanuary2015,U.S.longterminterestrateshaverecoveredsomewhat,aslabormarketconditionscontinuedtoimproveandyieldsin34 Europebouncedbackfollowingunusuallylowlevelsinpreviousmonths.However,afurtherstrengtheningoftheU.S.dollar,decliningoilpricesandconcernsaboutgrowthintherestoftheworldmaintainedU.S.longterminterestratesathistoricallylowlevels,hoveringinarangeofbetween2to2.2percent.35 III.GROWTHPROSPECTSANDVULNERABILITIESINEMERGINGANDFRONTIERMARKETS(EFEs)Althoughsomeofthe“push”factorsemanatingfromadvancedeconomiesgenerallyremainsupportiveforEFEs,andevenifthedriversofU.S.long-termyieldsaremorebenigncomparedtomid-2013,theupcomingFedtighteningcyclewilltakeplaceinanincreasinglychallengingglobalenvironmentforEFEs.First,globalGDPgrowthhaspersistentlydisappointedinthepastfewyears,withmultipleforecastdowngradessince2012(Figure5).Second,growthinworldtradehasalsobeensubduedinrecentyears,withbothcyclicalandstructuralfactorsaccountingforthemarkedpost-crisisslowdown(WorldBank2015a).Third,commoditypriceshaveexperiencedasubstantialdeclineoflate.Furthermore,recentspikesinglobalfinancialmarketvolatilitysuggestthatmarketparticipantsareincreasinglyconcernedaboutweakeninggrowthprospectsinsomemajoremergingmarkets.Figure5.AchallengingglobalcontextTheexternalenvironmentforEFEsisincreasinglychallenging.Amoderateupturninadvancedeconomiesisongoing,butprospectsofadurableglobalrecoveryhavebeenrepeatedlydisappointinginrecentyears,worldtraderemainsonaweakpost-crisistrend,anddecliningcommoditypricesareputtingcommodityexportersunderpressure.36 Source:WorldBank,WorldTradeMonitor.B.Lastobservation:June2015.C.Lastobservation:August2015.Whileglobalfactors,includingU.S.long-termyields,mayaffectEFEcapitalflows,countryspecific“pull”factors,includingmacroeconomicfundamentalsandpolicies,alsoplayanimportantrole.a)WeakeningfundamentalsSincethetapertantrum,macroeconomicfundamentalsinanumberofEFEshaveweakened(Figure6).Asaresult,theircreditratingshaveonaveragedeteriorated.Ratingdowngradeshavecoincidedwithdepreciatingcurrenciesandrisingcreditdefaultswapspreads.Since2010,growthhasslowedsteadilyandrepeatedlyfallenshortofexpectations.ThepatternofweakgrowthhasbecomeincreasinglymorevisibleinalargernumberofEFEsovertime.In37 fact,thisyearwillmarktheslowestpaceofEFEgrowthsincetheglobalfinancialcrisis,contributingtoboutsoffinancialmarketvolatility.ProductivitygrowthinEFEshasalsosloweddown,suggestingthatthepatternofdisappointinggrowthmaycontinue.Figure6.GrowthprospectsinEFEsSincethetapertantrum,growthprospectsandcreditratingshavedeterioratedinEFEs.Creditratingdowngradeshavecoincidedwithdepreciatingcurrenciesandrisingcreditdefaultswap(CDS)andbondspreads.Alargeshareofcountriesarefacingslowinggrowth,andsomeemergingmarketsarefacinggreaterpolicyuncertainty.Source:Bloomberg,Haver,WorldBankestimates,CBOE,JPMorganB.Thesovereignratingiscalculatedbasedonthesimpleaverageoflong-termforeign-currencycreditratingsofcountriesbyStandard&Poor’sRatingService.Lastobservation:August2015.AdeclineintheEMcurrencyindexdenotesadepreciation.C.FractionofEFEcountriesinwhichgrowthisslowerthanitshistoricalaveragefor1990-2008.For2015-17,theaverageofthreeyearsisshown.D.TheCBOEEmergingMarketsETFVolatilityIndexmeasuresimpliedvolatilityforoptionsonselectexchange-tradedfunds(ETFs).38 Ingeneral,EFEvulnerabilitieshaveseenlittleimprovementsince2013,assuggestedbymedianvaluesofsomekeyvulnerabilityindicators(Figure7).Medianinflationhasincreased,whiletheprimarybalancehasworsened.Thesemovements,however,maskdifferencesbetweencommodityexportersandimporters.Amongoilimporters,fiscaldeficitsareexpectedtonarrowasaresultofdecliningexpendituresonfuelsubsidiesfollowinglastyear’ssignificantdropinoilprices;moreover,inflationinoilimportershasgenerallyfallen,allowingcentralbanksinsomecountriestoreducemonetarypolicyratestosupportgrowth.Incontrast,fiscalandmonetarypolicyroomhasshrunkinoil-exportingcountriesasrevenueshortfallshaveweakenedfiscalpositionsanddepreciationpressureshavepushedinflationup.WhilegovernmentdebtlevelsinEFEsaremoderate,theyhaveincreasedinfrontiermarketssincetheglobalfinancialcrisis,amidarapidriseinbondissuanceinglobalcapitalmarkets.Insomefrontiermarkets,risinggovernmentdebthasbeenaccompaniedbyrapidlygrowingprivatesectorcredit(WorldBank2015a).And,afteryearsofrapidcreditexpansion,manycountriesstrugglewithhighlevelsofprivatesectorindebtedness,asweakeningdomesticdemand,prospectsofrisinginterestratesandcurrencypressurescomplicatethenecessarybalancesheetadjustments.Currentaccountdeficitshaveshownlittleimprovementsincethetapertantrum,generallyimprovingincommodityimportersbutworseninginseveralexporters;ontheotherhand,foreignreserveshaveonaverageedgedup.Highlightingthecontinuedneedforexternalfinancing,totalexternaldebtandshort-termdebthavechangedlittle.Realexchangerateovervaluationhasfallensharply,reflectingrecentnominalcurrencymovements.AndforeigncurrencyexposuresremainelevatedformanyEFEs.Theseexternalandcurrency-relatedvulnerabilitiesinEFEssuggestthatrapidshiftsincapitalflowsandcurrencymarketscanleadtosignificantpressuresontheirexternalbalances.Moreover,deeperintegrationofEFEsininternationaldebtmarkets,andashiftfromcross-borderbanklendingtorecordbondissuancebysovereignsandcorporates,appeartohaveheightenedthesensitivityoflong-terminterestratesinEFEstoglobalbondyields(SobrunandTurner2015).39 B.Country‐specificchallengesConsideringthemuchlargermagnitudeofdomesticandexternalvulnerabilitiestheyexperiencedduringthe1980sand1990s,theaggregatevulnerabilitieslistedaboveappearmanageableforEFEs.However,weakgrowthcouldreducetheresilienceofsomeEFEsovertime,particularlycommodityexporters.Moreover,thereareconsiderabledifferencesintheevolutionofexternalanddomesticvulnerabilitiesacrossindividualEFEs.•Domesticvulnerabilities(Figure8).AlthoughsomecountrieswithweakGDPgrowthin2013haveseensomeimprovementsmorerecently,thepaceofexpansionhasslowedinmostothers.Inflationhasmoderatedforsomeoil-importingcountries,butisstillatorabove(formalorinformal)inflationtargetsinseveralofthem.Privatedebtlevelshaveedgedupdespiteslowercreditgrowthinsomecountries.PublicdebthasalsoincreasedinsomeEFEsandprimarybalanceshavedeterioratedsomewhat,particularlyamongcommodityexporters.Countriesfacingbankassetqualityproblemshaveseenlittleimprovementsincemid-2013.40 Figure7.VulnerabilitiesinEFEsEFEvulnerabilitieshaveseengenerallylittleimprovementsince2013.Medianinflationhasincreaseddespiteslowinggrowth,whilefiscalpositionsandprivatedebtgenerallydeteriorated.Mediancurrentaccountdeficitsremainbroadlyunchangedandonlylimitedprogresshasbeenmadeinreducingexternalorshort‐termdebt.ForeigncurrencyexposuresremainelevatedinsomeEFEs.Source:BIS,HaverAnalytics,WorldBank,IMF.A.B.:ThebarsstandsforthemedianvalueofthevariablesofinterestamongtheselectedgroupofcountrieslistedinFigures9,10,and12A.Latestobservationis2014H2forprivatedebtandbank’snon-performingloans,2015estimatesforgovernmentdebt,primarybalance,andGDP,2015H1forcurrentaccountbalances,foreignreserves,realeffectiveexchangerate,andinflation,2014fortotalandshorttermexternaldebtand2013forforeigncurrencyexposure(measuredastheratiooftotalforeigncurrencydepositsinthedomesticbankingsystemtototaldepositsinthedomesticbankingsystem).41 Figure8.EvolutionofdomesticvulnerabilitiesinEFEsSince2013,GDPgrowthhasslowedinmostEFEs.Inflationremainselevatedinseveralofcountries.PrivatedebtlevelshaveedgedupinEFEs,publicdebthasincreasedandprimarybalanceshavedeteriorated,particularlyamongcommodityexporters.Countriesfacingbankassetqualityproblemshaveseenverylittleimprovement.Source:BIS,HaverAnalytics,WorldBank,IMF.“All”referstotheun-weightedaverageamongalllistedcountries.A.Inflationisthe6-monthaverageoftheannualaverageconsumerpriceinflation.Lastdata:May2015formostcountries.B.Privatedebtisdefinedasthesumofprivatenon-financialsectordebtandhouseholddebt.Lastdata:2014Q4.D.Primarybalanceexcludesnetinterestpayments.F.Lastdata:2014Q4formostcountries.42 Figure9.EvolutionofexternalvulnerabilitiesinEFEsCurrentaccountdevelopmentshavedivergedsince2013,withafewoilimportersseeingsomeimprovements,whiletheirreservecoverageincreasedslightlybutlargelyasaresultoflowerimports.Countrieswithhightotalexternaldebtorshort-termexternaldebthavemadelimitedprogressinreducingthose.Realexchangerateovervaluationhasbeenbroughtdowninseveralcountries,partlyduetorecentnominaldepreciation.Source:BIS,HaverAnalytics,WorldBank,IMF.A.“All”referstothemedianamongalllistedcountries.Lastdata:2015Q1formostcountries.B.Foreignreservesincludegold.Lastdata:May2015formostcountries.E.Realeffectiveexchangerateistrade-weightedexchangeratesthathaveadjustedforinflation.Lastdata:August2015.Adecreasedenotesadepreciation.43 •Externalvulnerabilities(Figure9).Relativetothetapertantrumepisode,therehasbeensomeimprovementincurrentaccountbalancesamonganumberofoilimportingeconomies,althoughdeficitsremainelevatedforseveralofthem.Inaddition,foreignreserveshaveincreased,albeitonlymodestly,forsomeEFEs;however,theycameunderpressureinsomeoil-exportingcountriesin2015.SomeEFEswithelevatedlevelsoftotalexternaldebtasapercentofGDPorwithahighshareofshort-termexternaldebthavemadeonlylimitedprogressinreducingsuchburdens.Theextentofrealexchangerateovervaluationhasbeenreducedinseveralcountries,partlyduetonominaldepreciation,butstillremainshighinafewcountries.Despitethegenerallackofmajorprogress,thereareindividualcountriesthathavesucceededinreducingsomeoftheirvulnerabilities.Forexample,theIndianrupeeandfinancialmarketswereseverelyaffectedduringthetapertantrum,amidmacroeconomicconditionsthathadweakenedinprioryearsandhadleftthemvulnerabletocapitaloutflows(Basu,Eichengreen,andGupta2014).TheIndianeconomyhassinceshownnotableimprovement,particularlyinreducingitshighcurrentaccountdeficitandinflation,andundertakingsignificantreforms.C.ImplicationsofU.S.dollarstrengthforEFEsAbroad-basedappreciationoftheU.S.dollarcanaddsignificantpressureonEFEcurrencies,contributetothecostofdebtrefinancingandbalancesheetpressures,andexposevulnerabilitiesindomesticbankingsectors.Consideringthenegativecorrelationbetweencommoditypricesandthedollar,thiseffectcouldbereinforcedbyanegativeincomeeffectforsomeexporters(Druck,MagudandMariscal2015).Inthepast,periodsofrapiddollarappreciationsweresometimesassociatedwithagreaterincidenceoffinancialcrisisinEFEs,suchasduringthefirsthalfof1980sinLatinAmericaandsecondhalfofthe1990sinAsia(Figure10).Inthelatterepisode,countrieswithcurrenciestightlyconnectedtothedollarexperiencedagreaterproportionofsuddenstopsandsharpereconomicdownturns(IMF2015b).Figure10.U.S.dollar,financialcrises,andrecentcurrencydevelopmentsinEFEsPeriodsofrapidU.S.dollarappreciationwereassociatedwithagreaterincidenceofexternalcrisisinEFEsduringthemid-1980sandmid-1990s.AstrengtheningU.S.dollarsincemid-2014hasbeenreflectedinsignificantcurrencydepreciationsinanumberoflargecommodityexportersandcountrieswhereuncertaintyiselevated.44 Source:WorldBank,HaverAnalytics.A.Frequencyofcrisesreferstonumberofcurrency,sovereigndebt(domesticorexternal),andbankingcrisesidentifiedbyEscolano,Kolerus,andNgouana(2014).Sincethelate1990s,theshareofdebtdenominatedinforeigncurrencyandthenumberofcountrieswithcurrencyregimestightlylinkedtotheU.S.dollarhavedeclined.However,foreigncurrencyexposuresarestillelevatedinsomecountries,especiallyinseveralcommodityexportersandEFEsthathavereceivedlargecapitalinflowssincethecrisis(Figure11).Giventhepre-eminentroleoftheU.S.dollarasthecurrencydenominationofcross-borderdebt,adollarappreciationconstitutesinitselfatighteningofglobalfinancialconditionsandcouldheightenrisksassociatedwithliabilityexposuresanddollarshortages(Borio2014).Thisisparticularlytrueforsomecountrieswithsignificantshort-termdollardenominateddebt,makingthemmorevulnerabletorolloverandinterestraterisksandadryingupofforeignexchangeliquidity(IMF2015b).Figure11.ForeigncurrencyexposureandcorporatedebtinEFEsForeigncurrencyexposuresinanumberofEFEsandtheshareofforeign-currency-denominatedexternaldebtinsomecountriesremainhigh,renderingthemvulnerabletosharpmovementsintheircurrencies.Corporatedebthasalsoincreasedinmanycountries.45 eyIndiarkAfricaPolanduTChinaMexicoCzechThailandRepublicHIndonesiaSouthSource:BIS,Moody’s,WorldBank.A.Foreigncurrencyexposureismeasuredastheratiooftotalforeigncurrencydepositsinthedomesticbankingsystemtototaldepositsinthedomesticbankingsystem.Lastavailabledatafor2013.C.GDP‐weightedaverage.ListofemergingmarketsincludesChina,CzechRepublic,Hungary,India,Indonesia,Mexico,Poland,SouthAfrica,Thailand,andTurkey.D.The2007dataofSouthAfrica’scorporatedebtisnotavailableandthusreplacedby2008Q1data.Regardingcorporatebalancesheetexposures,record-lowinterestratesandaccesstoabundantgloballiquidityinthepost-crisisperiodhavefacilitatedasignificantincreaseincorporatebondissuanceininternationalmarkets(Feyenetal.2015,LoDucaetal.2014,McCauleyetal.2015).ThishasinturnledtoasizableincreaseinleverageinagrowingnumberofEFEs(Figure11).Thecorporatedebtbuild-upisparticularlymarkedinpartsofEastAsiaandLatinAmerica.WhilealargenumberofcorporatesinsomemajorEFEs,particularlyinAsia,wereabletoissuedebtdenominatedintheirowncurrencies,theU.S.dollarstillaccountsforthebulkof46 corporatedebtissuanceinmostcountries(GruićandWooldridge2013,Feyenetal.2015).Asaresult,privateexternaldebtissizableinseveraldevelopingcountries,especiallyinEuropeandCentralAsia.Muchofthisexternaldebthasbeenaccumulatedbycorporationsexportingcommoditiesorproducingtradablegoods,whichmayhaveforeigncurrencyrevenuesprovidinganaturalhedgetotheirexternalliabilities(BIS2015).However,suchhedgingmightnotbeaseffectiveforcommodityexporters,assomecommoditypricesarenegatively(andtightly)correlatedwiththeU.S.dollar.Furthermore,hedginginfinancialmarketsiseffectiveonlyinsofarasthecounterpartysellingprotectionisabletohonorthecontract—i.e.notvulnerableitselftolargecurrencymovements.AfurtherappreciationoftheU.S.dollarcouldthereforeamplifyvulnerabilitiesinsomecountries,especiallythosewithhighlevelsofdollar-denominateddebtaswellascommodityexporters,astheeffectwouldcompoundtheimpactofdeterioratingtermsoftrade.47 AppendixⅡ:中文译文即将到来的美国利率收紧周期——一帆风顺或波澜不断执行概要背景：美国加息预期已久，但依旧会带来严峻的危机。自全球金融危机爆发以来，美国联邦储备系统（简称美联储）宽松的货币政策立场帮助刺激了经济活动、提振了资产估值、降低了风险溢价。此外，宽松的政策在提高新兴经济体和前沿市场经济体[简称新兴前沿经济体（EFEs）]的资本流入方面也发挥了关键性作用。随着美国经济的好转，美联储预计短期内要开始提高政策利率（该事件被广泛成为“直线升息”），由此也开始了近十年内的第一轮利率收紧周期。2013年年中的“削减恐慌”依旧在残酷地提醒着人们：即使早已预期到美联储政策会发生改变，但是改变一旦真正发生，其细节仍会让市场措手不及，进而导致金融市场剧烈动荡，新兴前沿经济体的资本流入出现波动。近期争论关注利率直线提高事件对新兴前沿经济体的潜在影响，但是也会有严峻的危机也随着利率的进一步提高而来，虽然现在人们预期加息进程是缓慢的，但是当新兴前沿经济体的政策缓冲衰退之后，加息进程就可能加快。本份政策研究报告全面分析了自削减恐慌以来国际形势所发生的改变；在即将到来的美联储利率收紧周期内引发市场混乱的风险；对新兴前沿经济体的潜在影响以及为这些国家提供政策选择。具体来说，本份报告回答了以下四个问题：·自削减恐慌以来，发达国家的发展前景和政策发生了什么变化？·自削减恐慌以来，新兴前沿经济体的发展前景和脆弱性发生了什么变化？·对新兴前沿经济体来说，有哪些风险随着利率收紧周期而来？·为了应对利率收紧周期的潜在负面影响，有哪些政策可供新兴前沿经济体选择？发达经济体经济恢复缓慢。美国经济活动持续回升，劳动力市场正在加强。虽然在其他主要发达经济体恢复依然脆弱，但是自2013年以来其势头已逐渐增强（图1）。尽管近期出现动荡，但全球长期利率保持低位，欧洲中央银行和日本银行也会继续采取异常宽松的货币政策。新兴前沿经济体脆弱性加剧。自削减恐慌以来，新兴前沿经济体的增长前景恶化，信用48 等级被调低，同时，很多国家脆弱性加剧:·内部脆弱性：很多新兴前沿经济体的经济活动放缓，2015年预计是金融危机爆发后年增长最弱的一年。一般来说，私人债务有所上升，财政状况普遍恶化。·外部脆弱性：很多石油出口国的经常项目平衡有所好转，但是很多石油进口国的经常项目平衡恶化。外债总额和短期外债高企的国家在降低这些脆弱性方面没有取得进展有限。一些新兴前沿经济体的外汇敞口依旧过高。一些国家的公司债券明显增多，其中大部分债券以美元计价。底线：一个一帆风顺的利率收紧周期。有多个原因可以让市场预期即将到来的收紧周期将会一帆风顺，不会对新兴前沿经济体产生过于严重的影响：·市场早已预期到这一利率收紧周期即将到来，而且加息进程可能十分缓慢。·该利率收紧周期发生的背景正值美国经济蓬勃发展之际，而根据一份向量自回归分析，美国经济的发展对新兴前沿经济体将有积极实际的溢出效应。·美国的期限利差可能会像在过去利率收紧时期一样保持偏窄的水平。·其他主要央行预计会继续采取异常宽松的政策，这些政策会增强流动性，帮助保持低全球利率。底线周边的严峻风险。利率收紧周期会带来严峻风险。五个因素突出了金融市场发生动荡的风险，这对新兴前沿经济体的经济活动有负面影响:·对美国经济根本实力的不确定让市场不清楚美联储距离实现其双重目标具体还有多远。·美国期限溢价远远低于其历史平均水平，可能会突然回归正常水平。·市场对未来利的预期率要低于美国联邦开放市场委员会的预期。·市场流动性状况脆弱。·日益充满挑战性的外部环境正在削弱新兴前沿经济体的恢复力：全球增长疲软、国际贸易增长乏力、商品价格一直低廉。49 资本流动有大量减少的风险。美国收益率的波动对推动新兴前沿经济体的资本流入波动有重要作用。如果在利率收紧的同时，美国长期利率也大幅上升，像在削减恐慌期间一样，那么新兴前沿经济体的资本流入会大量减少（图2）。根据一个向量自回归模型，美国长期收益率每上升1个百分点（就像在在削减恐慌期间一样），就可能暂时减少流入到新兴前沿经济体的资本流动总量，减少量高达新兴前沿经济体GDP总和的2.2个百分点。资本流动如此大量的减少会给脆弱的新兴前沿经济体带来严峻的政策性挑战。多起事件会带来灾难？全球市场的金融压力倾向于给发展前景疲软、脆弱性严峻和政策环境充满挑战性的新兴前沿经济体造成较大的影响。在利率收紧周期期间，金融市场动荡加上国内薄弱环节很可能会形成一场灾难，导致更多脆弱国家的资本流入大幅减少。慢慢地，随着一些主要新兴前沿经济体的的迟缓增长成为定局，国内脆弱性扩大，此次危机可能会因此加剧。此外，对新兴前沿经济体资产的风险偏好可能会突然改变，进而蔓延影响到很多国家的资本流入，这些国家即使脆弱性有限也不能幸免于难。这会让新兴前沿国家原本可控的资本流入减少恶化，新兴前沿国家资本流入会出现突然停止，对增长和金融稳定产生严峻的负面影响。一项活动研究表明，在资本流动突然停止两年后，新兴前沿经济体的增长普遍会降低大约7个百分点。政策选择：期待最好的结果，做最坏的准备。新兴前沿经济体应首先关注可以降低脆弱性和加强政策可信度的货币财政政策和可以提高增长率的结构性政策议程。在面临着高通货膨胀率的国家，加强货币政策可信度可能是当务之急。可能要密切监督拥有大量外币债务的银行。如果有足够的财政空间可供使用，财政政策就可以支持增长。虽然结构改革的成果要假以时日才能物质化，但果断地采取行动实施雄心勃勃的改革很可能给投资者释放出增长前景正在提升的信号。如果围绕着即将到来的利率收紧周期的风险变成现实，一些国家的汇率灵活性可以缓冲冲击，但仍需辅以货币政策措施和精准干预，如此才能支撑市场有序运行。新兴前沿经济体可以在即将到来的利率收紧周期期间期待最好的结果，但是考虑到其中涉及的严峻风险，新兴前沿经济体需要做最坏的准备。50 图1.变化中的全球经济局势尽管近期市场出现动荡，全球长期利率依旧保持低位。美国经济活动持续回升，劳动力市场正在加强。其他发达经济体的状况正在好转，但依旧还很脆弱。与此相反，新兴经济体和前沿市场经济体[（简称新兴前沿经济体（EFEs）]的增长前景恶化，信用等级被调低，内部脆弱性和外部脆弱性依旧存在。来源：国际货币基金组织、哈沃、世界银行A.G3国家（欧元区、日本和英国）以GDP加权的十年政府债券收益率的平均值。蓝条表示的是2013年5、6月的削减恐慌。最后观察日期：2015年9月。C.G3国家GDP增长指的是欧元区、日本和英国的GDP增长总和。2015年的增长为预测。51 D．主权评级是以标准普尔评级服务公司所给出的国家长期外汇信用等级的简单平均数为基础计算的。E.F．条形代表的是图9和图10所列出的24个新兴前沿经济体中间值。最新价值：2014年下半年（私人债务）、2015年（政府债务）、2015年上半年（经常项目平衡）、2014年（外债）图2.利率收紧周期前后的风险如果美国利率收紧周期进行得一帆风顺，美国期限利差会和以前几次利率收紧时期一样，保持偏窄水平，但是新兴前沿经济体的货币很可能依旧处于重压之下。但是，风险溢价或许会突然上涨，或者市场与美联储政策制定者对于政策利率的期待有望逐步统一，二者都可能会让美国长期收益率有突然激增的风险。美国收益率的突增可能会造成新兴前沿经济体资本流动的大幅减少，加大脆弱国家资本停流的风险。52 来源：国际货币基金组织、哈沃分析公司、彭博社、纽约联邦储备银行、世界银行A.期限利差表明美国美国10年期国债收益率和6月国债收益率的差别。B.下降意味着名义实际汇率的下降。x轴表示的是t=0前后月份的数字。t=0指的是1994年2月、1999年6月、2004年6月和2013年月。C.期限溢价预估来自于艾德里安(Adrian),克伦普（Crump）,and芒什（Moench）(2013b)描述的一个模型。最后观察日期：2015年8月。D.对美国期限利差的100个基点冲击被应用于一个向量自回归模型，该模型假设了对欧元区、英国和日本债券收益率的一系列转付利率，从0到百分之100。灰色区域表示的是对资本流动的预估影响范围，影响取决于转付利率（横线下方区域对应零转付利率，意味着对全球债券收益率的一次40基点冲击，而上方区域对应的是百分之100的转付利率，或者是对全球债券收益率的一次100基点冲击）。如果取中间值，全球债券收益率初步会上涨70个基点，与削减恐慌期间观测到的转付利率相对应。E.F.蓝线表示的是经历过系统性突发增长停止的新兴前沿经济体的平均值。红色和橙色的先表明第75百分位和第25百分位。系统性突发增长停止指的是在一个时期内，资本流动比其历史比均值低一个标准差，与此同时，波动率指数比其历史平均值高一个标准差。该计算包括了1995年至2014年间在58个新兴前沿经济体内发生的21次间断系统性突发增长停止。F.下降意味着贬值。53 “我们面临长期利率会在未来某个时刻激增的风险。”（本·伯南克，前美国联邦储备局主席，2013年3月1日a）“一个至少在现阶段看来更实际的方法是：资本来源国的央行重新解读其任务，考虑资本接收国政策应对的中期效果，例如汇率干预。”（拉古拉姆·拉杨，印度储备银行行长，2014年4月28日a）“虽然美联储的利率收紧周期会给新兴市场国家（英语简称EMEs）带来挑战，但是没有必要惊慌失措。”（威廉·达德利，纽约联邦储备银行行长，2015年4月20日）“长期利率处于极其地位，这似乎体现了低的期限溢价，而期限溢价可以很快地发生变化⋯⋯”（珍妮特·耶伦，美联储主席，2015年5月6日）“如果经济如我所预期般地继续好转，我认为在今年某一时候就可以采取初步政策提高美联储基金目标利率。”（珍妮特·耶伦，美联储主席，2015年5月22日）“一旦真正提高政策利率，可能会激发进一步的动荡，但是我最好的预测是新兴市场经济体最终能处理好美国政策的正常化。”（斯坦利·费希尔，美联储副主席，2015年5月26日）“我认为对‘直线升息"的预期造成了更多的动荡（比美联储实际加息造成更多的动荡）。我认为美联储一旦真正加息，情况会稳定下来。”[洁蒂·阿卡塔·阿兹（ZetiAkhtarAziz），马来西亚国家银行行长，2015年8月7日]“我们需要注意围绕着美国联邦储备系统货币政策正常化的不稳定因素，⋯⋯可以加剧国内外金融市场的动荡。”（李柱烈，韩国银行行长，2015年6月12日）54 “一些新兴市场经济体对国内外借款的需求量很大，其美元计价的债务高筑，宏观经济和政策十分脆弱。美联储不再采取零政策利率会给这些国家带来严重的问题。”[鲁里埃尔·鲁比尼（NourielRoubini）,鲁比尼全球经济咨询公司董事长，2015年6月29日]“在充满高度不确定性的世界，美联储不能即依赖数据又采取一成不变的政策。如果美联储要力保其未来政策的实行，以此来缓解现在的鲁莽行动造成的后果，进而让自己信誉受损，这比继续依赖数据要糟糕得多。”（劳伦斯·萨摩斯，美国前任财政部长，2015年9月9日）55 Ⅰ.序言自全球金融危机爆发以来，美国联邦储备系统的宽松政策帮助刺激了经济活动、提振了资产估值、降低了风险溢价。此外，美联储的宽松政策在降低美国和其他发达经济体的长期利率方面也发挥了重要作用。由于投资者要寻求高回报，宽松的政策也帮助增加了新兴经济体和前沿市场经济体[简称新兴前沿经济体（EFEs），大致来说就是大量或部分资金流入国际资本市场的发展中国家)]的资本流入，因此，新兴前沿经济体一直能提供十分优惠的借贷条件。随着美国经济的好转，美联储预计短期内要开始提高政策利率（该事件被广泛称为“直线升息”），由此也开始了一轮利率收紧周期。这将会是自2006年来美国政策利率的第一次上调。由于大多数人都预计到了此次利率收紧周期的到来，而且正时逢美国经济蓬勃发展之际，因此这次调高利率预计会对新兴前沿经济体的资本流入有良好的影响(费希尔，2015)。但是，此次利率收紧周期的时间表依旧不明确，很多新兴前沿经济体的脆弱性却已经加剧，在过去两年内情况尤为严峻。2013年5、6月的“削减恐慌”依旧在残酷地提醒着人们：即使早已预期到美联储的政策会发生变化，但是改变一旦真正发生，其细节仍会让市场措手不及，进而导致金融市场剧烈动荡，新兴前沿经济体的资本流入出现波动。引爆了“削减恐慌”的是美联储主席本·伯克南2013年5月22日的一份声明，他提到美联储可能会“在几次会议之后”减少资产收购（伯克南，2013b），此份声明也被称为“削减讲话”。虽然此前已预期到美联储会在未来某个时刻减少资产收购，但是本·伯克南所给出大致时间表还是震惊了金融市场。在首次削减讲话发表后的几个月内，美国10年期国债收益率增加了100个基点。美国国债收益迅速大增，随后，新兴前沿经济体金融市场动荡加剧，具体表现为：新兴前沿经济体的货币贬值；债券收益率差距急剧扩大；流入其债券基金和股票基金的外国投资组合大量减少；流通性收紧；债券市场和资本流动动荡加剧。这迫使很多新兴前沿经济体收紧货币政策、干预货币市场，一些国家甚至出台了非常规措施防止资本外流。利率收紧周期即将来临，届时，新兴前沿经济体将面临一个充满挑战性的环境——全球增长乏力、世界贸易萎缩、商品价格低廉、金融市场动荡加剧、主要新兴经济体发展前景堪忧。在这一背景下，利率收紧周期对新兴前沿经济体资本流入的潜在影响由两个因素决定，56 即“推动”因素（发达经济体的经济和金融状况）和“拉动”因素（国家各自特定的前景、脆弱性和政策）。·推动因素。在发达国家中，与新兴前沿经济体有关的增长前景有所好转，因此，投资收益很可能会提高，发达国家的货币政策将会逐渐收紧。虽然来自发达国家积极的增长溢出效应会支持新兴前沿经济体的经济活动，更高的利率可能会拉大相关的金融资产收益率差，使之对发达国家更有利。·拉动因素。虽然新兴前沿经济体的发展整体上要快于发达经济体，但是前景已经不再乐观，很多新兴前沿经济体面临严峻的脆弱性问题，在其中一些国家，政策方向的不确定性加剧，影响了投资者的决策。这些因素增加了对新兴前沿经济体的固有金融资产风险性进行再次市场评估的可能性，而且该评估可能是突发性的。本份政策研究报告提供了全面的分析报告，分析了自削减恐慌以来推动因素和拉动因素所发生的改变；在即将到来的美联储利率收紧周期内引发市场混乱的风险；对新兴前沿经济体的潜在影响以及为这些国家提供可选的政策。具体来说，本份报告回答了以下四个问题：·自削减恐慌以来，发达国家的发展前景和政策发生了什么变化？·自削减恐慌以来，新兴前沿经济体的发展前景和脆弱性发生了什么变化？·对新兴前沿经济体来说，随着利率收紧周期而来的危机有哪些？·为了应对利率收紧周期的潜在负面影响，有哪些政策可供新兴前沿经济体选择？Ⅱ.发达国家的发展前景和政策自削减恐慌以来，发达经济体的经济状况和一些主要中央银行的政策立场都发生了明显的变化。A．不断改变着的经济局发达经济体的增长、货币政策、更大范围的金融局势是推动资本流入新兴前沿经济体的关键性推动因素。自削减恐慌以来，发达国家的经济状况和政策背景发生了显著变化（图3）。57 图3：发达国家的状况主要发达国家的长期利率保持在历史最低水平。美国货币政策长期保持宽松，支持了全球金融市场，随后，欧洲中央银行和日本银行近期推出更多的扩张性货币政策，也给全球金融市场提供了支持。美国经济正在加强，劳动力市场正在恢复，信贷趋松，而其他发达经济体却正在经历更加脆弱的经济恢复。美元自2014年年中开始就显著升值，反应出主要储存货币国家日益分化的货币政策。来源：彭博社、哈沃、世界银行A.以GDP加权的G3国家（欧元区国家、日本和英国）10年政府债券收益平均值。蓝色58 直线表示2013年5、6月的削减恐慌期。最后观察日期：2015年9月8日。B.灰色区域表示预测期。最后观察日期：2015年8月。C.G3国家GDP增长指的是欧元区国家、日本和英国的GDP增长总量。D.蓝色直线表示2013年5、6月的削减恐慌期。最后观察日期：2015年8月。E.以GDP加权的G3国家（欧元区国家、日本和英国）私营领域信贷平均值。最后观察日期：2015年7月。F.最后观察日期：2015年9月。·持续保持着的低利率。主要中央银行的政策利率保持在零或者接近零的水平，一些央行的利率甚至在零以下（世界银行2015b）。虽然美国即将收紧利率，主要经济体的长期利率仍然保持在异常低位的水平。除了低利率之外，欧洲中央银行和日本银行也进一步调松了政策，寻求进一步扩大资产负债表。这些中央银行的货币刺激措施应该会继续加强全球流动性，即使美国开始调高政策利率，这些措施也能帮助把全球利率保持在低水平。·为美国经济聚集动力。自2013年起，美国经济进一步加强，增长率超过了过去15年的平均增长率，让其他发达经济体相形见绌。自削减恐慌以来，美国劳动力市场显著提高。这表明了美联储实现“充分就业”的任务并不会妨碍美国直线升息（耶伦2015c）。·其他发达经济体经济正在恢复但势头很弱。自2003年以来，得益于宽松的货币政策、货币贬值、低油价和不断放缓的财政整顿，其他主要发达经济体的经济恢复得以加强，但是欧元区和日本近期的一些经济指标表明恢复依旧脆弱。此外，在其他主要发达经济体，银行借贷情况仅有些许好转，非金融公司信贷和家庭信贷也未见大幅增长。自削减恐慌以来最令人瞩目的变化之一就是美元对其他主要货币在短时间内大幅升值。自2013年年中以来，美元名义有效汇率升值超过15%，而同期的欧元和日元则大幅贬值，这部分反映了主要央行货币政策立场的分化。如果美元大幅升值能反映出美国经济发展势头强劲，并且意味着欧元区和日本宽松的货币政策能取得成功，那么储存货币国家自2003年以来的发展应该能支持全球经济恢复（世界银行2015b）。但是，美国经济已有所恢复，美元升值有超过美国经济恢复所需之风险，持续走弱的欧元和日元也有可能不能如预期般地重新激活欧元区和日本的经济活动。如果这样的话，强势的美元可能会阻碍发达经济体的经济增长，也有可能给新兴前沿经济体的发展带来更多挑战，后者将在第三单元加以讨论。59 B．不断转换的美国长期收益率拉动点从长远来看，美国长期收益率的上升抑或反映出了美国经济的持续好转，有潜力对世界其他国际产生积极的溢出效应，抑或反映出市场对美国货币政策或者对中期通胀风险的期待会有变化。美国经济活动的持续好转（有利的“实际冲击”）可以提振权益估值，减少对高度宽松货币政策立场的需要，如果美国经济能出人意料地保持上升，效果则更明显。市场预期货币政策准备要收紧，股本回报率上升，股价会下跌，收益率也会上升。另一种情况是，即使稍微收紧货币政策立场也会让金融市场措手不及。如果投资者对美国经济的看法与美联储不同，他们会认为这样是一种加速收紧货币政策的做法（不利的“货币冲击”）。同样的，生产力保持较低水平，潜在产出持续低迷，二者会让市场预期产出缺口快速缩小，给加速政策利率正常化进程提供了理由。下文将使用结构向量自回归（VAR）模型分析实际冲击和货币冲击对美国长期收益率起伏的作用，包括与美国经济增长前景变化有关的起伏变化（由标普500指数代表）和反应市场对美国货币状况的看法的起伏变化（由10年主权债券收益率代表）。分析设想不利的货币冲击（例如美联储如人们预期般地加快收紧货币政策）在美国会增加收益率，让股价下跌；而有利的实际冲击（比如说反映更好增长前景的冲击）即会增加收益率，拉动股价上涨。结果表明，2013年5月后长期收益率的首次增长大部分反映出于不利的货币冲击：在市场忧心美国经济实力的背景下，金融市场认为削减讲话释放出美联储要加快收紧货币政策的信号（图4）。在2013年年初，公布的经济数据显示美国经济低迷不振，数据里也没有迹象表明美国经济的增长动力能强大到保证长期债券收益率会上升。因此，实际冲击对十年美国债券收益率的变化几乎没有影响。但是，自削减恐慌以来，感知到的货币冲击，不管是与国内因素有关还是与国外因素有关，都变得越来越有利。从2013年12月到2014年10月，美联储资产购买并没有减少，即使如此，这段时间内的金融状况依旧保持高度宽松，这表明市场预期到的削减影响已经发挥作用。在2014年年末，感知到的货币冲击开始把收益率拉到低于2013年5月的水平。2014年8月，欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉（MarioDraghi）在美国杰克逊镇发表演讲，此后，市场关于欧洲央行要使用量化宽松的猜测加剧，该猜测最终也得到了证实。欧元区长期债券收益率的下降对美国长期债券收益率也产生了溢出影响。60 图4.美国债券收益率的走势：货币冲击和实际冲击美国长期收益率在2013年5月后突然上涨，主要因为金融市场认为削减讲话释放出美联储要加快收紧货币政策的信号，从而形成了不利的“货币冲击”，。自此，市场就预期利率收紧周期会逐渐到来，这一预期一直让收益率保持在低水平，对消了积极的“实际冲击”带来的拉高收益率的压力——积极的“实际冲击”反应出劳动力市场正在加强，美国实际经济活动正在好转。来源：哈沃，世界银行估算数据A．长期利率指的是美国10年期国债收益率，股价指的是标普500。最后观察日期：2015年9月。B．以上述模型估算为基础，利用多种符号约束确定货币冲击和实际冲击，除了焦点中的冲击，所有的冲击都归零，利用该模型测出反事实长期利率的走势。对货币冲击和实际冲击的分析是分开进行的，橙色（绿色）反事实分析展示出只受估算出的货币（实际）冲击影响的长期利率会如何变化。数字以百分比的形式出现。最后观察日期：2015年9月。61 C．D.这是由VAR模型估算出来的货币冲击和实际冲击的时间序列。数字以累计百分数的形式出现。表示冲击的符号只要为正，就会引起长期利率的增长。最后观察日期：2015年9月。与此同时，有迹象表明劳动力市场越来越欣欣向荣，加强了给长期收益率施加上涨压力的积极实际冲击。美国长期利率在2015年1月跌到多年以来的最低点1.6%，自此，美国长期利率有所回升，因为劳动力市场持续好转，而且欧洲的收益率在保持了异常地位几个月之后也触底反弹。但是，美元进一步走强、油价下跌以及对世界其他国家增长的担忧都让美国长期利率保持在历史最低水平，在2%到2.2%这一区间内浮动。Ⅲ.新兴经济体前沿市场经济体（新兴前沿经济体）的增长前景和脆弱性虽然来自发达经济体的一些“推动”因素一般都会支持新兴前沿经济体的发展，而且即使美国长期收益率的拉动力与2013年年中相比状态更佳，但对新兴前沿经济体来说，即将到来的美联储利率收紧周期将会发生在一个挑战性日益增强的全球环境。第一，全球GDP增长率在过去几年一直让人失望，自2012年以来，很多预测值都已调低（图5）。第二，近几年，全球贸易增长低迷，周期性和结构性因素都造成了危机后贸易增长明显放缓（世界银行2015a）。第三，商品价格近期大幅下降。更甚者，最近全球金融市场动荡加剧，这表明市场参与者越来越担心一些主要新兴市场国家日益变弱的增长前景。图5.充满挑战性的全球环境新兴前沿经济体所面临的外部环境的挑战性日益增强。发达经济体经济正在获得一定程度的恢复，但令人失望的是，近几年全球经济恢复一直无法持续，世界贸易依旧保持在危机后的低水平趋势，商品价格的下降也向商品出口国施加了压力。62 来源：世界银行、《世界贸易监测》B．最后观察日期：2015年6月C.最后观察日期：2015年8月虽然全球因素（包括美国长期收益率）可能会影响新兴前沿经济体的资本流动，但是国家特有的“拉动”因素（包括宏观经济基本因素和各种政策）也发挥了重要作用。A．不断变弱的基本面自削减恐慌以来，很多新兴前沿经济体的宏观经济基本面变弱（图6）。因此，这些国家的信用等级普遍被调低。等级被调低的同时，货币贬值，信用违约交换利差上升。自2010年以来，增长稳步放缓，经常低于预期。慢慢地，大部分新兴前沿经济体增长疲软的模式日益明显。事实上，今年会是新兴前沿经济体自全球金融危机以来经济增长最慢的一年，造成了金融市场的动荡。新兴前沿经济体的生产率增速同样放缓，这表明让人失望的的经济增长模式仍会继续。63 图6.新兴前沿经济体的增长前景自削减恐慌以来，新兴前沿经济体的增长前景恶化，信用等级降低。调低信用等级的同时，货币贬值，信用违约互换利差（英文简称CDS）上升，债券收益率差距扩大。很多国家正面临着增长放缓的前景，一些新兴市场国家面临着更严重的政策不确定性。来源：彭博社，哈沃，世界银行估算数据，芝加哥期权交易所，摩根大通B．主权等级的计算基础是标准普尔评级服务公司给出的各国长期外币信用等级的简单平均数。最后观察日期；2015年8月。新兴市场货币指数的下降意味着货币贬值。C．少数新兴前沿经济体的增长低于其在1990年到2008年间的平均增长率。图中所示的2015年到2017年的增长率为三年的平均数。D．芝加哥期权交易所的新兴市场交易型开放式指数基金（英文简称ETF）波动率指数测量交易型开放式指数基金期权的隐性波动性。64 自2013年以来，正如一些关键的脆弱性指标的中间值所显示的（图7），新兴前沿经济体的脆弱性基本都没有好转。中期通胀加剧，基础财政收支恶化。但是，这些变动掩盖了商品出口国和进口国间的差距。去年石油价格大幅下跌，随即燃料补贴支出减少，因此在石油进口国中，财政赤字预计要收窄。此外，石油进口国的通货膨胀率普遍下降，这让一些国家的央行可以减少货币政策利率，支持发展。与此相反，由于收入的减少削弱了财政，货币升值压力也拉高了通货膨胀率，因此石油出口国的财政和货币政策空间缩小。虽然新兴前沿经济体的国家债务不高，但是自金融危机爆发以来，前沿市场国家的债务已经增多，与此同时，全球资本市场债券发行也急速增多。在一些前沿市场国家，国家债务越来越高，同时，私人部门信贷快速上升（世界银行2015a）。信贷快速扩张数年之后，由于不断变弱的内需、加息前景和货币压力把对资产负债表的必要调整变得复杂化，很多国家私人部门债务高企。自削减恐慌以来，经常项目赤字便没有多少好转，商品进口国的经常项目赤字普通好转，一些商品出口国的经常项目赤字却恶化。与此不同，外汇储备普遍微升。外债总额和短期债务几乎没有变化，突出了二者对外源融资的持续需求。实际汇率高估大幅下降，反映了近期名义货币的变化。对很多新兴前沿经济体来说，其外汇敞口依旧过高。新兴前沿经济体的这些外部脆弱性和与货币有关的脆弱性表明：资本流动和货币市场快速变化可以给这些国家的外部均衡造成很大的压力。此外，新兴前沿经济体更深一步地融入了国际债务市场；银行跨境借贷风光不再，而主权国家和公司发行债券的数量创历史新高，这些似乎都让新兴前沿经济体的长期利率对全球债券收益率更加敏感。B.不同国家特有的挑战考虑到新兴前沿经济体在20世纪80年代和90年代经历过更严重的内外部脆弱性，因此这些国家似乎可以改善上述所列出的所有脆弱性。但是，疲软的增长会渐渐地削弱一些新兴前沿经济体的恢复力，对商品出口国来说更是如此。此外，每个新兴前沿经济体的内外部脆弱性的发展变化都有所不同。·内部脆弱性（图8）。在2013年,很多国家GDP增长疲软，虽然其中一些国家最近经济有所恢复，但在其他大多数国家，扩张的速度已经放缓。一些石油进口国的通货膨胀有所缓解，但在一些石油进口国，通货膨胀依旧达到了或者高于（正式或非正式的）通货膨胀目标。虽然一些国家的信贷增长变缓，但是私人债务水平微升。一些新兴前沿经济体的公共债65 务也已增加，但是基础财政收支却在恶化，在商品出口国间情况尤为明显。自2013年年中以来，面临着银行资产质量问题的国家没有取得什么进展。图7.新兴前沿经济体的脆弱性自2013年以来，新兴前沿经济体的脆弱性普遍没有好转。虽然增长放缓，但中期膨胀加剧，同时财政状况普遍恶化、私人债务普遍恶化。大部分国家的中期经常项目赤字没有变化，在减少外债和短期债务方面仅取得些许成果。对一些新兴前沿经济体来说，其外汇敞口依旧过高。来源：国际清算银行、哈沃分析公司、世界银行、国际货币基金组织A.B.图中短条代表的是图9、10和12A中所列举的国家相关变量的中间值。最后观察日期：2014年下半年（私人债务、银行的不良贷款）、2015年（政府债务、基础财政收支和GDP估算值）、2015年上半年（经常项目平衡、外汇储备、实际有效汇率和通货66 膨胀）、2014年（外债总额和短期外债）、2013年[外汇敞口（以国内银行系统内的外币存款总额与国内银行系统内的存款总额之比计算）]。图8.新兴前沿经济体内部脆弱性的变化发展自2013年以来，大多数新兴前沿经济体的GDP增速放缓。一些国家通货膨胀率依旧过高。新兴前沿经济体的私人债务水平微升，公共债务增加，基础财政收支恶化，特别是在商品出口国情况更严重。面临着银行资产质量问题的国家没有取得什么进展。67 来源：国际清算银行、哈沃分析公司、世界银行、国际货币基金组织。“全部”指的是所列出国家的未加权平均数。A．通货膨胀是年平均消费者价格膨胀在6个月内的平均值。最后数据：2015年5月最后收集大多数国家的数据。B．私人债务指的是非金融私人部门债务和家庭债务的总和。最后数据：2014年第四季度。D．基础财政收支不包括净利息支付。F．最后数据：2014年第四季度最后收集大多数国家的数据。68 图9.新兴前沿经济体外部脆弱性的发展变化经常项目走势在2013年以来开始分化，少数石油进口国情况有所好转，由于进口减少，这些国家的外汇储备覆盖率涨幅虽然不大，但所扩大的范围很广。外债总额和短期外债高企的国家在减少外债方面没有取得长足的进展。很多国家的实际汇率高估都已下降，部分原因是由于近期的名义货币贬值。来源：国际清算银行、哈沃分析公司、世界银行、国际货币基金组织A.“全部”指的是所有列出国家的中间值。最后数据：2015年第一季度最后收集大多数国69 家的数据。B.外汇储备包括黄金。最后数据：2015年5月最后收集大多数国家的数据。E.实际有效汇率是根据通货膨胀进行调整的以贸易加权汇率。最后数据：2015年8月。实际有效汇率的每次下降表示贬值。·外部脆弱性（图9）。与削减恐慌有关，很多石油进口经济体的经常项目平衡有所好转，虽然很多这些国家的赤字依旧很高。此外，很多新兴前沿经济体的外汇储备有所增加，虽然增幅不大。但是，在2015年，很多石油出口国的外汇储备承受重压。一些新兴前沿经济体的外债总额占GDP的比例很高或者短期外债高企，这些国家在减轻这两个负担方面取得的进展有限。实际汇率高估在很多国家已降低，部分原因是由于名义货币贬值，但在少数国家，实际汇率高估依旧很高。虽然大多数国家没有取得重大进展，但是个别国家已经成功降低了自身的脆弱性。比如说，在削减恐慌期间，印度卢及其金融市场都受到严重影响，与此同时，前几年印度的宏观经济形势变弱，让印度无力阻止资本外流[巴素（Basu）,艾特格林（Eichengreen）,古普塔（Gupta），2014]。自此，印度经济已经有了明显好转，特别是在减少其高额经常项目赤字和降低通货膨胀这两方面，而且印度还采取了重要的改革。C．美元走强对新兴前沿经济体的影响美元广泛升值可以大大加重新兴前沿经济体的压力，增加债务再融资成本，加大资产负债表压力，暴露国内银行业的脆弱性。考虑到商品价格与美元之间呈负相关关系，负面收入效应会加强此种关系对出口国的影响[德鲁克（Druck）,马故（Magud），马里斯卡尔（Mariscal），2015]。在过去，美元快速升值时期有时会加大在新兴前沿经济体发生更严重的金融危机的机率，例如20世纪80年代初期的拉丁美洲和20世纪90年代末期的亚洲（图10）。在后者期间，货币与美元联系紧密的国家经济突然大规模地停止发展并急速下滑（国际货币基金组织，2015b）。70 图10.美元、金融危机和新兴前沿经济体近期的货币变化在20世纪80年代中期和90年代中期，随着美元快速升值，外部危机发生在新兴前沿经济体的频率增加。自2014年年中以来，一些大型商品出口国和不确定性过高国家的货币严重贬值，反应了美元的走强。来源：世界银行、哈沃分析公司A.危机频率指的是由埃斯科拉诺（Escolano）、科莱若斯（Kolerus）和安戈阿纳（Ngouana）（2014）所确定的货币、主权债务（包括内债和外债）和银行业危机的发生次数。自20世纪80年代晚期以来，以外币计价的债务份额下降，货币体系与美元紧密联系的国家数量也有所减少。但是一些国家的外口敞口依旧过高，特别是在一些商品出口国和自危机爆发以来已经吸收了大量资本流入的新兴前沿经济体（图11）。考虑到美元作为跨境债券货币单位的重要作用，美元升值本身就足以构成全球金融状况紧缩、加剧责任风险和与美元短缺相关的风险[博里奥(Borio)，2014)]。对有大量以美元计价的短期债务的国家来说，这种情况尤为明显，因此这些国家更容易受到展期交割、利率风险和外汇流动性枯竭的影响（国际货币基金组织，2015b）。71 图11.新兴前沿经济体的外汇敞口和公司债务很多新兴前沿经济体的外汇敞口高居不下，一些国家的以外币计价的外债也同样高企，这都让这些国家无法承受本国货币的剧烈变化。很多国家的公司债务也在增加。来源：国际清算银行、穆迪公司、世界银行A．外汇敞口以国内银行系统的外币存款总额与国内银行系统的存款总额之比来计算的。最后可用数据收集于2013年。C．以GDP加权的平均值。新兴市场名单包括中国、捷克共和国、匈牙利、印度、印度尼西亚、墨西哥、波兰、南非、泰国和土耳其。D．2007年南非公司债务的数据缺失，因此代以2008年第一季度的数据。至于公司资产负债表敞口，历史新低的利率以及在后危机时代获得充裕的全球流动性的机会增加了公司债券在国际市场的发行数量[费延(Feyen)等，2015；罗杜卡(LoDuca)等，2014；麦考利(McCauley)等，2015]。这也让越来越多新兴前沿经济体的杠杆率大大提高（图11）。东亚和拉丁美洲一些国家和地区的公司债务明显增加。位于主要新兴前沿经济体，特别是位于亚洲的新兴前沿经济体的很多公司都能发行以本72 国货币计价的债券，即使如此，大多数国家发行的公司债券主要都是以美元计价的[格鲁伊奇（Gruić）、伍治奇（Wooldridge），2013；费延(Feyen)等，2015]。因此，私人外债在很多发展中国家规模相当大，在欧洲和中亚情况更为明显。这些外债大多数是由公司出口商品或生产可贸易商品积累而来，这可能会让外汇储备对其外债产生自然对冲(国际清算银行，2015)。但是，对商品出口国来说，这样的对冲可能抵不上一些商品价格与美元呈负相关（紧密）关系的影响。进一步说，金融市场上有效对冲的前提是销售保护的一方有能力履行合同——例如不能轻易地受货币汇率大幅波动的影响。由于美元升值会加重不断恶化的贸易条件的影响，美元进一步升值可以加重一些国家的脆弱性，在拥有以美元计价的高额债务的国家，以及在商品出口国，情况则更为严重。73'