《公共投资管理的力量》（第六章）翻译项目报告.pdf

'－雜皆八妹感據六｜衡译专业学位硕壬论文■１．《公共教々管巧看》ｒ第大幸＾舶々巧８報告————一．—＇．＇７‘…二＇，巧Ａｖ／ｆｌｒｔｆｉ？．°．－ｒ＇．Ｔ？＿■．．＇．．．：巧巧巧巧：张勇巧教巧考化名巧：巧译硕女研巧巧尚：英语口巧论文巧巧时向《？〇化年４月？■论义巧巧时闽：２０１６年５月论文编々，２０化４３５＇ SichuanInternationalStudiesUniversityATranslationprojectreportofThePowerofPublicInvestmentManagement(Chapter6)byQuanQianAthesissubmittedtotheGraduateSchoolinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofTranslationandInterpretingunderthesupervisionofAssociateProfessorZhangYongChongqing,P.R.ChinaMay2016 《公共投资管理的力量》（第六章）翻译项目报告摘要本翻译项目报告所选翻译文本为《公共投资管理的力量》(第六章)。该章阐述导致采购绩效不佳的原因及解决方案,能为我国当前不完善的公共投资管理模式提供一些有价值的借鉴。本翻译报告分为四部分：第一部分翻译项目介绍，包括项目背景、目标及意义等；第二部分背景分析，包括原文背景、理论背景；第三部分翻译难点及翻译方法；第四部分翻译经验和仍待解决问题。译者认为，信息类文本的翻译应在目的论“原文翻译应以翻译目的为宗旨，采用恰当的翻译方法和策略翻译出功能对等的目的语文本”这一理论指导下，通过细致分析原文语言特征，采用转换、调整语序、增译或省译等翻译方法以使译文符合目的语语言特点，准确传达原文信息。关键词：公共投资管理；采购；信息类文本；目的论；转换；增译ii ATranslationprojectreportofThePowerofPublicInvestmentManagement(Chapter6)AbstractThisisatranslationprojectreportonThePowerofPublicInvestmentManagement(Chapter6).Thischapterelaboratesonreasonsforpoorperformedprocurementandsuggestspossiblesolutions,whichcanprovidesomevaluablelessonsforChina’spresentimperfectpublicinvestmentmanagementmodel.Thereportisdividedintofourparts:Partoneisthetranslationprojectintroduction,includingbackgroundoftranslationproject,objectivesandsignificanceandtranslationneeds.Parttwoisbackgroundstudy,includingbackgroundofsourcetext,theorybackground.Partthreeisaboutthedifficultiesintranslationandsolutions.Partfourconcludeswiththeexperienceandunsolvedproblemsinthetranslationproject.WiththeguidanceofSkopostheory“Focusingaboveallonthepurposeofthetranslation,thetranslatorshoulddeploypropertranslationmethodsandstrategiestoproduceafunctionallyadequateresult.”,thetranslatorcarefullyanalyzesthelinguisticfeatureofthesourcetextthenconsidersthatthetranslationofinformativetextshoulddeploydifferenttranslationmethods,includingconversion,changeoforder,andadditionandomissionandsoon,toexpresscorrectlyandexactlytheoriginalmeaningofsourcetextinaccordancewiththefeaturesofthetargetlanguage.Keywords:publicinvestmentmanagement;procurement;informativetext;Skopostheory;conversion;additioniii AcknowledgementsFirstandforemost,thetranslatorwouldliketoexpressherdeepestgratitudetohersupervisor,AssociateProfessorZhangYong,forherkindadviceduringtheprocessofwritingthistranslationprojectreport.Withoutherinstruction,kindnessandpatience,thetranslatorcouldnothavecompletedthisreport.Herkeenandrespectableacademicobservationenlightensthetranslatornotonlyinthisprojectbutalsoinherfuturestudyaswellastranslationpractice.Besides,thetranslatoralsofeelsgratefultoalltheteachersatthecollegeofInterpretingandTranslation,whotaughtthetranslatorinhispostgraduatestudyperiodandhelpedhertodevelopheracademiccompetence.Lastbutnotleast,thetranslatorshallshowhersincereappreciationtoherfamilywhohassharedwithherherworries,frustrations,andtoallherfriendsaswellasclassmatesfortheirencouragementsandsupports.iv CONTENTS中文摘要........................................................................................................................iiAbstract........................................................................................................................iiiAcknowledgements.......................................................................................................ivChapterOneTanslationProjectIntroduction.............................................................11.1TranslationProjectBackground........................................................................11.2NeedsAnalysis..................................................................................................11.3Significance.......................................................................................................2ChapterTwoSourceTextAnalysis&skoposTheory................................................42.1SourceTextAnalysis.........................................................................................42.1.1SourceTextContent................................................................................42.1.2LinguisticFeaturesofSourceText.........................................................52.2SkoposTheory..................................................................................................6ChapterThreeTranslationDifficulties&Methods....................................................93.1TranslationQualityControl..............................................................................93.2TranslationDifficulties...................................................................................103.2.1Terminologies........................................................................................103.2.2Complexsentences................................................................................113.3TranslationMethods........................................................................................113.3.1Conversion............................................................................................113.3.2ChangeofOrder....................................................................................133.3.3Division.................................................................................................143.3.4AdditionandOmission.........................................................................16ChapterFourConclusion..........................................................................................184.1TranslationExperienceAcquired....................................................................184.2ProblemstoBeSolved....................................................................................19References....................................................................................................................20AppendixISourceText...............................................................................................21AppendixIITanslatedText..........................................................................................52v ChapterOneTranslationProjectIntroduction1.1TranslationProjectBackgroundInrecentyears,asChina’sinvolvementinglobaldevelopmentgrows,translationindustryisgainingitsmomentuminChina.From2004to2013,thecopyrightedbooksfromU.S.andU.K.intoChinaaresteadilyincreasing,whichamountsto45%ofthetotalimportedbooksin2013.Underthebackgroundofglobalizationandinformatization,translatedpublicationwillbecomemorediversified,standardizedandthequalityoftranslatedworkswillbegraduallyoptimized(Zhao&Sun,2015).AlthoughthetranslatormajorsinEnglishInterpreting,shehasadeepunderstandingoftheimportanceoftranslation.Interpretingandtranslationsharemanycommonbasicprinciples,whichwouldfirstbeunderstoodanddigestedthroughtranslationprocess.Agoodinterpreterwithquickresponseandaccuratejudgementisboundtobeagoodtranslatorinthefirstplace.Onecanonlyimprovehisinterpretingproficiencybylayingasolidfoundationintranslationbecausehecanidentifylinguisticweaknessesfromthetranslationprocess.(Guan,2013)Bycompletingthistranslationproject,thetranslatorhopestoimprovehertranslationabilityandhencetakesthistranslationashergraduationproject.1.2NeedsAnalysisPublicinvestmentisthebasisofnationaleconomicdevelopment,andpublicinvestmentmanagementisaveryimportantissuearoundtheworld.Publicinvestmentmanagementisrelativelywell-developedindevelopedcountries.Forexample,theUnitedKingdomhasimplementedhighlycentralizedmanagementonitspublicinvestment,andthepublicsectorhasadoptedcompellingbiddingtoguaranteemorestrictsupervisionofandfairuseofgovernmentspending.Moreover,thespendingof1 thepublicsectorismonitoredbypublicexpenditurecommitteeoftheparliament.(Wu,2008)TheframeworkthatguidespublicinvestmentintheUnitedKingdomisbasedontwokeyelements:asetoffiscalrulesthatunderpinthegovernment’scommitmenttosoundpublicfinancesandguidethemacroeconomicmanagementoftheeconomy;andbudgetingrulesandproceduresthatcreatetherightincentivesatthemicroeconomiclevel.Withinthisframework,theUnitedKingdomgovernmenthasimplementedastrategytodeliverasustainedincreaseinpublicinvestmentwithnetinvestmentrisingto2.25%ofGDP,whilemaintainingasustainablefiscalpositionwithnetdebtstabilisingataround37%ofGDP.Over2004-05,nominalnetinvestmenthasincreasednearly40%overthepreviousyeartoalevelofaround1.5%ofGDP.(WorldBank:2006)However,manyimperfectionsstillexistinChina’spublicinvestmentmanagementsuchassmallscale,irrationalityofstructure,unevendistributionandinefficientuse.Forexample,ontheoverallGDPfrom1981-2007,theproportionofpublicinvestmentscalewas4.01%-10.93%,increasingby6.99%onaveragein27years.Butaccordingtoexperiencesfromdevelopedcountries,onlybeingabout16%ofthetotalGDP,publicinvestmentcaneffectivelysupportthesustainedeconomicgrowth.(Cui&Mu,2010)Soitrequiressustainedefforttocollectastrongbodyofknowledgefromexperienceacrosscountries.Therefore,thetranslatorchoosesthisbookassourcetext,hopingthatitcanbringsomevaluableexperiencesforChina’spublicinvestment.1.3SignificanceThepowerofpublicinvestmentmanagementintroducesthecloserelationshipbetweenprocurementandpublicinvestmentmanagement,thatis,procurementshouldberecognizedasacoreaspectofacomprehensiveapproachtopublicinvestmentmanagement(PIM).ThischapteralsosetsoutaconceptualframeworkforlinkingprocurementtotheprocessofPIManddetailsthebenefitsthatcoordinatedmanagementwithinthisframeworkcouldachieve.Therefore,thetextcanprovidesomeilluminatinginsightsforChina’spublicinvestmentmanagement.2 Inaddition,thetranslatorcanimproveherselffromthreeaspectsbycompletingthistranslationproject.Firstofall,thetranslatorcanbroadenherhorizonandenrichherindustryknowledge.Translationprocessisalsotheprocessoflearning,whichisnotonlyrelatedtotheprofessionalknowledgeinbothChineseandEnglish,butalsotorelativeindustryknowledge.Secondly,thetranslationprojectcanaccessefficiencyinbothChineseandEnglishofthetranslator.Thatmeansthetranslatorshouldaccuratelytranslatethesourcetextintothetargettextonthebasisofathoroughunderstandingofthesourcetext.ItrequiresthetranslatortoacquaintprofessionalknowledgeinvolvedinthesourcetextandstrongChineselinguisticabilitytoproduceanequivalenttranslationversion.Inaddition,differenttranslationmethods,translationassistanttoolsareusedinthetranslationprocess.Duringthetranslationprocess,thetranslatorusesmanydifferenttranslationassistanttools,includingfinancialdictionary,investmentreferencebooksandtranslationsoftwares,etc.Bydeployingpropermethods,thetranslatortriesherbesttoeliminatemuchofthehardshipandimprovetheaccuracyandacceptabilityofthetranslation.3 ChapterTwoSourceTextAnalysis&SkoposTheoryThischapterfocusesonthesourcetextanalysisandSkopostheory.Firstly,sourcetextcontentandlinguisticfeaturesofthesourcetextarediscussed.AndthecorevalueoftheSkopostheoryisalsoanalyzed.2.1SourceTextAnalysisThistranslationprojectreportisbasedonThePowerofPublicInvestmentManagementpublishedontheofficialwebsiteofWorldBankGroupin2014:https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20393.Thesourcetextcontains82,100wordswith11,000wordsinchapter6.ThereisnopublishedChineseversionofanypartofthisbookuponthecompletionofthetranslationreport.2.1.1SourceTextContentThepowerofpublicinvestmentmanagementisoncontributingtoanunderstandingoftheproblemofPIM—adistinctiveaspectofeconomicpolicyandbudgetmanagementthatrequiresanddeservesspecialtreatmentanddiscussionandanacknowledgmentofthespecialinstitutionalarrangementsandcapabilitiesthatarenecessarytoensuregoodoutcomes.Inadditiontochapter6ProcurementandPublicInvestmentManagement(PIM),theoriginaltextconsistsofothersixchapters,includingbuildingasystemforPIM,unifiedframeworkforPIM,countryexperiencesofPIM,approachesforbetterprojectappraisal,andunderuncertaintyPIMforpublic-privatepartnerships.ThistranslationprojectisaboutChapter6,ProcurementandPublicInvestmentManagement.Itmakesthecasefortreatingprocurementplanning,contractaward,andcontractmanagementascriticalpartsofPIMratherthanasaseparate“procurement”processfocusedlargelyoncontractaward.Changesinglobalmarkets,intechnologies,andintheever-presentriskoffraudandcollusionmakeprocurement4 oneofthemostcomplexandchallengingaspectsofpublicmanagement.Yetprocurementsystemsareoftennotexplicitlyconsideredindiscussionsofpublicinvestment.ConceptuallyintegratingprocurementwiththePIMprocessaddsscopeforcapturingthepotentialefficiencygainsthroughcoordinatedmanagementwithinthisframework.Thisapproachiswellalignedwiththegrowinginterestinmovingawayfromtheoldercompliance-with-rulesapproachtoamoreperformance-basedapproachtoprocurement.CountriescouldsignificantlyimprovePIMefficiencyiftheprocurementprocesswereintegratedwithupstreamprojectplanningandbudgetingandifdownstreamcontractandprojectmanagementwerealsobettercoordinated.Admittedly,therequiredinstitutionalcapacitiesforsuchintegratedPIMmanagementarehigh,andmanydevelopingcountrieswithlimitedcapacitiesmayinitiallyfallshortofthemark.Nevertheless,thesecapacitiescanbebuiltupovertimeandactivatedthroughincrementalandpragmaticreformswithagoalofefficientandeffectiveinvestment.ThischapterisinstructivetoChina’spublicinvestmentmanagement.Therefore,thetranslatorhopesthistranslationreportcouldprovidesomevaluablereferencefordomesticreaders.2.1.2LinguisticFeaturesofSourceTextAccordingtoReiss’Typologytheory,textscanbedividedintothreetypesaccordingtodifferentcommunicativefunctions:informativetype,expressivetypeandoperativetype(Reiss,1977).Forinformativetype,thecontentor‘topic’isthemainfocusofthecommunication.Thesourcetextisclassifiedasaninformativetext.Thefollowingaresomelinguisticcharacteristicsofthistext:First,useofterminologies.Asafinancialtext,itcontainslotsofterminologiesininvestmentandprocurement.Example1:SourceText:TheinvestmentlendingportfolioofanorganizationliketheWorldBankprovidesabroadviewoftheglobalprocurementproblem.5 Example2:SourceText:Ithasheldnofewerthanfiveconferencesoverthepastdecadeandissuedseveralpapersonhowtocombatbidriggingandcartelizationintheconstructionsector.Example3:SourceText:Wherepowerfulcartelsofferbureaucraciesmonetaryinducementstosteergovernmentcontractstheirway,theinteractionbetweenaweakgovernmentandstrongbusinessinterestscanleadtohigh-costprocurementandwastefulallocationofpublicresources.Second,useofcomplexsentences.Duetostronglogicandprofessionalism,itiscommontoseecomplexsentenceinthistext.Example4:Sourcetext:Governmentprocurementofgoodsandworkssuffersfromthefactthattheresourcesaremanagedonbehalfofabsentprincipals—thecitizens(andtaxpayersinthedonorcountry)—byagents(politiciansandgovernmentbureaucrats)whomaynotfullyrepresenttheprincipals’bestinterests.Example5:Unlikestandardgoodsprocurement,thelimitedscopetofindprivatesectorcomparatorsforpublicgoodssuchasnationalroadsoranirrigationsystemorairportsimpliesthatgovernmentsmustdefinetechnicalstandardsandmechanismstodeterminecostsandqualityexanteandundertakecomplexmonitoringandmeasurementtoensureadherenceexpost.Asanon-literarytext,itfocusesonthetransmissionofinformationandfacts,ratherthanextravagantrhetoricorwords.Sentencesareaimedtopreciselyandlogicallystateorexplainfacts.Sothetranslatortriesherbesttoavoidburdensomeandtomaketranslationmoreaccurate.2.2SkoposTheory“Skopos”isaGreekwordfor“purpose”,andtheprimeprincipledetermining6 anytranslationprocessisthepurposeoftheoveralltranslationaction.Therefore,thetranslatortakesSkopostheoryasthetheoreticalguidanceofthistranslationproject.Theinformativetext,whichaimsatconveyingcontents,shouldbetranslated"accordingtothesenseandmeaning"inordertomaintaintheinvariabilityofthesecontents.Tothisend,plainlanguagewithoutunnecessaryredundancyshouldbeadoptedanditmaybenecessarythatwhatisconveyedimplicitlyinthesourcetextshouldbeexplicatedinthetranslatedtext(Vermeer,1996).BeforeFunctionalism,scholarssuchasEugeneAlbertNidaemphasizedonequivalenceintranslation.However,whenusingdifferentorevencontradictorystandardsinnon-literaltexts,theequivalenceapproachwhichwasmainlyusedinliterarytextsbecamecontroversial.Thus,anewtheorywasestablished.KatharinaReissviewsthatthetranslationcriticcannolongerrelyonfeaturesderivedfromsource-textanalysisbuthastojudgewhetherthetargettextisfunctionalintermsofthetranslationcontext.(Reiss,1971).Andlater,ChristinaNord,thesecondgenerationofFunctionalist,initiativelyintegratedideasofFunctionalismsystematicallywithEnglish,carriedoutandfurtherdevelopedtheSkopostheorybycomingupwiththe“FunctionplusLoyalty”inTextAnalysisinTranslationin1998.KatharinaReissdividestextsintofourtypes:informativetext,expressivetext,operativetextandaudiomedialtext.Thistextisaninformativetext.First,forthiskindoftext,Skopostheoryisusuallydeployedasthetranslationguideline.ThemainideaofSkopostheoryisthattranslatorsshouldholdthethoughtfromtheperspectiveofthetargetreadersduringtheprocessoftranslation.Therefore,translatorsshouldbearinmindwhatthefunctionoftranslationtextis,whatthetargetreaders"demandisandevenwhatcommunicativesituationis.Consequently,inordertoachieveabetterfunctiontext,thechoiceoftranslationstrategiesisdecidedbythepurposeofthetranslationtext.AccordingtoKatharinaReiss’sworkontexttypetheory,shesuggeststhatthetranslationofinformativetextshouldtransmitthefullreferentialorconceptualcontentofthesourcetextandshouldbein‘plainprose’,withoutredundancyandwiththeuseofexplicitationwhenrequired.(Reiss,1976:20)The7 translationshouldconformtotheprincipleofSkopostheory,loyaltyandreadabilitytorealizethecommunicationfunction.InChinastudiesonSkopostheorystartedfrom1987byMr.GuiQianyuan’sThreeTranslatorsfromFederalGermany.Later,severalinfluentialChinesescholarsintroduceChineseversionofrelatedtheories.TopicsconcerningSkopostheoryrangefromtranslationdefinition,translationstandards,translationcritic,translationteaching,literarytranslationtonon-literaltranslationandsoon.SomeofthescholarsstudySkopostheorybycomparingitwithtraditionalChinesetranslationtheory.Forinstance,ProfessorZhouMengzhen(2007)holdsthatSkopostheoryemphasizethattranslationshouldbeguidedbySkoposrulestocarryondiversifiedstandards,while"true,smoothandtasteful"translationtheoryputforwardbyYanFuismoreabstractandsubjective.Thesetwokindsoftheoryaresimilarinfaithfulness,coherenceandadaptationtoreaders.Buttheygreatlydifferintermsoftranslationstandard,translator"spositionandsoon.8 ChapterThreeTranslationDifficulties&Methods3.1TranslationQualityControlTranslationqualitycontrolisanessentialstepinthisproject.Translationqualitycontrolisadegreetowhichthecharacteristicsofatranslationfulfilltherequirementoftheagreeduponspecifications.Thetranslatorshouldbecrystalclearaboutmeaningandpurposeofthesourcetext.Thenonthebasisofherunderstanding,sheshouldconvertthesourcetextintothetargettextbyselectingaccuratetargetlanguagetoattainthegoalof“FunctionalEquivalence”.Duetotheimportanceoftranslationqualitycontrol,thetranslatordividestheprocessofthetranslationprojectintofivephases:PhaseISourcetextcomprehension(15,September,2015—25,October,2015):Thetranslator,gainedafullunderstandingofthecontentandlinguisticfeaturesofthetextbyreadingthesourcetextcarefullytwice.Aftercarefulconsideration,shetookSkopostheoryasthemaintheoreticalguidance.PhaseIIReferencecollection(1,November,2015—11,November,2015):InordertothoroughlydigestSkopostheorytosupportthistranslationreport,thetranslatorstudiedreferencebookssuchasJeremyMunday’sIntroducingTranslationStudies,VermeerandReiss’sTranslationCriticism-PotentialsandLimitations,etc..Then,thetranslatorsearchedthebackgroundinformationaboutthistext,theauthors,goodtranslationversionsofparalleltexts,aswellasfinancialinvestmentknowledgewhichishighlyrequired.Allareofgreathelpforunderstandingtheoperationofpublicinvestmentmanagementandverybeneficialforthetranslation.PhaseIIITextTranslation(15,November,2015—31,December,2015):Inthisphase,thetranslatorconcentratedhereffortontranslatingthesourcetext.Inevitably,sheencounteredmanydifficultiesinthetranslatingprocess,soshekeptcarefulrecordsofallthedifficultieswhenshemetthem,solatershecouldreflecton.PhaseIVReportwriting(1,January,2016—15,January,2016):After9 completionofthetranslatedtext,thetranslatorimmediatelydevotedherselftoreportwritingbyreflectingontheexperiencesandlessonsshegained.PhaseVProofreading(16,January,2016—20,January,2016):Inthisphase,thetranslatordedicatedherselftoproofreading.Shecheckedthewholetranslationmeticulouslyandcorrectedthetranslationmistakes.Inordertogetridoftranslationese,shealsoaskedafavorofthesupervisorandotherexpertstomakebettercorrections.Duringthewholeprocessofthetranslationproject,thetranslatorimprovedherselfalotfrommanyaspects.3.2TranslationDifficultiesAfteranalyzedthesourcetext,thetranslatorfindsthattofinishthistranslationisfarfromeasy.Thesourcetextisaprofessionalreadingmaterialrichinfinancialinvestmenttermswhichrequiresadequatebackgroundknowledgeandrelatedresearch.Accordingtothetranslator’stranslatingexperience,shehasencounteredmanydifficultiesduringthetranslationprocessofthisprofessionalinformativetext,andshehassummarizedthefollowingdifficulties:3.2.1TerminologiesProfessionalterminologiesisoneofthebiggestchallengesthetranslatormeets.Terminologyisthestudyoftermsandtheiruse.Termsarewordsandcompoundwordsormulti-wordexpressionsthatinspecificcontextsaregivenspecificmeanings—thesemaydeviatefromthemeaningsthesamewordshaveinothercontextsandineverydaylanguage.Wordisthefundamentalelementofatext.Itisimpossibletounderstandasentencewithoutknowingthemeaningofkeywordsofasentence.Thesewordsalsomeanextralinguisticknowledgetosomeextent.Thosewordsfrequentlyemergedinlinesarealwayskeystounderstandingthewholesentenceorparagraph.Therefore,beforetranslationthetranslatorhastoknowtheirmeaningand10 rangeofpracticebysearchingthroughdictionariessuchastheOxfordEnglishDictionary,MBAlib,ReuterChineseNetwork,andCNKI.Example4:portfolio,bidrigging,cartels,contractaward,rent-extractingpractices.FinallythetranslatorobtainedtheaccurateChinesemeaningsoftheexamplewordsabove:投资组合、串通投标、行业联盟、合同判授。3.2.2ComplexsentencesAcomplexsentenceisasentencethatcontainsanindependentclauseandatleastonedependentclause.Deployingcomplexsentencesisoneofthecharacteristicsofthesourcetext.Generallyspeaking,Englishprefersmorelongsentenceswithstronglogictostressitsstrictandprofessionalism;andChineseprefersshortsentencewithclearlogic.Example5:Governmentprocurementhasdiversifiedinnature,size,andcomplexity,particularlyoverthepasttwodecadesastechnologicalchangehasrevolutionizedboththeindustryandservicesectorsandcorrespondinglychangedthenatureofgovernmentpurchases.3.3TranslationMethodsTranslationMethodsarethosebywhichthetranslatorcantranslatetheaccuratemeaningofsourcetextintotargettext.InE-Ctranslation,somecommonmethodsareusuallydeployed,includingconversion,addition,omissionandsoon.Thesourcetextisnon-literarymaterial.UndertheguidanceofSkopostheory,thetranslatortriestomaketranslationwellunderstoodbyreadersandmakethetranslatedversionmakesenseintargetculture.Therefore,differenttranslationmethodsareused.3.3.1ConversionConversionreferstotheshiftofpartofspeechofawordortotheshiftofvoice11 ofasentenceintranslation.Forexample,adjectivesareconverteddirectlyintoverbs,orverbsareconvertedasnouns,etc..EnglishlanguageusemorepassivevoicewhileChineselanguagepreferactivevoice.Therefore,thetranslatorshouldchoosepropertypesofconversiontomakethetranslationcomplytothereadinghabitsofthetargetlanguagereaders.BecauseChineselanguageusemoreverbs,whileEnglishlanguageprefersadjectivesornouns,especiallyinnon-literaltexts.Thus,inEnglishtoChinesetranslation,adjectivesornounscanbechangedintoverbssoastoadaptthetranslationversiontoChineselanguagehabit.Example5:Sourcetext:Deficienciesintheinteractionbetweentheprocurement,PIM,andbudgetingsystemcreateaviciouscycleinwhicheverybrokenlinkweakensanotherone,tothedetrimentofoverallinvestmentoutcomes.Translatedtext:采购、公共投资管理和预算系统间缺乏联系会形成恶性循环，每个中断的环节会影响另一个环节，有损整体投资效益。Analysis:Inthissentence,thefirstword“Deficiencies”isanounwhichmeans“缺乏，不足”.Thenthemeaningof“Deficienciesintheinteraction”is“联系的缺乏”.Thetranslatorconverts“Deficienciesintheinteraction”intotheverb“缺乏联系”tomakeitmoreconformtoChineseexpression.Example6:Sourcetext:Landacquisitionisoftenproblematicincountrieswherepropertyrightsarenotclearlyestablishedandwherelegalsystemsareinefficientoroverloaded.Translatedtext:一些国家没有制定明确的财产权法规，法律体系不健全或难以匹配国家运转速度，土地征用频繁出现问题。Analysis:Here,thesourcetextusesanadjective“problematic”,whichmeans“有问题的”.Thetranslatorchosetoconvertthisadjectiveintoverb“出现问题”tomakeitinaccordancewithChineselanguage.Example7:Sourcetext:Complaintandappealsmechanismsinsuchcasesareusuallynot12 effective.Translatedtext:在此类案例中，投诉和上诉机制通常不起作用。Analysis:Accordingtotheoriginalmeaningofthesentence,thetranslationshouldbe“在此类案例中，投诉和上诉机制通常并不是有效的”.ThisdefinitelymakestheChineseversionmoreredundant.Togetridoftranslationese,thetranslatorconverteditintoaverb“起作用”.Besidespartofspeech,conversionalsoincludestheconversionofvoice.ConversionofvoicesalsofrequentlyusedinEnglish-Chinesetranslationtoemphasizekeypointsofthesentence.Example8:Sourcetext:Expansionoftheroadnetworktookplaceatthesametimethatthefinancialmodelforbuildingroadswaschanged,andtheprocurementprocesswasreconstructedandenhanced.Translatedtext:在道路网络拓展的同时，该机构也改变了道路建设的财务模式，并对采购流程进行了重组、改进。Analysis:InChinese,ifthepassivevoicewaskept,itmightbeawkward.Sothetranslatorconverted“waschanged”and“wasreconstructedandenhanced”intoactivevoice“改变了”and“重组、改进了采购流程”.3.3.2ChangeofOrderItissometimesnecessarytochangethewordorsentenceorderofthesourcetexttomakeitmoreunderstandable.Englishwriterstendtobedirectinwritingbypresentingimportantinformationfirstly.However,forChinesetexts,itisveryimportanttounveilthepointsstepbystepandtellreadersthemostimportantthingatlast.Example9:Sourcetext:Nevertheless,thesecapacitiescanbebuiltupovertimeandactivatedthroughincrementalreformsifmotivatedbygooddesignprinciplesandanendgoalofefficientandeffectiveinvestment.13 Translatedtext:尽管如此，在良好的设计原理和高效投资终极目标的激励下，各国政府可以通过渐进式改革建立并激活这些能力。Analysis:Here,“if”actsastheleadingwordofanadverbialclauseofcondition.InaccordingtoChinese,adjustingtheadverbialclauseofconditionbeforethemainsentenceisbetterforthepart“thesecapacitiescanbebuiltupovertimeandactivatedthroughincrementalreforms“iswhatthissentencewantstoemphasize.Example10:Sourcetext:Thescenariosjustdescribedandmyriadotherpitfallscanderailapublicinvestmentproject,nomatterhowcriticalitmaybe.Translatedtext:无论一个公共投资项目多么关键，之前描述的情形及无数其他陷阱都可能破坏它。Analysis:BasedonChineselanguagehabit,adverbialclauseofconditionisusuallyplacedbeforemainsentence.Therefore,thetranslatormoves“nomatterhow⋯”before“Thescenariosjustdescribed⋯”.Example11:Sourcetext:TheConstructionSectorTransparencyInitiative(CoST2011)foundvariationsbetweenfinalandinitialcontractpricesoftypically10–50percent—insomecasesashighas100–180percentforselectedagenciesinEthiopia,Guatemala,Malawi,thePhilippines,Tanzania,theUnitedKingdom,Vietnam,andZambia.Translatedtext:建筑业透明度倡议（CoST2011）发现埃塞俄比亚,危地马拉、马拉维、菲律宾、坦桑尼亚、英国、越南、赞比亚部分企业的最终与最初合同价格差异通常为10%-50%，在某些情况下甚至高达100%-180%。Analysis:Generally,adverbsofplaceareusuallyputattheendofasentenceinEnglish,whiletheorderofChineseisalwaysexactlytheopposite.Thenthetranslatorchoosestomovethosecountrynamesnextto“TheConstructionSectorTransparencyInitiative”.3.3.3DivisionThemethodofdivisionmeanssplittingalongsentenceintotwoormore.Itis14 verycommoninEnglishtoChinesetranslationsinceEnglishlanguageemphasizesthestructure,whileChineselanguagefocusesmoreonmeaning.SowecanalwaysfindlongsentenceinEnglishtexts,andsmallandshortsentencesinChinesetexts.AndifwejustkeepthestyleofthesourcetextbypresentingthesamelongandcomplexsentencesinChinese,readersmightbeconfused.Example12:Sourcetext:Contractmanagementbeginswhenaprocurementcontractissignedandendswhenallthecontractedservicesandproductshavebeendelivered,accepted,andpaidfor,andallassociatedcontractpaperworkandfileshavebeenarchived.Translatedtext:采购合同签署后合同管理启动；所有合同规定的服务和产品均已交付、签收、支付应付款项且所有合同相关文件均已归档后，合同管理结束。Analysis:Thestructureofthislongsentenceisrelativelycomplex.Thetranslatorsplitthissentenceintotwoaspectstoexpoundtheirmeaningrespectively.Thistranslationmethodenablesreaderstobemoreclearaboutthemeaningofthewholesentence.Example13:Sourcetext:Itisimportanttonotethatsuchturnkeydealsmaysometimesbearationalchoiceinsituationswheregovernmentslackthecapacitytomanagecomplexprocurementandcontractmanagement,butsuchcontractsstillneedtobenegotiatedtransparentlyandwithaneyetovalueformoney.Translatedtext:值得注意的是，当政府缺乏复杂采购和合同管理的能力时，这种承包协议不乏是一种理性选择。当然，此类合同的协商过程需透明，并着眼于物有所值。Analysis:Thetranslationofthissentencedeploysdivisionmethod.ThetranslatorsplitoneEnglishsentenceintotwoChinesesentences,whichmakestheversioneasierforunderstanding.Example14:Sourcetext:Valueformoneyincapitalinvestmentprocurementisalsoamuch15 moredifficultconstructthaninstandardgoodsprocurement—involvingadeterminationoftheextenttowhichtheassetisfitforpurposeandthetotallifetimecostoftheasset(avariablethatisoftennotpossibletodeterminewithoutananalysisoftherateofdepreciation).Translatedtext:相比标准商品采购，资本投资采购的等值概念更为复杂，需确定资产对目标的适用程度以及资产的总寿命成本（在未分析贬值率的情况下，通常无法确定该变量）。Analysis:Thisisalongsentence.InspokenChinese,wearesousedtoexpresseachdifferentsensegroupwithashortpausetoanotherone.AndinwrittenChinese,weusecommatoseparatesensegroups.BasedonthischaracteristicsofChinesegrammar,thefactorsrelativetooralbehavior,thetranslatorcutsthewholesentenceintothreesensegroups.Suchdivisioncansimplifythesentencestructure,makingthetranslationmoreunderstandableandacceptable.3.3.4AdditionandOmissionDuetodifferentgrammarstructure,sometimesthetranslatorhastoaddoromitafewwordsofthesourcetextforbetterunderstandingofthetranslatedtext.Additionmeansaddingnecessarywordsintranslationonthebasisofaccuratecomprehensionofthesourcetextforsemanticcompletionandsyntacticcompletion.Andomittingisawayofkeepingthemeaningofthesourcetextclearlyexpressedandatthesametimeguaranteeingthebrevityofthetranslatedversionbycuttingsomepronouns,connectivesandprepositionsandsoon.Example15:Sourcetext:Shouldthecostimplicationsbeverylarge,itmaybenecessarytoreconsidertheviabilityoftheproject.Translatedtext:如果项目改动会对成本造成巨大影响，那么就有必要重新考量该项目的可行性。Analysis:Here,iftranslatethefirsthalfsentencedirectlyinto“成本影响如果16 巨大的话”,readersmightbeconfusedbythecauseof“thecostimplications”.Therefore,thetranslatoraddedthereasonfor“thecostimplications”accordingtothecontext,tomaketheversionmorespecificandclear.Example16:Sourcetext:Aconsiderableamountofattention,therefore,focusesonensuringthatprocurementdepartmentsfollowcompetitiveandtransparentprocesses;avoidconflictsofinterest;andreflectadequateconcernforefficientandeffectiveprocurementofgoods,construction,andservicesoftherequiredqualityandquantityattheleastcost.Translatedtext:因此要更关注采购部门的采购流程，确保其竞争性、透明性；避免利益冲突；以最低成本高效采购符合需求质量及数量的商品、施工和服务，对此应予以足够重视。Analysis:Inthissentence,“efficient”and“effective”sharethesamemeaning.Inordernottoberedundant,thetranslatoromittedoneofthetwowords“efficientandeffective”andtranslatethesetwowordsinthesameChineseword“高效”.Meanwhile,thetranslatorchanged“procurement”intoaverb,andchanged“efficientandeffective”intoanadverbialtomakeitobeytheChineseexpression.Example17:Sourcetext:Althoughthesestepsandmechanismsareimportantaspectsofagoodprocurementsystem,theyprovideanincompleteperspectiveandcreateapotentiallycostlydetachmentfromthefullpublicinvestmentprocess.Translatedtext:尽管这些步骤和机制是建立一个良好采购体系的重要方面，但它们并未涵盖采购体系的方方面面，并且可能造成采购与公共投资全流程分离，带来高昂的损失。Analysis:Here,thekeypointofthissentenceshouldbeemphasizingtheresultbroughtbythereasonsabove,butithasnotstatedoutrightwhattheresultis.So,thetranslatormakesimplicitresultexplicitbyaddingtheresult“带来高昂的损失”attheendofthetranslatedversion.17 ChapterFourConclusion4.1TranslationExperienceThroughthistranslationpractice,thetranslator,ontheonehand,enrichesherownknowledgeonprocurementandfinancialinvestment.Ontheotherhand,shelearnsmoreaboutEnglish-Chinesetranslation,accumulatingmuchexperience.Firstly,thetranslationcontributestoimprovementofthetranslator’sefficiencyinbothChineseandEnglish.Duringthetranslatingpracticeprocess,thetranslatorpersonallyexperiencesthattranslationpracticeplaysanactiveroleinmasteringbothChineseandEnglishvocabularyandgrammar,aswellasimprovingpragmaticcompetenceandexpressiveability.Byreferringtomanyfinancialinvestmenttextsinbilingualversion,thetranslatorhaslearnedmanyauthenticChineseandEnglishexpressionofthisprofessionalfield.Secondly,thetranslatorhaslearnedtranslationoffinancialinvestmentterminologies.Therearemanyterminologiesinfinancialinformativetext.AlthoughmostoftheterminologieshavetheirownequivalenttranslationversioninChinese,therearestillsometerminologiesthathavenoequivalenttranslationinChinesesothatthetranslatorhastotranslatethemonthebasisofherownunderstandingoftheoriginalwords.Thetranslatorlearnsitisveryhelpfultorefertorelevantbilingualmaterialsanddictionariestounderstandtheauthors’meaningfromthecontext,andthencreateequivalentterminologiesonherown.Thiskindoftranslationmethodnotonlyfitsforfinancialinvestmentterminologies,butalsoforterminologiesinotherfields.Thirdly,throughthistranslationprocess,thetranslatorhasgotsomeunderstandingoffinancialinvestmenttextandmasteredrelevanttranslationskills.Sincethereareseldomanyfinancialinvestmenttextsintranslationpracticesofthetranslator,shehasgotagoldenchancetounderstandfunctionandfeatureofthiskindoftext.Especially,theinformationalfunctionoffinancialinvestmenttextcanhelp18 peopleattainsomeinformation,theoriesandstrategiesoffinancialinvestment.Withregardtotranslationmethodsoffinancialinvestmenttext,therearesomedifferencesfromthoseofliterarytext.Tosumup,thetranslationmethodsoffinancialinvestmenttextaremainlyliteraltranslation,additiontranslation,andadjustingsentencestructure,andsoon.Fourthly,thetranslatorhasobtainedadeepunderstandingoftheoperatingstepsofprocurementandextendedtheknowledgeofhowtomakeprocurementmoreefficient,asaresult,thetranslatorhaslearnedbothsomebasictheoriesandhowtoapplythesetheoriesintopractice.4.2ProblemsToBeSolvedAlthoughthetranslationhasbeenproofreadforseveraltimes,itstillneedsfurtherimprovement.Firstly,duetothelimitsofthetranslator’slanguageabilityaswellaslackofprofessionalism,thetranslatedversionisnotgoodenoughtobeaccurate,smoothandprofessional.Someoftheexpressionsstillcarrytranslationese.Therefore,thetranslatorisexpectedtoimproveherlanguageproficiencyandbroadentheknowledgeofrelatedfield.Secondly,becausetheprojectiscompletedonlybasedonthetranslator’spersonaltranslationexperience,moretranslationmethodsareexpectedtobeusedformakingabettertranslatedversion.Meanwhile,asitismuchtime-consumingtocollectneededmaterialsandinformation,thetranslatorisexpectedtouseCATsoftwaretoimproveefficiency.19 ReferencesMunday,J.IntroducingTranslationStudies,2001.Nord,C.TranslatingasaPurposefulActivity:FunctionalistApproachesExplained,Manchester:StJerome.1997.Rajaram,Anandetal.ThePowerofPublicInvestmentManagement.WorldBank.https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20393.2014.Reiss,K.‘specialtranslationmethodsaccordingtotexttype’.1976:20.Reiss,K.‘Texttypes,translationtypesandtranslationassessment,’translatedbyA.Chesterman,inA.Chesterman(ed.)(2004).1981/2004.www.oecd.org/unitedkingdom/43469354.2006.VermeerHJ.ASkoposTheoryoftranslation.1996.Vermeer&Reiss,K.TranslationCriticism-PotentialsandLimitations.2004.Wong,Christine.China:PIMunderReformandDecentralization.WorldBank,Washington,DC.https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21045.Woods,Robert.PublicInvestmentintheUnitedKingdom.崔显凯，慕永玲.当前我国公共投资存在的问题及建议[J].财经界.2010,(23).陈玉龙，王晓燕.功能翻译目的论在中国的研究现状综述[J].中国电力教育.2010,(24).冯庆华.《实用翻译教程》[M].上海：上海教育出版社.2008.管艳郡.汉英笔译与口译关联性分析[J].英语广场：学术研究.2013,03.吴雄志.发达国家政府投资项目管理模式的分析与借鉴[J].特区经济.2008,07.赵冰，孙雪松.中国翻译出版的现状及发展趋势[J].出版参考.2015,(15).周锰珍.“目的论”与“信达雅”——中西方两种译论的比较[J].学术论坛.2007,(08).20 AppendixⅠSourceTextChapter6ProcurementandPublicInvestmentManagementIntroductionProcurementisamajoraspectofeverygovernment’sbusinessprocessandhasprofoundeconomicimpact.Thesizeoftotalgovernmentprocurement(consumptionandinvestmentexpenditure)wasestimatedtobeabout12percentofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)forOrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)countriesin2008(OECD2011).Thecorrespondingfigurefordevelopingcountriesistypicallyhigher.Thevolumeofinvestmentprocurementaloneisestimatedtobe75–80percentoftotalgovernmentprocurement(VeigaMaltaetal.2011).Inefficiencyintheprocurementsystemcanthushavesignificanteffectsbothmacroeconomicallyandonthecost-benefitrationaleforinvestmentdecisions.Bothresultscouldadverselyaffecttheeconomicwelfareofcitizens.Yetfeweconomictextspaymuchattentiontothiscriticalaspectofthepublicinvestmentprocess.Governmentprocurementhasdiversifiedinnature,size,andcomplexity,particularlyoverthepasttwodecadesastechnologicalchangehasrevolutionizedboththeindustryandservicesectorsandcorrespondinglychangedthenatureofgovernmentpurchases.Thirtyyearsback,thebulkofprocurementincludedstraightforwardandsimplegoods(suchasofficesupplies,fuel,parts,basichealthsuppliesandmedicines,andbooks);relativelystandardcivilworks(suchasbridges,watertreatmentplants,androads);andplant-relatedequipment(suchasgenerators,transformers,andwaterpumps).Thesedays,governmentsfacemorecomplexprocurementrequirementssuchasmultiparttechnologicalsystems;integratedbusinesssolutionsinvolvinginformationtechnologyhardwareandsoftware;concessioncontracts;andpublic-privatepartnershipstobuild,operate,andmaintainmajorinfrastructuresystems.21 Correspondingly,governmentshaveaccesstomore-advancedprocurementmethodsandtoolssuchaselectronicprocurementtotakeadvantageofbettersupplystrategies.1Presentlyinanycountry,thereislikelytobeablendofsimpleandcomplexprocurement,withthepredominanceofoneortheotherdependingonthelevelofeconomicdevelopment,thesizeandstructureoftheeconomy,andthenatureoftheinvestmentplans.Theimplicationsofthisevolutionarefar-reachingforprocurementsystems.Thereisaneedformuchbetterprojectandprocurementplanning,betterbudgeting,nimbleandadaptableregulations,controlsystemsmorefocusedonresultsandriskdetectionandmitigation,increasedtechnicalcapacity,andbetter-educatedprocurementandprojectmanagersandprofessionalsabletomanagecomplexprocessesinpursuitofvalueformoney.Whileevenhigh-capacitygovernmentsarehard-pressedtokeepupwiththesedemands,thechallengesforcountrieswithlowercapabilitiesareevenmoredifficult.Onewaytodescribetheevolutionofprocurementgraphicallyisprovidedinfigure6.1.Administrationofprocurementofthenaturedescribedinthelower-leftquadrantofthefigurepredominantlyinvolvedcompliancewithlegalandadministrativerulesandprocedurestoachieveacompetitiveprocessandvalueformoney.Theimplicitassumptionisthatstrictcompliancewithwell-designedruleswouldresultinoptimumresults.Ontheotherhand,procurementofthenaturedescribedintheupper-rightquadrant,whichischaracterizedbygreatercomplexity,wouldrequirecompliancewithestablishedmanagerialstandardswithinasetofprescribedethicalandprofessionalnormsbutwouldallowmanagerswiderdiscretiononproceduralandadministrativematterstoachieveresults.Inotherwords,whileofficersinthefirstcaseareexpectedtocomplywithstrictformalproceduresandhaveverylimiteddiscretion,22 inthesecondcasetheyareexpectedtocomplywithethicalstandardsbuthavemoreproceduraldiscretiontoundertakeanalysisandexercisejudgmenttoachieveprojectobjectives.Similarly,whileinthefirstcasecontrolslookatproceduralmatters,inthesecondcasetheyfocustoagreaterextentonmanagerialperformanceandethicalbehaviors.Thecomplexityofmodernprocurementcombinedwithincreasedemphasisonresultsrequiresgreatercapacitytomakediscretionaryjudgmentsbasedoncontextualanalysis.Partlybecauseofthesenewdemandsonprocurementsystems,publicprocurementisoneofthefastest-changinggovernmentfunctionsasbothOECDanddevelopingcountriesfocusontheadaptationofprocurementtonewrealities(seebox6.1).Moreover,theintensepublicinterestinthefightagainstcorruptionandglobalconcernsaboutfiscalefficiencyhavealsocreatedpressuresforpoliticiansandgovernmentstoaddresstheneedformoretransparentandfunctionalprocurementsystems.Despitethevariousinfluencesdescribedinbox6.1,itisfairtosaythatprocurementremainstheleastsatisfactoryaspectofmostgovernmentsystems,particularlyindevelopingcountries.Mostdevelopingcountriesinheritedacolonialmodelofprocurementthatimplementedarule-bound,highlycentralizedprocessthroughnationaltenderboardsandstoresorsimilar23 bodies.Thesuccessfuladoptionofeventhisrule-basedmodelofprocurementwasunevenacrosscountries.Procurementisparticularlyproblematicindevelopingcountries,becausewherevertheinstitutionsandnormsforpublicmanagementarenotwellestablished,andwhereverthecivilservicemaybepoorlytrainedandremunerated,compliancewithrulestendstobeweakandoverallgovernanceconditionspoor.However,asprocurementexpandedinvolumeanddiversity,andasglobalizationchangedtechnologicalspecializationandtheunderlyingmarketstructures,centralizedprocurementbecameevenlessabletorespondtotheneedsoftheclientagencies.Thesystemoftenfailedtoperformbecause,initsrigidity,itcouldnotadaptquicklytomodernmarketconditions.Theresponsetothisproblemofoutdated,ineffectiveprocurementwastorecommendanalternativeinstitutionalmodelforprocurementadministration.The1994UNCITRALModelLawontheProcurementofGoods,ConstructionandServiceswaspromotedacrossmuchoftheworldbyinternationalorganizationssuchastheagenciesoftheUnitedNationsandtheWorldBank.Thismodellaw—formallyadoptedbyover30countriesandinfluentialontheprocurementsystemsofmanyothers—recommendedthefollowing:Centralizedregulationofprocurementatthenationallevel,withdecentralizedprocurementbythedifferentagenciesatthecentralorsubnationallevelsundertheresponsibilityofdesignatedagencyordistrictprocurementauthorities.Apermanentadministrativeauthority(usuallytheMinistryofFinance)tocoordinateprocurementpolicieswiththeoverallgoalsofgovernment.Box6.1influencesontheapproachtoprocurementImportantdevelopmentsintheearly1990striggeredthechangeinperspectiveregardingtheroleofprocurementbeyondtheconceptionofamereadministrativefunctionintoastrategicstatesectorfunction.Theseeventsforcedgovernmentstofocusonprocurementastheysoughttoadaptnationalsystemstointernationaltradeagreementsandtonewbusinessconcerns.Inaddition,growingcivilsocietyinterestincurbingcorruptionandthegreaterdemandsforaccountabilityandresultsputpoliticiansonnoticeabouttheimportanceofpromotingandensuringefficientandtransparentprocurement.Severaleventsordevelopmentsduringthisperiodservedasimportantdriversinreformingprocurement:24 TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)andtheUruguayRoundofmultilateraltradenegotiationswithintheGATTframeworkculminatedwiththesigninginApril1994oftheGovernmentsProcurementAgreement(GPA)andthecreationoftheWorldTradeOrganizationin1995.TheGPAintroducedamultilateralframeworkforgovernmentprocurementthataimedtoachievegreaterliberalizationandexpansionofworldtrade.In1994,theUnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLaw(UNCITRAL)publishedtheModelLawonProcurementofGoods,ConstructionandServices.Thislawwasinresponsetothefactthatinanumberofcountriestheexistinglegislationgoverningprocurementwasfelttobeinadequateandoutdated,resultingininefficiencyandineffectivenessintheprocurementprocess,patternsofabuse,andthefailureofgovernmentstoobtainvalueformoneyintheuseofpublicfunds.Amidincreasedpublicinterestingovernmentcorruptionandthecreation,TransparencyInternationalwasestablishedin1993.Inthemid-1990s,inresponsetotheseevents,internationaldevelopmentinstitutionsshiftedthefocusofprocurementduediligencefromsupervisingborrowercompliancewiththeirpoliciesandprocedurestooneofpromotingsystemicanalysis,riskassessment,andpolicyadviceonhowtoimprovenationalsystems.Thetechnologicalimpetusbeginningintheearly1990smadeavailablenewtoolsforelectronicprocurementthatrevolutionizedthewaygovernmentscoulddobusiness.ThecreationoftheEuropeanUnion(EU)in1993broughttotheforefrontthemultiplicityofnationalprocurementsystemsthatwereanimpedimenttofreetradeandforcedgovernmentstofocusonaligningtheirnationalsystems,whichculminatedintheEUprocurementdirectivesadoptedinMarch2004.InMarch2006,allleadingmultilateralandbilateraldevelopmentagencies,91countries,andseveralcivilsocietyorganizationsinvolvedindevelopmentissuedtheParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness.Thedeclarationcommittedinstitutionsandcountriestocontinuingandincreasingeffortsinharmonization,alignment,andmanagingforresults.Italsolistedasetofmonitorableactionsandindicatorstoaccelerateprogressintheseareas.Asaresultofthe2006declaration,theOECDproducedastandardizeddiagnostictooltoassesspublicprocurementsystemsonthebasisofaninternationallyacceptedsetofstandardsforgoodprocurementthat25 governmentscanuseasabenchmarkingandmonitoringinstrument.Acentralindependentregulatoryagencyresponsibleforformulatingpolicies;issuinginstrumentsforapplicationoftheregulations(suchasinstructions,manuals,andmodelorstandardsolicitationdocuments);monitoringprocurementoperations;andtraininganddisseminatingknowledgetoprocurementofficers.Althoughtheexpectationwasthatthenewinstitutionalmodelwouldbemoreeffectiveandresponsivetomodernconditionsandtheneedsofspecificagencies,itsignificantlyraisedthebarintermsofcapabilities.Itrequiredtheexecutingagenciestohavehighercapacityandestablishadequateoversightandensureconsistencyofpoliciesandprocedures.Aswithallinstitutionalchange,thisadaptationhasnotyetoccurred,forcomplexreasons—onebeingthatmostofthecentralregulatoryagenciescreatedunderthereformsgenerallylackedthetechnicalandbudgetaryresourcesaswellasthepoliticalinfluencenecessarytomeaningfullyaffectsystemperformance.Becauseoftheshortageofresources,manyprocurementofficersthroughoutthesystemremainignorantofthenewregulationsandinstruments,particularlyatthesubnationallevel.Abackgroundassessmentoftheimpactofprocurementsystemreformscametothisdismalconclusion“Thereislittleornoinformationonevaluationoftheimpactofrecentlyimplementedreformsonefficiency,transparency,publictrustinthesystem,orresults.Infact,thereisnomethodologyforthiskindofevaluation,andtherearefewdocumentedevaluationsofprogressinimplementingactionplans.”(Sanchez2012)Althoughappliedeconomictheoryandlegaltheoristshaveprovidedausefulframeworkforthinkingaboutthechallengesofprocurement,thereisagapbetweenprocurementtheoryandpractice,andpublicmanagementpractitionerscontinuetostrugglewithdesigningandreformingprocurementsystems.Thegapisparticularlylargeindevelopingcountrieswherecapabilitiessignificantlylagtheneedsofgovernments.Inbroadterms,thestatusofappropriateinstitutionalarrangementsforprocurementandthecapacityofgovernmentstoundertakeeffectiveprocurementgenerallyappears,atbest,tobe“workinprogress,”withmostcountriesstillfarfromachievinganeffectivesystemforprocurement.26 WhyprocurementisintegraltopublicinvestmentForthepurposeofthisvolume,ourinterestisinprocurementrelatedtopublicinvestmentexpendituresspecifically,whichtypicallyinvolvemoderatetocomplexcontractualfeatures,asdepictedinfigure6.1.Mostinternationaldevelopmentassistanceisclassifiedascapitalexpenditureanddeployedtofinancepublicinvestmentprojects,anditformsthebulkofinvestmentspendinginlow-incomecountries.Countriesalsoallocatesubstantialsharesofrevenuefromboomingnaturalresourcesectorstoinvestmentsintendedtocreatecriticaldevelopmentinfrastructure.Ifweweretobetoldthenthattheassetspurchasedthroughsuchspendingweresubjecttofraudandcorruption—thatcollusivecartelshadinflatedthecostsoftheassetsor,worsestill,replacedthemwithpoor-qualitysubstitutesorneverdeliveredthematall—wewouldconcludethatpublicinvestmentwasawastefulexpenditurewithlittleornoimpactonthegrowthprospectsofthecountry.2Evenmorebenignfactorsmaycontributetothelowvalueofpublicinvestment:forexample,manycountriesconsistentlyunderspendtheallocatedcapitalbudget,inpartbecauseofdelaysintheprocurementprocess,andthedelaysthencontributetocostescalationanddevaluationofbenefits.Thescenariosjustdescribedandmyriadotherpitfallscanderailapublicinvestmentproject,nomatterhowcriticalitmaybe.Whethertheinvestmentultimatelysucceedsorfailshingesonthestrengthsorweaknessesofagovernment’sprocurementsystem.Themostprevalentchallengesmightbecharacterizedasclassicprincipal-agentproblemsandindustry-specifichindrancestofaircompetition.Principal-AgentProblemsGovernmentprocurementofgoodsandworkssuffersfromthefactthattheresourcesaremanagedonbehalfofabsentprincipals—thecitizens(andtaxpayersinthedonorcountry)—byagents(politiciansandgovernmentbureaucrats)whomaynotfullyrepresenttheprincipals’bestinterests.Politiciansclaimtorepresenttheelectorateandtomakewell-considereddecisionsinthebroadpublicinterest.Itisclearfrominternationalexperiencethat,onceelected,politicianshaveastrongfinancialincentivetoexercisediscretioninwaysthatstrengthentheirpolitical27 benefitsandoftendeviatefromthepublicinterest.Acommonstrategyforincumbentpoliticalpartiesistomaintainamonopolyonpoliticaldonationsbythreateningtorevokemarketprivileges,includingprocurementcontracts,fromcontractorswhodonateresourcestooppositioncandidates.Thisisthefirstdistortioncreatedbytheseparationoftheprincipalandtheagentwithinagovernmentagencyundertakingprocurement.Anotherdistortion—informationasymmetrybetweenthepurchasingdepartmentandthecontractor—createsafurtherclassofproblemsthatcomplicateprocurement.Procurementprocessesaresusceptibletoarangeofrent-extractingpractices,allthemorewithcomplexcontractsandlimitedcompetition.Becauseeconomicreturnstocapitalinvestmentprojectsareoftenlarge,contractorsmayofferbribestobefavoredintheawardofcontractsandseektocorruptgovernmentofficials.Aconsiderableamountofattention,therefore,focusesonensuringthatprocurementdepartmentsfollowcompetitiveandtransparentprocesses;avoidconflictsofinterest;andreflectadequateconcernforefficientandeffectiveprocurementofgoods,construction,andservicesoftherequiredqualityandquantityattheleastcost.Inevitably,theseobjectivesrequireasystemformonitoringandoversightthatidentifiesandsanctionscorruptbehaviorbygovernmentofficialsandfirmsandprovidesacheckagainstcorruption.ThumbsontheCompetitiveScalesAsecondsetofissuesemergesfromthenatureoftheindustrysupplyingthegoodorserviceandwhetheritischaracterizedbycompetitionorbycollusion.Ifanindustryhasbarrierstoentrythatlimitcompetition,oriffirmsbehavecollusivelyorfraudulentlyinanyway,thenevenawell-managedprocurementagencywillfinditdifficulttocontaincostsandensurequality.Insomecases,governmentsseektoachievemultiple,evenlaudable,objectivesthroughprocurement,suchaspromotinglocalindustrythroughlocalcontentrequirements.Unfortunately,suchlimitationsmayalsoleadtohighercostsorlowerquality.Inaddition,publicprocurementoftenhasattractedorganizedcartels,andwithoutasoundsystemofdetectingandpenalizingcollusionandensuringfaircompetitionforthesupplyofgoodsandservicestopublicagencies,theefficiencyofpublicinvestmentcouldbesignificantlyreduced.Addaweakgovernmentprocurementmanagementsystemtoamonopolisticorcollusive28 setofsuppliers,oftenalliedwithrent-seekingpoliticalelites,andyouhaveaformulafortheworstpossibleoutcomes.Wherepowerfulcartelsofferbureaucraciesmonetaryinducementstosteergovernmentcontractstheirway,theinteractionbetweenaweakgovernmentandstrongbusinessinterestscanleadtohigh-costprocurementandwastefulallocationofpublicresources.Whenauditprocessesfailtoidentifysuchcorruptpracticesorwherepoliticalinfluenceisusedtosuppressthereportingofcollusionorimpositionofpenalties,thecorruptionintheprocurementprocesscanbecomeanentrenchedproblem.3Real-WorldCostsPublicinvestmentprocurementisparticularlypronetosignificantefficiencylossesbecauseitinvolveslarge,discretecontractsthatcanprovidehighpayoffstoelitesbymeansofpooraccountingandcollusion.Someexampleswillillustratethenatureoftheproblemmorevividly:Collusiveenvironmentcombinedwithinadequatedesignandappraisal.Turkey’spublicinvestmentprogramattheendofthe1990sconsistedof5,321projectswithanestimatedcostof$150billionandanunfinishedbalanceof$105billion.Basedontheapproximate$5billionallocatedforallpublicinvestmentin2001andprojectionsofsimilaramountsinfutureyears,theStatePlanningOrganizationestimatedthatthecurrentportfoliowouldtakeover20yearstocomplete.Despiteafairlycapablecost-benefitanalysisprocess,theprocurementprocessprovedtobeproblematic:projectsthatwereputoutforbidoftencost,atcompletion,uptothreetimesthecostsestimatedatappraisal(WorldBank2001).Onereasonforthecostescalationwasthewidespreaduseofchangeordersindesignandconstructioncontracts.Althoughinadequatedesignattheappraisalstagecontributedtotheproblem,theprocurementprocessandcollusionwereseentobesignificantreasonsfortheobservedcostescalationofinvestment.Rampantcostoverruns.TheConstructionSectorTransparencyInitiative(CoST2011)foundvariationsbetweenfinalandinitialcontractpricesoftypically10–50percent—insomecasesashighas100–180percentforselectedagenciesinEthiopia,Guatemala,Malawi,thePhilippines,Tanzania,theUnitedKingdom,Vietnam,andZambia.Evencountrieswithwell-developedpublicinvestmentmanagement(PIM)systems,suchastheUnitedKingdom,havecostoverrunsofupto15percent.Thedisparitybetweeninitialandfinalcostsmostcommonlypertaintoinadequateprojectidentificationanddesignaswellasinefficient29 procurementcontractingandexecution(CoST2010).ThesefindingssuggestthatthereisalargescopeforefficiencyimprovementinallPIMsystems,butinlow-andmiddle-incomecountries,thepotentialefficiencygainscanbeespeciallysignificant.Lowcapacityinfragilecountries.Projectdesignandprocurementinpoliticallyfragilecountriescanbecomplicatedbylimitedinformation,lowprivatesectorinterest,andtechnicalcomplexity.Inonecountry,therehabilitationofapowertransmissionlineacross2,000kilometersofjungleledtonumerousfailedeffortsover10yearsbeforeacontractorwascompetitivelyprocured.Poorprocurementperformancehamperingdevelopment.Arecentreviewofabout500projectsfundedbytheWorldBankacrossallregionsconcludedthatunsatisfactoryprocurementperformancesignificantlyaffectedthedevelopmentoutcomesofprojects,withthoseoutcomesbeingthreetofivetimesmorelikelytobenegativeincaseswithpoorprocurementperformance.Thesustainabilityofsuchprojectswasalsoadverselyaffected(WorldBank2014).AtStake:TheValueofPublicInvestmentTheinvestmentlendingportfolioofanorganizationliketheWorldBankprovidesabroadviewoftheglobalprocurementproblem.In2000-10,theWorldBanklent,worldwide,closeto$56billionforroadconstructionandmaintenance—slightlylessthan20percentoftheBank’stotallendingoverthepastdecade.Theroadssectorillustratesthedifficultyofmanagingprocurementinanimportantsectorfordevelopment(PattersonandChaudhuri2007).Inonecountry,theWorldBank’sappraisalprocessidentified36areasatriskofcorruptioninthedesign,planning,award,andmanagementofaroadscontractandrecommendedmonitoring59differentindicators(WorldBank2006,146-54).Among29casesofWorldBank-fundedprojectsthatwerereviewedbecauseofallegationsofmisconductinprocurement,threebroadtypesofmisconductwereoftennoted:collusion,falsedocumentation,andfraudincontractimplementation,thelatteroccurringoftenwiththeaidofprojectmanagers.Astheexamplesinbox6.2illustrate,publicprocurementsystemsareintegraltoPIMbecausetheyhaveapotentiallysignificantimpactonthecost-benefitcalculusthatjustifiedtheproject.Poorlyperformingprocurementsystemsdiminishthevalueofpublicinvestments(oftenattremendouscurrentandlong-termcost)andoftenimpairthesustainabilityoftheinvestment.Effortexpendedinselectinggoodprojectsand30 inensuringadequatebudgeting(amongthesubjectsofearlierchaptersinthisvolume)maybecompletelyunderminedbyaweaksystemofpublicprocurement.Box6.2collusionandcartelsintheroadssectorInJune2011,theWorldBankIntegrityVicePresidencyissuedaninvestigativereportthatdocumentedwidespreadfraud,corruption,andcollusionthatplaguetheroadssectorworldwide.Thefollowingselectedexcerptsfromthatreport(WorldBank2011a)showsomeglimpseofthescopeoftheproblemsandtheircoststodevelopingcountries.InaninvestigationinBangladesh,evidenceshowedthatcompaniespaidprojectofficialsupto15percentofthecontractvalueinexchangeforcontractawards.AKenyaninformantsaidthat“collusionwasrife”inthenation’sroadssector,anallegationlaterconfirmedbytheKenyanRoadsAuthorityandtheKenyanAnti-corruptionCommission(GovernmentofKenya2004,2007).AfterinterviewingseveralfirmsandgovernmentofficialsinCambodia,[WorldBankIntegrityVicePresidency](INT)investigatorsconcludedthattherewerestrongindicationsthat“awellestablishedcartel,”aidedandabettedbygovernmentofficials,controlledtheawardofroadscontracts.InthePhilippines,“NumerouswitnessesindependentlyinformedINTinvestigatorsthatawell-organizedcartel,managedbycontractorswithsupportfromgovernmentofficials,improperlyinfluenced[DepartmentofPublicWorksandHighways]contractawardsandsetinflatedpricesonprojectsfundedbytheBankandothers”(WorldBank2011b,3).OneIndonesianrespondentexplainedthat“theIndonesiancollusivesystemhadbeenoperatingfor32years,andmanyviewedthe‘freemarket’systemascountertotheculturalnormofconsensusandcooperation,”astatementconsistentwithreportsbyIndonesia’scompetitionlawauthority(Soemardi2010)andscholarlyresearch(vanKlinkenandAspinall2011).TheINTreportsoughtevidenceofcollusioninBank-supportedprojects,anditalsofoundwell-documentedexamplesofcollusioninnon-Bankprojects.StaffoftheOverseasDevelopmentInstitutereportedevidenceofanindustry-widecarteltofixpricesonroadscontractsinUganda(BoothandGolooba-Mutebi2009).InTanzania,areviewbyaformerPrimeMinisterdisclosedanindustry-widecartelintheroadssector(GovernmentoftheUnitedRepublicofTanzania1996).In2005IndianDeputyGovernmentSecretarySanjeet31 SinghtoldparticipantsataninternationalconferencethatcartelsintheroadssectoroperatedinvariousIndianstates(Singh2005).AjointstudybytheGovernmentofNepal,theAsianDevelopmentBank,theU.K.’sDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment,andtheWorldBankconcludedthatinrecentyearsnotenderintheNepaleseconstructionindustryhadbeenfreeofcollusion(GovernmentofNepal2009).AstatisticalanalysisofbidsinroadtendersbytheLithuaniancompetitionagencystronglysuggestedcollusionamongfirmsthere(GovernmentofLithuania2008);a2009WorldBankstudyofpublicprocurementinArmenianotedwidespreadreportsofcollusionintendering(WorldBank2009);andin2005theSlovakiaAnti-MonopolyOfficeuncoveredacartelamongroadconstructionfirms(OECD2005).Atthe9thGlobalForumonCompetitionin2010,thegovernmentsofColombia,Peru,Pakistan,andTurkeyallreportedthatcartelswereoperatingintheirroadssector(OECD2010).Cartelsareactiveintheroadssectorthroughoutthedevelopedworldaswell.TheUnitedStatesiscertainlynostrangertobidrigginginauctionsforhighwaycontracts,thefederalprosecutionsofwhichpeakedinthe1980s.TheOECD’sownworkatteststothepersistenceofcollusioninroadcontracts.Ithasheldnofewerthanfiveconferencesoverthepastdecadeandissuedseveralpapersonhowtocombatbidriggingandcartelizationintheconstructionsector.Box6.2collusionandcartelsintheroadssector(continued)In1992,theDutchparliamentconcludedthattheentireconstructionindustryintheNetherlandswascartelized(VandenHuevel2006);in2000,theSwissCompetitionCommissionconcludedthatthemarketforroadsurfacinginthenortheasternpartofthecountrywascontrolledbyacartel(Hüschelrath,Leheyda,andBeschorner2009);andin2010,theKonkurransetilsynet,Norway’scompetitionauthority,finedtwocompaniesforcolludingonhighwaybridgemaintenancetenders(GovernmentofNorway2011).Source:WorldBank2011a.table6.1estimatedcostsavingsinpublicinfrastructureprocurementfroma10%increaseincompetition,byGlobalregionandsector,201132 Averagepercentageofcostssaved,%ofGDPRegionRoElectrWSeweTadicitybateragecotaralEastAsia942215andPacificEurope43242264andCentralAsiaLatin42006AmericaandtheCaribbeanMiddle730010EastandNorthAfricaSouth4172246AsiaAfrica1124419Total1672225Source:EstacheandIimi2011.Note:GDP=grossdomesticproduct.33 a.Assumingaroadlengthof150kilometers.b.Assuminganinstalledcapacityof75megawatts.c.Assumingatreatmentcapacityof50,000cubicmeters.EstacheandIimi(2011)provideahighlyrelevantdiscussionofthestateofknowledgeregardingprocurementandinvestmentininfrastructure,drawingontheexperienceofbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Arobustprinciplethatemerges,consistentwithauctiontheory,isthevalueofcompetitiontoreducecostandincreasequalityinprocurementoutcomes(Klemperer2000;Krishna2002).Althoughthedataonthenumberofbiddersforprocurementcontractsinvarioussectorsarelimited,theauthorsnotethatevidencefromaid-financedprojectssuggeststhattheaveragenumberofbiddersishigherinroadcontracts(about6.2percontract)thanforwatersector(5.2)orelectricity(4.6)contracts.Theyestimatethata10percentincreaseinthenumberofbiddershasthepotentialtoreducetheprocurementcostofinfrastructureby5-11percent,withthelargerelasticityapplyingtothewatersector,thelower-boundestimateapplyingtotheelectricitysector,andtheroadssector’selasticityestimatedtoreducecostsbyabout9percent(EstacheandIimi2011,49-54).Table6.1showsanestimateofcostsavingsduetomorecompetitiveprocurement,bysectorandregion.procurement’sroleinanintegratedpimsystemTobeeffective,procurementneedstobeunderstoodinthecontextofthebroaderfunctioningofthepublicsectorandnotasaself-standingsystem.Seenfromapositiveperspective,procurementsystemsthatgivethepublicsectoraccesstoprivatesectorinnovationandcreativitycangreatlyenhancethereturnstopublicinvestmentandthebenefitsthenationderivesfrompublicprojects.Inarecentpolicydocumentondevelopingthecapabilityofthecivilservice,theU.K.Governmentconveyedideasthatareessentialtoimproveanationalprocurementsystem(seebox6.3).Whileacknowledgingtheimportanceofthebroadcivilserviceethostoanypublicmanagementprocess,wefocushereondevelopingaprocurementapproachaspartofaPIMsystemthat,whileconsistentwiththethree-partdescriptioninbox6.3,goesfarbeyondit.Procurementisoftenmistakenlyconceivedasatechnicalcontractingexercisethat34 culminatesinthesigningofacontractbyasuccessfulbidder.Thisconceptualizationofprocurementhasdrivenadeepfocusontheprocessofcontracting:definingthestepsintheprocessingreatdetailandthemechanismstobeusedtodeterminethewinningbid.Althoughthesestepsandmechanismsareimportantaspectsofagoodprocurementsystem,theyprovideanincompleteperspectiveandcreateapotentiallycostlydetachmentfromthefullpublicinvestmentprocess.Box6.3theU.K.civilserviceandprocurementIn2013,theU.K.CabinetOfficepublishedareporttitled“MeetingtheChallengeofChange:ACapabilitiesPlanfortheCivilService,”whichemphasizedtheneedtoobtainbettervaluebyimprovingtheprocurementskillsofallcivilservants,“notjustthosedeemedtobeprocurementspecialists.”Anexcerptfromthatsectionfollows:Valueisobtainedduringallthreephasesofcommercialengagement:preprocurement,procurement,andpostcontract.Todaywetendtooverlyfocusontheprocurementphase.Allcivilservantsinvolvedinpolicydevelopmentanddeliverywillneedtodothefollowing:•Preprocurement:Developbetterskillstospecifyneedsconfidently,clearly,andconcisely,whilenotbeingoverlyprescriptive,inadvanceofcommencingaformalprocurement.Thiswillallowformeaningful,planned,andcompetitiveengagementwiththewholemarket.•Procurement:Understandtheunderlyingeconomicsandcontractingaspectsofsuppliers’tendersincludingpricingtechniques,margins,andopenbookarrangements,aswellasbasiccontractingtermssuchascontractchanges,intellectualpropertyrights,andtermination.Knowinghowtonegotiateagooddeal,applyingcommercialjudgmentisasimportantasunderstandingtheprocurementprocess.•Postcontract:Understandandapplycommercialtechniquestoensurethatsuppliersdelivertomeetour(contractual)expectationsinordertomaintainbestvalue,andbeabletonegotiatewithsupplierswhentheydonotdeliver,includingcompetentlyandconfidentlyhandlingdisputes.Inaddition,weshouldbeabletomeetanddealconfidentlywithseniorrepresentativesfromlargesuppliers,understandingtheirpersonal,professional,andcorporatedrivers.Source:HMG2013,7.Amoreintegratedandrobustunderstandingoftheprocurementfunctionstretchesfrom35 projectplanningthroughselectionoftheappropriateprocurementmethod,thecontractingprocess,andcontractmanagement.Particularlyforprocurementoftechnicallycomplexsystems,procurementdoesnotstopwiththecontractawardbutremainsrelevantduringimplementationandcontractmanagement.Figure6.2illustratesthefullscopeofanintegratedPIMsystemandhighlightsessentiallinkagesandprimarypointsofintersectionwiththebudgetingandprocurementprocesses.Itidentifiesthekeystagesofprocurement(planning,methodselection,contractplanning,tenderevaluationandcontractaward,contractmanagement,reviewandmonitoring,andauditandreporting).4EachofthesestageshaslinkagestoassociatedaspectsofPIMandbudgetingthat,ifwellmanaged,couldlowercostsandspeedupprojectimplementation.Ofcourse,theitemslistedunderthe“procurement”headingarenotuniquetocapitalinvestmentprojects;alltypesofgovernmentpurchasesinvolveplanning,amechanismforawardingcontracts,andcontractmonitoring.Manyofthetechnicalaspectsofprocurement—rulesabouthowtoadvertise,ortheopeningofbids,orbidevaluation—arealsocommonacrossallformsofprocurement.Figure6.2pimsystemlinkagesSource:AdaptedfromBiletskaandFozzard2012.Moreover,thespreadofprocurementlawsshapedbytheUNCITRALModelProcurementLawoverthepasttwodecades(asfurtherdescribedinbox6.1)hascreatedstrongsimilaritiesin36 thesubstanceofrulesacrosscountries.However,asnotedearlier,procurementforpublicinvestmentprojectsraisesdistinctchallenges(relativetoprocurementforstandardgoods).Amajorinfrastructureprojectmayrequiremultiplecontractawardsfordesigns,separatecontractsforconstruction,andyetothersfortechnicalsupervisionandoversight.Landacquisitionisoftenproblematicincountrieswherepropertyrightsarenotclearlyestablishedandwherelegalsystemsareinefficientoroverloaded.Eachoftheseprocessesrequiresspecificskillsforthetechnicalengineering,environmental,financial,andlegalaspectsoftheproject.Inmanycases,governmentsmayalsohavetodefinetechnicalstandardsforuniqueconditions.Becausesomeproblemsmanifestonlyduringconstruction,governmentsalsoneedtomakeexpostassessmentsandpotentiallyresolvedisputeswithcontractors.Warrantiesextendtheneedforcontractandassetmanagementwellpastthecompletionoftheinitialworkandrequirecontinuedattention.5Unlikestandardgoodsprocurement,thelimitedscopetofindprivatesectorcomparatorsforpublicgoodssuchasnationalroadsoranirrigationsystemorairportsimpliesthatgovernmentsmustdefinetechnicalstandardsandmechanismstodeterminecostsandqualityexanteandundertakecomplexmonitoringandmeasurementtoensureadherenceexpost.Valueformoneyincapitalinvestmentprocurementisalsoamuchmoredifficultconstructthaninstandardgoodsprocurement—involvingadeterminationoftheextenttowhichtheassetisfitforpurposeandthetotallifetimecostoftheasset(avariablethatisoftennotpossibletodeterminewithoutananalysisoftherateofdepreciation).Someofthecomplexityofpublicinvestmentprocurementcanbebettermanagedthroughasystematicanddisciplinedapproachthatlinkstheprojectselection,design,budgeting,andprocurementprocesses.MakingbetteruseofinformationfromupstreamPIMandbudgetingcanenhancekeystagesofprocurementandprojectimplementationandcontributetoefficiencyinpublicinvestment.ThefollowingsubsectionsdescribeelementsoftheprocurementprocessandtheimportanceoftheirlinkagestothePIMandbudgetingprocessesaspartofanintegratedsystemsapproach.ProcurementPlanningGoodprocurementplanningthatisderivedfromtheinvestmentprojectplanisacritical37 elementineffectiveinvestment.Procurementplanningshouldideallybeinitiatedinparallelwiththeprojectdesignandappraisal,anditmayinfluencethebudgetplanestimatesoftheprojectcostbyidentifyingaprocurementmethodthatoffersthebestprospectofachievinglowestcostforacceptablequality.ButprocurementplanningisusuallytheweakestlinkbetweenprocurementandthePIMandbudgetsystems,inpartbecauseitisnotadequatelyrecognizedasanintegralaspectofPIM.Asaresult,countriescommonlyunderspendthebudgetaryallocationforcapitalinvestment.Ironically,whenscarceresourcesareallocatedtopublicprojectswithpotentiallyhighratesofreturn,afailuretosynchronizeprocurementplanningwithbudgetingleadstodelaysandlowutilizationofresources.Suchdelayscanthencontributetocostescalationandfurthererodetheefficiencyofinvestment.Governmentagenciesinmanycountriestypicallydonotdevelopdetailedprocurementplansforhigh-value,complexprojectseventhoughacquisitionofsuchpublicinvestmentsispreciselyanareawheresuchplanshavethemostvalueadded.Theprocurementprocessisofteninitiatedonlyafterfundingforapublicinvestmentprojectisalreadyallocated,allowingprocurementstafflittletimetoanalyzeneeds,researchthemarket,anddevelopspecifications.Procurementplanningoftenstartsafterafewmonthsofthefiscalyearhaveelapsed,andacontractmaybeawardedmorethanhalfwaythroughthefiscalyear.Becausebudgetsaregenerallyappropriatedannually,thisdelayisrepeatedeveryyearandcontributestocumulativeslippageintheimplementationplan.Italsoundermineseffectivecontractplanningthattakesmarketstructureandsupplychainsintoconsideration,ensuresappropriatecontractdesignandmethodology,andsupportsadequatecostingandbudgeting.Exceptionsmaybelargecapitalinvestmentprojectswithexternalfinancing6:feasibilitystudiesforsuchprojectsareusuallypreparedwiththeinvolvementofprocurementexpertsandconsideralternativeprocurementoptions.Upstreamdelayscanalsoaffectprocurement.Inmanycountries,projectapprovalandbudgetaryresourceallocationtakealongtime.Forinstance,intheUnitedStates,thisprocesstakesmorethanthreeyears(Gansler2002).Inadequatebudgetallocationposesanothersignificantobstacletoefficientprocurementplanning,evenforprojectsthatareaccuratelycosted.Additionalcomplicationsareintroducedforprocurementplanningwhenprojectsarefragmentedwiththeaimofbypassingthescrutinyofeconomicappraisal.38 TenderEvaluationandContractAwardThisstageinthepublicprocurementprocesshasamajorimpactontheefficiencyofpublicinvestments,andinpoorgovernancesettingswithweakcapacity,thisisalsowhereanumberofthingscangowrong.Ensuringcompetitiveselectionandafairmarketpriceremainsachallengeinbothlow-andmiddle-incomecountries.Powerfulvestedinterestsoftencapturethetenderevaluationprocessandinfluencethecompositionofanevaluationteam,theevaluationcriteria,thecontractorselectionandbiddingmethods,andthecontractaward.Complaintandappealsmechanismsinsuchcasesareusuallynoteffective.Governmentsofteninsistondomesticcontentinselectioncriteriawhenthecapacityofdomesticproducersislimited.Yetanumberofcountrieshavemadeprogresstowardgreatercompetition,includingAlbania,Mexico,Poland,Turkey,andothers,wheretransparencyandcompliancewiththeproceduresduringthetenderevaluationandcontractawardhavesignificantlyimproved.Ontheotherhand,asdiscussedinbox6.4,firmsoftenenterintocollusiveagreements,whichcanimpairefficiencyandvalueformoney.Box6.4elementsofthetheoryofprocurementThereisarichliteratureontheappliedeconomictheoryofprocurement(competitivemarketsandbarrierstoentry,informationasymmetry,incentiveeconomics,contracttheory,andmechanismdesign).MuchoftheliteratureonprocurementandregulationwassparkedbyseminalworkbyJean-JacquesLaffontandJeanTiroleinthe1980s,whoappliedtheperspectiveofinformationalasymmetriesbetweenbuyersandsellerstobetterunderstandtheproblemsofprocurementandregulation.LaffontandTirole(1993)describetheissuesthatcomplicatepublicprocurementintermsofmoralhazard,adverseselection,andnonverifiability.Lateron,EstacheandIimi(2011)succinctlydescribethekeyideasoftheliteraturethatprovidethebasisfordecisionsregardingwhetheraninvestmentshouldbeundertakenin-houseorcontractedout(contracttheory);whetherandhowtounbundleconstructionandoperationininvestmentprojects;howtoselectcontractors(auctiontheory);andwhethertoestablishanexpostadjustmentoranincentivecontract.Whileeconomicsprovidesastronganalyticalbasisfordesigningprocurementsystems,aliteraturederivedfromlegaltheoryprovidesacomplementarybasisforapproachesto39 procurement.Forexample,Schooner(2002)providesajustificationforkeyprinciplesthatprovidearobustbasisforthelegalfoundationsofprocurementintheUnitedStates.Theseincludecompetition,systemictransparency,andprocurementintegrity,whicharecriticalfortheU.S.procurementsystem.Theproliferationofprocurementregulationsinlow-andmiddle-incomecountriesalsotendstobecomecounterproductive,withaadverseeffectsonefficiencyandcosts.Overregulationpromptscontractorstospecializeinbiddingforworkatasingleagencyorveryfew,whicheffectivelyleadstomarketsegmentationandreducedcompetition.Thevolumeofprocurementregulationsatthenationallevel--excludingtreaties,specialacts,andguidelines--rangesbetween158and508inLatinAmericancountries,25inAustralia,and83incanada,withtheUnitedKingdomandNewZealandfallinginbetween(VeigaMaltaetal.2011).Moreover,therigidityoftheestablishedprohibitionsonpost-tendernegotiationsoftenimpedestheabilityofthepurchasingagencytoaddressstrategicrequirementsofcomplexinfrastructureprocurement,suchasadaptationofdesignandprojectschemestothecontractcommitment(Krüger2009).Thecontractawardstageintheprocurementprocessalsohassignificantimplicationsforbudgetingofpublicinvestmentsandoverallfiscalsustainability.Itisawidespreadpracticethatcontractsaresignedwithoutverificationofbudgetaryresources.Thelackofcommitmentcontrolisadysfunctionofthepublicfinancialmanagementsystem,underminingtheabilityoftheprocurementunitstodeliverefficientprocurementoutcomes.Iftheministryoffinanceisnotawareofthetrueamountofcontractualcommitments,thereisnoguaranteethatitwillbeabletofindsufficientresourceswhenpaymentsaredue.Outstandingcommitmentsforinfrastructureprojectscanoftenreachamultipleoftheinfrastructureministry’sannualoperatingbudget.Theproblemof“pendingbills”alsocausescontractorstofactorpaymentdelaysintotheirbids,furtherescalatingthecostsofpublicinvestment—apracticethat,ifleftunaddressed,canundermineinvestmentefficiencyacrosstheboard.Inothercases,procuringentitiesmaydeliberatelyunderstatethevalueofthecontracttostaybelowathresholdforscrutinybytheministryforfinanceorplanning.Butgamingthesysteminsuchawaycanleadtoproblemsdownstreamduringprojectexecutionwhencontractorsdemandchangeordersthatescalatethecoststotheirtruelevel.40 ContractManagementContractmanagementbeginswhenaprocurementcontractissignedandendswhenallthecontractedservicesandproductshavebeendelivered,accepted,andpaidfor,andallassociatedcontractpaperworkandfileshavebeenarchived.Goodpracticesuggeststhatthemanagemententityprepareacontractmanagementplanthatidentifiestheactivitiesthatprojectstaffshouldperformorinitiatetomanage,track,amend,andcloseacontract.Theplan’slevelofdetailshouldbedeterminedbythevalueandtheriskassociatedwiththecontract.Contractmanagementinvolvessupervisingthecontractor’sperformance,havingqualifiedengineersorauditorsverifycompletionandqualityofplannedphasesofconstructionwork,andauthorizingpaymenttranchesasperthecontractterms.Whenthecontractorrequestsachangeorder,atechnicalexpertmayneedtoassesstherequestonatimelybasis,butthecontractmanagerwouldneedtofollowasystematicproceduretoensureappropriateandtransparentdocumentationanddecisionmaking.7Withoutgoodcontractmanagement,paymentscanbedelayedorpaymentsmaybeauthorizedwithoutverifyingreceiptofgoodsorservicesorprogressofworks.Inextremecases,thedisbursementoffundsmayprecedethecommencementofaproject,whichmayadverselyaffecttheperformanceincentiveofthecontractor.Asindicatedearlier,upstreamproblemssuchascashrationingorlackofcommitmentcontrolcanhindertheeffortsofevenagoodcontractmanager.Deficienciesintheinteractionbetweentheprocurement,PIM,andbudgetingsystemscreateaviciouscycleinwhicheverybrokenlinkweakensanotherone,tothedetrimentofoverallinvestmentoutcomes.Large,complexprojectsalwaysrequireadaptationandmodification:Disputesariseovercontractinterpretationorhowanunanticipatedproblemshouldbeaddressed.Problemsmayariseconcerninglandclearanceorthecollaborationbetweenlevelsofgovernment,andsoforth.Tohandlesuchissues,contractmanagementcaneitherbeproactive—anticipatingproblemsandfindingwaystoresolvedisputesbeforetheyescalate—oritcanbebureaucraticandrigid,leavingpeoplemoreconcernedaboutavoidingblameforimproperactionsthanaboutgettingtheprojectdone.InIndia,forexample,disputeshavestoppedworkonapproximately10-15percentofprojects,andamassiveamountofconstructionresourcesaretrappedinprojectsthatarenotprogressing(WorldBank2008).Effectivecontractmanagementmakessurethatphysicaland41 financialprogressarealignedandontrack,andfiguresoutwhattodoincasetheyarenot.Italsomakessurethatmechanismsforcheckingthequalityofworkarefunctioningproperlyandeffectively.Atthemostextreme,mechanismsforacquiringcapitalassetscanbecomedissociatedfromPIMandbudgetsasgovernmentsturntotradingresourcesforinvestment,havingcontractorsbuildassetswithapromiseofrepayment,orrelyingexcessivelyongovernment-to-governmentdeals.Arrangementssuchastheseareoftenpopularinresource-rich,cash-poornationsthathavelittleexperienceorcapacitytoexecutestipulatedprocurementproceduresinamannerthataddsvalue.Capital“spending”intheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,theLaoPeople’sDemocraticRepublic,andMongolia,forexample,havefeaturedextensiveuseofsuchtypesofdeals,oftenundertakenwithoutthenecessarytransparencyregardingthetermsofthedeal,muchtotheconsternationofparliamentsanddevelopmentpartners.Itisimportanttonotethatsuchturnkeydealsmaysometimesbearationalchoiceinsituationswheregovernmentslackthecapacitytomanagecomplexprocurementandcontractmanagement,butsuchcontractsstillneedtobenegotiatedtransparentlyandwithaneyetovalueformoney.ReviewandMonitoringMonitoringtheimplementationofacontract,althoughtreatedseparatelyhere,isintrinsictoeffectivecontractmanagement.Contractscanincludepenaltiesfordelaysorunderperformance,andsuchprovisionsrequirethecontractmanagertomonitorandassessperformancerelativetothetermsofthecontract.Withoutconsistentmonitoringandperiodicdiscussionwiththecontractor,projectsarelikelytogooff-track,andanypotentiallycorrectivemeasuresfordelaysorpoorperformancemaycometoolate.Afailuretoreviewandmanagecontractorsprobablyaccountsforthewidelynotedtendencyforlargechangeordersandcostescalation.Forinstance,theColombiangovernmentallowedcontractmodificationsforroadsconcessionssignedwithvariousentitiesin2008fortwiceasmuchastheoriginalcontractedamounts;existingconcessionswereextended,andonewaslengthenedby20yearswithadditionalfinancingtotalingfourtimestheoriginalamount(VeigaMaltaetal.2011).Contractsareusuallyamendedthroughchangeordersor,inextremecases,renegotiationofthecontractscopeandprovisions(Krüger2009).Contractmodificationsaretypicallynot42 capturedinafinancialinformationsystem,sothefinancialimplicationsofthechangeordersarehighlighted.Fewcountrieshavetheirre-procurementsystemslinkedtotheintegratedfinancialmanagementinformationsystem.Monitoringoftheprogressandqualityofworksisfrequentlyaproformaexercise.Forinstance,spotchecksonsitesinMongoliaandPeruarerareandtheirqualitycontrolmarginal.Undertheseconditions,monitoringtheimplementationofcontractsisweak,andsignificantcostoverrunsmaybefrequentwithinvestmentprojects.AuditandReportingProcurementauditsplayanimportantroleinawell-functioningintegratedprocurementsystem.Theynotonlyaddresscompliancewithregulationsandfinancialandoperationalintegritybutalsoprovideadditionalassurancethattheprocuredgoodsandservicescanandwillcontinuouslyperformaccordingtoacceptablestandards.Inaddition,procurementauditscanidentifyweaknessesinprocurementprocessesandpracticeswithaviewtorecommendingnecessaryimprovements.Inawell-functioningsystem,procurementauditsareconductedperiodically,coveringdifferentgovernmentagenciesbasedontheriskmanagementstrategy.Reliableandfullprocurementreportingcomprisesalltheinformationmaterialtotheprocurementprocess,suchasthetenderevaluation,financialreports(includingcostoverrunswithdocumentationexplainingincreases),reportsonthephysicalprogressandqualityofworks,andfacilitycompletionreports.Suchreportingisfundamentalfortheefficientpublicinvestmentandexpendituremanagementthatcontainscostescalationanddeliversvalueformoney.Moreover,accuraterecordingandreportingofthefinishedinfrastructureprocurementsmakesitmorelikelythatcreatedassetsareproperlytransferredto“owner”governmentagencies,areaccountedforintheassetregistry,andhaveanassetmanagementplan.implicationsandillustrationsFromadiagnosticpointofview,theapproachdescribedaboveprovidesabasisfordiagnosingweaknessesinexistingprocurementsystemsandidentifyingtheaspectsthatmostcriticallyaffecttheefficiencyofpublicinvestment.However,itmaystrikethereaderthatthemanagementcapabilitiesforafullyintegratedapproachtoprocurementasakeyaspectofPIM43 arequitedemanding.Buildingthecapabilityofabroadclassofcivilservantstounderstandmarketsandindustries,tonegotiateandmanageprocurementcontracts,andtoexercisejudgmentthatensuresgoodvalueforgovernmentisanachievablegoalforadvancedcountries,butitislikelytobealong-termobjectiveformostdeveloping-countrygovernmentswithlimitedcapabilities.ModelsforReformHowever,someexamplesofferawaytostrengthenprocurementforinvestmentprojects.Somecountrieshavetriedstrategiesthatboostperformancebysupportingtheabilityofagenciestoshapeandmanagecomplexprocurements.StrengtheningContractMonitoringandOversightTheUnitedKingdom’sGatewayreviewprocesswascreatedtohelpagenciesavoidthemostcommoncausesofprojectfailure.8UndertheauspicesoftheOfficeofGovernmentCommerce(OGC),Gatewayreviewsconvenepanelsofknowledgeable,respectedpublicandprivatesectorrepresentativestoprovideguidanceandadviceatcriticalpointstoagenciesmanaginglargeprocurements.SixseparateGatewayreviewsareorganizedtoexaminethestrategicassessmentofeachlargeproject,thebusinessjustificationfortheproject,theacquisitionstrategy,thecontractualarrangements,thereadinessoftheagencytomanagetheassetonceitisdelivered,andafinalreviewoftheoperationandthebenefitsreceivedafterdeliveryoftheproject.9AlthoughnodefinitivestudyhasbeenconductedontheGatewayprocess’simpact,thereviewsarecreditedwithcontributingtosignificantsavingsinprocurementandwithcreatingamoreinformedapproachacrossgovernmenttoprocurementofcapitalprojects.OnemeasureofitsperceivedsuccessisthedecisionbytheGovernmentofNewZealandtoadoptasimilarpracticeforitsmajoracquisitions.AligningOrganizationsaroundtheProcurementFunctionAlthoughdevelopedcountrieswithhighercapabilitymaysucceedwithsuchapproaches,therearewaystostrengthenthelinkbetweenprocurementandprojectmanagementthat44 economizeonlimitedcapacity,whichmayofferdevelopingcountriessomemeanstoimproveoutcomes.Inmostcountries,procurementisconductedbyanenormousnumberofministriesandagenciesthathavealargenumberofotherfunctions.Thebureaucraticpractices,civilservicehumanresourcepolicies,andofficialhierarchiesthatdefinethesebodiesoftenimpedethetypeofdecisionmakingandoutputorientationthatisessentialforoptimizingeithertheexecutionofprocurementorthemanagementofcontracts.Theyalsofailtoconsolidatelimitedcapacitywheretheywouldbemosteffective.Onewaytoimproveonthisistocreateastateorganizationthatisspecificallydesignedtoprocureandmanagelargeprojects.TheSouthAfricanNationalRoadsAgencyLtd.(SANRAL)isastateorganizationconsciouslydesignedforthepurposeofmanagingallaspectsofaroadnetwork,includingprocurementandcontracting.10Operatinglikeaprivatesectorfirm,theagencywasentrustedwithresponsibilityforimplementingtheGovernmentofSouthAfrica’stransportationpoliciesinacommerciallyviablefashion.Theagencystructuresupportsaflathierarchy,operatingwithastrongoutputorientation.Organizationalstructureandprocessesweredesignedtoenhancetheefficiencyofoperationsandtheeffectivenessofprojectmanagement.Thetenderingprocesswasrestructuredtoincludeanindependentevaluationcommitteethatbroughttogethertheprojectmanagerwithrepresentativesoftheprivatesector.Integratingsophisticatedmarketexpertiseinthereviewprocessenabledtheagencytoreviewarangeofdifferentproposals,expandingitsabilitytogivecontractorsandconsultantsmorefreedomtoproposeinnovativeapproaches.Staffwereorganizedinexpertiseclusterstoreducehierarchy,promotetechnicalexcellence,andfosterproactivityinriskandcontractmanagement.Inpartbecauseofhigh-qualityleadership,SANRALhasbeenlargelysuccessful.Inthefirstdecadeofitsexistence,SANRALmorethandoubledthesizeoftheroadnetwork(from7,000kilometersto16,000kilometers)andpreparedSouthAfrica’sinfrastructureforthechallengeofhostingtheWorldCupin2010.Expansionoftheroadnetworktookplaceatthesametimethatthefinancialmodelforbuildingroadswaschanged,andtheprocurementprocesswasreconstructedandenhanced.11PartofSANRAL’ssuccessisderivedfromitsorganizationalstructure.Freedfromtraditionalbureaucraticlimitations,SANRALwasabletoshapeitsprocurementpracticestomeetitsorientationtowardperformance.1245 MarshalingLimitedCapacityforEmergencyActionModificationoforganizationalarrangementforprocurementhasalsobeenpursuedinPapuaNewGuinea(PNG)forquitedifferentreasons.In1994,twinvolcanoeseruptedandrenderedthecentraltownofRabauluninhabitable.InresponsetheGovernmentofPNGestablishedtheGazelleRestorationAgency(GRA)toactastheprojectimplementationunitforallrestorationwork(WorldBank2010).ConcentratingthelimitedtechnicalexpertiseintooneunitenabledtheGRAtoamassthenecessaryskillstoeffectivelymanageandexecuteprocurementtransactionsandmanagesophisticatedcontractsforrelocatinganentiretown.Centralizationofresponsibilityalsoprovideddonorsandotheraidproviderswithafocalpointforsupportandcapacitydevelopment.Overthecourseof10years,theGRAoversawthecompletionof99outofthe125priorityprojectsandinitiatedworkonanadditional13(whilefundingwasstillbeingsoughtfortheremaining13undertakings).Inasituationofseverecapacityconstraintsandurgentneed,centralizingresponsibilityintoasingleentitytomanageprojectimplementationprovedtobeasuccessfulstrategyforimprovingprocurementperformance.PlanningforChangeAnotherareatotargetforimprovingprocurementistoanticipatetheneedsoflarge,complexpublicinvestmentprojectswherecontractmodificationsarehighlylikely.Itwouldbeimportanttoensurethatthecontractmanagementincludesanestablishedprocessandperformancemetricsforeffectivemonitoringoftheproject.Eachpublicinvestmentprojectmusthaveanengineerassignedtosupervisethephysicalprogressandqualityofworks.Suchanengineersignsoffallworkbeforepaymentsareprocessed.Theengineerisaccountableforthedeliveryandqualityoftheprojectandthusshouldbevestedwithindependenceandauthoritytocarryoutthisresponsibility.Butwhensignificantchangeordersmaybeanticipated,itmaybeappropriatetoretainaqualifiedtechnicalexpertoragencytooffertimelyadviceonwhatcontractchangesarejustifiedandhowtokeepcostsandthecompletionscheduleasclosetooriginalestimatesaspossible.Shouldthecostimplicationsbeverylarge,itmaybenecessarytoreconsidertheviabilityoftheproject.TheRepublicofKorea,forinstance,adoptedtheTotal46 ProjectCostManagementSystem(TPCMS)in1999thatenablestheBudgetMinistrytoundertakecontinuouschecksonprojectcostsforlarge-scaleprocurements(Kim2008).Althoughlineministriesreceiveacontingencyfundofupto8percentoftotalprojectcoststomanage,theMinistryofStrategyandFinance(MOSF)mustreviewallincreasesintotalprojectcosts.TheTPCMSalsoinstitutesatriggeringmechanismtoensurethatprojectsremainfeasible:Anincreaseinprojectcostsbyover20percenttriggersareassessmentofprojectfeasibility(topreventnewmoneybeingthrownafterbad).TheTPCMSprocessalsoregularlycheckstheaccuracyofthedemandforecaststoensurethatnomaterialchangeswouldaffectdemandprojections.Areductionindemandbyover30percenttriggersareevaluationbyMOSFofoverallprojectfeasibility.SincetheapplicationoftheTPCMS,thepercentageofprojectswithsignificantcostoverrunshasshrunkdramatically.From1994to1998,morethan9percentofprojectsregisteredincreasesofover20percentintheirtotalcosts.By2002-04,thatpercentagehaddroppedtounder3percent(Kim2008).Otherpragmaticremediesmaybewithinthereachofdevelopingcountries.Forone,tobeginprocurementplanningattheprojectdesignstagewouldenhancetheefficiencyoftenderingandcontractingoncetheprojecthasbeenapprovedandbudgeted.Thebenefitsofsuchimprovedupstreampreparationandcoordinationcouldbesignificantformajorprojects.ConclusionThischapterhasunderlinedthecriticalneedtorecognizeprocurementasacoreaspectofacomprehensiveapproachtoPIM(andtogoodpublicmanagement,moregenerally).ThisimportantlinkageisoftennotacknowledgedandevenmorerarelyreflectedineffortstostrengthenPIM.ItalsosetoutaconceptualframeworkforlinkingprocurementtotheprocessofPIM(particularlyinthediscussionsurroundingfigure6.2)anddetailedthebenefitsthatcoordinatedmanagementwithinthisframeworkcouldachieve:•IntegratingtheschematicfeaturesofaprocurementprocesswithPIMinawaythatassessesthestrengthsandweaknessesofactualprocurementandPIMarrangementsinparticularcountries.•Providingthekeydesignprinciplesforprocurementreformtotargetandstrengthentheweakestlinks.47 •Aligningtheprocurementprocesswiththegrowinginterestinmovingawayfromtheoldercompliance-with-rulesapproachandtowardamoremodern,performance-basedapproachtoprocurement.Achievingthesebenefits,however,doesrequireagovernmenttodevelopstrongcoordinationandmanagementcapabilitiestotailorreformsaswellastoprovideconsistentpoliticalleadershipofreforms.Needtoupgradecapacitysubstantially.Becausethehumanresourceandinstitutionalcapacitiesrequiredarehigh,fewcountriescurrentlydowellinmanaginganapproachtoprocurementthatisintegratedwithPIM.Nevertheless,thesecapacitiescanbebuiltupovertimeandactivatedthroughincrementalreformsifmotivatedbygooddesignprinciplesandanendgoalofefficientandeffectiveinvestment.Focusingscarcemanagerialcapacityonhigh-valueprojectsmayallowgradualprogressratherthanattemptingtocoverallpublicinvestmentprojects,manyofwhichmaybeoflowvalue.Needfordomesticallytailoredapproachestoachievereforms.Itisworthemphasizingthattheinstitutionalarrangementsshouldbeintelligentlyadaptedtodomesticcapability.Focusingoninstitutionalfunctionalityavoidstheproblemof“isomorphicmimicry,”whereinblindimitationofdeveloped-countryinstitutionalformsfailstoachievefunctionalpurposeinadeveloping-countrycontext(Pritchett,Woolcock,andAndrews2011).Needforcommitted,credibleleadership—bothpoliticalandtechnical—tomaneuvertheinstitutionalreformprocess.Procurementreforms,likemostpublicsectorreforms,rarelyproceedaccordingtoastandardblueprintorplan.Beingadeeplypoliticalprocess,reformrequiresbothcredible,authoritativepoliticalleadershipandcompetent,motivatedtechnicalleadership.Itisthecombinationofareformpullfromthetop(throughtheadoptionofnewpoliciesandpractices)combinedwithapushfromthebottom(throughagenciesandministriesdevelopingpracticesthatproducebetteroutcomes)thatultimatelyyieldssustainedperformanceimprovement.Sustainedcitizenengagementandinterestinreceivingpublicgoodsandservicescanmotivatescrutinyandfeedbackthatcanlimitwasteandfraudintheprocurementandinvestmentprocess.Initiativestoimprovethetransparencyofcontractscangalvanizepoliticalandbureaucraticresponseandimproveprocurementprocessesandoutcomes.Itisnotthathardtopointtonewpracticesthathaveimprovedprocurementoutcomesin48 oneormorejurisdictions.Introducingnontraditionalformsofcontracting(suchasturnkey,performance,andotherpublic-privatepartnerships)orincreasingtransparencyaroundcontractpricesandinputcosts,orenhancingoversightofcontractperformancecanallchangethedynamicsoftheprocurementprocess,andthislistofinnovationsisbynomeanscomplete.However,thelistofcountriesthathaveachievedsustainedperformanceimprovementsinprocurementacrosstheirPIMsystemsismuchsmaller.Sufficeittosaythatthespacebetweenconceptualizingthedimensionsofawell-integratedprocurementsystemandestablishingsuchasystemiswide.Bridgingthatgapwillrequiresustainedefforttocollectastrongerbodyofknowledgefromexperienceacrosscountriesandsectors.Thischapteris,wehope,aconceptualcontributiontowardbuildingthatbodyofknowledge.notes1.Theterminologyfornewapproachestoprocurementisnotfullysettled.Anelectronicreverseauctionisanonline,real-timedynamicauctionbetweenthepurchasingorganizationandsupplierswhocompeteagainsteachothertowinthecontractbysubmittingsuccessivelylower-pricedorbetter-rankedbidsoverascheduledperiod.Aframeworkagreementbetweenoneormorecontractingagenciesandoneormoresuppliersorvendorsestablishestheterms(pricesandthequantitiesenvisaged)thatwillgoverncontractstobeawardedduringagivenperiod.2.Poorprocurementcanalsoleadtofraudandwasteinthepurchaseofofficesupplies,schooltextbooks,pharmaceuticalproducts,andsoon;thustheinefficiencycanalsoaffecttherecurrentbudgetandunderminegovernmentservices.3.Arangeofliteraturediscusseshowpoliticalinterestsinfluencetheprocurementprocessandundermineinvestmentoutcomes(TanziandDawoodi1997;Pinto-Duschinsky2002;Olken2007,2009;OlkenandPande2012;Sacksetal.2013).GoldenandMin(2013)provideabroadreviewofdistributivepoliticsover30countries.4.SeeVeigaMaltaetal.(2011)formoredetailedstepsoftheprocurementprocess.5.Manyofthesefeaturescanalsobefoundincontractsforgoods.Governmentpurchasingofgasolineorcomputersofteninvolveslargesumsofmoney,complexcontractualterms,andadvancedmechanismstomonitorcontractualperformance.Wehaveemphasizeddistinctions49 betweenprocurementincapitalinvestmentprojectsandsimpleprocurementtohighlightcertainfactors,butthemoregeneralpointisthis:thecomplexityofmoderncontractingimpliesthatourperspectiveonallofourprocurementneedstoberevised.6.However,evenexternally(donor)fundedprojectsoftencannotescapethelimitationsofpoorprocurementplanningandbudgeting.7.Australiaprovidesclearguidanceonthisprocess,includingachecklistforconsideringrequestsforcontractvariation.ToseethechecklistandotherpartsoftheAustralianGovernment’s“BetterPracticeGuideonDevelopingandManagingContracts,”refertothewebsite:http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Files/BPG%20HTML/Developing%20and%20Managing%20Contracts/5_10.html.8.AlistofthemostcommoncausesofprojectfailureintheUnitedKingdom,compiledbytheNationalAuditOfficeandtheOfficeofGovernmentCommerce,highlightsissuessuchasthelackofalignmentbetweentheorganizationandtheproject’sstrategicpriorities,theabsenceofseniorleadership,thelackofeffectiveengagementwithshareholders,andthelackofprojectmanagementskillsandexperiencedealingwithsuppliermarkets.See“CommonCausesofProjectFailure”athttp://webarchive.Nationalarchives.Gov.uk/20110822131357/http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Project_Failure.pdf.9.ForinformationaboutOGCGatewayReviews,seehttp://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110822131357/http://www.ogc.gov.uk/what_is_ogc_gateway_review.asp.ForinformationonthereviewprocessusedinNewZealand,seeMajorProjectApprovalandAssuranceGuidance,April2011,athttp://www.Hm-treasury.uk/d/major.projects.approvals.assurance.guidance.pdf.10.ForinformationontheSouthAfricanRoadAgency,Ltd.(SANRAL),seeBennet2011.11.TheperformanceofSANRALsetsitapartfromotherAfricanroadagenciesthatwereestablishedatapproximatelythesametime.Foracomparisonoftheperformanceofdifferentroadagencies,seePinard(2012).12.TheoutstandingperformanceofSANRALhasnotbeensharedbymanyoftheroadagenciesthatwereestablishedataroundthesametime.Roadagenciescanbefoundacrosstheglobe,butmanyofthesebodieshavebeenunabletoestablishindependencefrompoliticalcontrolortocreateorganizationsthatfunctiondifferentlyfrommoretraditionalministries.TheSANRAL50 experiencedemonstratesthepossibilityofusingorganizationalrestructuringtogenerateimprovedprocurementoutcomesincapitalprojects,whiletheexperienceofotheragenciescautionsthatsuchperformanceimprovementistheexceptionratherthantherule.51 AppendixIITranslatedText第六章采购和公共投资管理导言采购是政府业务流程的一个主要方面，并且有着深远的影响。2008年，据经济合作与发展组织（OECD）的估算，政府采购总规模（消费和投资支出）大约占其成员国国内生产总值（GDP）的12%（OECD2011）。在发展中国家，相应的占比通常更高。仅投资采购一项就占政府采购总量的75%-80%（马耳他等人：2011）。如果采购系统的效率低下那么既会严重影响宏观经济也会严重影响用于做出投资决定的成本效益基本原理。两种结果都可能对公民的经济福利带来不利的影响。但很多经济类文献不够重视公共投资过程的这一关键方面。尤其在过去二十年里，由于技术变革彻底改变工业和服务业，也相应地改变了政府采购的性质，政府采购在性质、规模和复杂性上呈现出多样化。三十年前，大宗采购的商品含有简易商品（例如办公用品、燃油、零部件、基本医疗物资和药品、书籍）；相对标准的土建工程（例如桥梁、水处理厂、道路）；以及工厂相关设备（例如发电机、变压器、水泵）。近来，政府面临更多复杂的采购需求例如多部分技术系统；涉及信息技术硬件和软件的一体化解决方案；特许权合同；用以构建、运行以及维护主要基础设施系统的公私合作关系。政府相应地可以使用更先进的采购方法和工具，例如选择电子采购以利用更好的供应策略。目前任何国家都会存在简单和复杂相混合的采购模式，决定一个国家的采购模式是以简单还是复杂为主取决于经济发展水平、经济规模和结构以及投资计划的性质。这一演变对采购系统有深远的影响。这就需要更好的项目和采购计划，更好的预算，灵活且适应性强的规章制度，更加注重结果和风险测定与缓解的控制系统，更强的技术能力，受教育水平更高的的采购及项目管理者、专业人员来管理复杂过程从而实现物有所值。即使是能力强的政府都难以达到这些要求，能力弱的国家就更难应对这些挑战了。图6.1用图表的方式描述了采购的演变。图表的左下象限描述了采购管理的性质，内容主要包括遵从法律、行政法规和程序来实现竞争过程和物有所值的目标。这影射出只要严格遵从精心设计的规则就会产生最佳结果。另外，图表的右上象限描述了采购的性质，其特点更为复杂，其运作需要符合现行的管理规范和既定的职业道德准则。同时，管理者应该被赋予更大的采购流程及行政事务决策权，这样才能实现既定的采购目标。换言之，在第一种情况下官员们52 来源：萨切斯2012应该遵守严格的正式程序，同时他们拥有非常有限的事务决策权，然而在第二种情况下他们应该遵守道德标准但拥有更多程序上的决策权用以实施分析和判断来实现项目目标。同样地，在第一种情况下，管控人员着眼于程序上的事务，然而在第二种情况下他们更多注重管理成效和道德行为。现代采购的复杂性与对结果的愈发强调相结合就要求他们有更强的能力能在对环境进行分析的基础上做出灵活的判断。一部分是因为采购系统的新要求，公共采购是政府转变最快的职能之一，经合组织和发展中国家都注重让采购适应新的实际情况（参照表6.1）。此外，公众对反腐的热情高涨以及全球对财政效率的极度关注给政客和政府施加了更大的压力来满足采购系统更透明更具功能性的要求。尽管表6.1描述了不同的影响，公正的说来，采购仍然是大多数政府系统令人最不满意的方面之一，就发展中国家而言尤为如此。大多数的发展中国家继承了殖民采购模式即通过国家招标委员会这种类似的组织实现受规则限制且高度集权的采购过程。各国在采用这个基于规则的采购模式的效果是不一样的。采购就发展中国家而言是一个难题，因为在任何公共管理体系和标准建设不完善，公务员缺乏训练且所得薪酬低的国家，遵守规则往往十分困难，总体的治理条件也差。然而，随着采购数量和多样性的增加，以及全球化使得技术专业化和潜在的市场结构发生了变化，集中采购变得更加不能够满足委托代理机构的需求。系统经常失效，因为它的刻板性使得它不能迅速适应现代市场条件。应对采购过时无效这一问题的方法则是推荐另一种采购管理的制度模式来替代。例如联合国和世界银行之类的国际组织在世界大部分地方倡导1994年联合国示范法在商品采购、施工与服务方面的法律法规。该示范法正式被30多个国家采用，对其他国家的采购53 系统也产生了影响，它如下写道：国家层面上的采购集中监管与不同中央或地方的机构在指定的机构或地区采购部门的责任下进行的分散式采购并存。常设行政当局(通常是财政部)协调政府采购政策的总体目标。方框6.1对采购方法的影响九十年代早期重要的发展引起采购在功能上发生变化，超越仅仅具有管理功能这一概念，更具有战略性国有部门功能。这些事件迫使政府力求使国家体系适应国际贸易协议和新的商业关注点的过程中关注集中采购。此外，公民社会对遏制腐败的兴致日益高涨，对责任和结果有更多需求，这让政客们认识到推广和确保高效和透明的采购的重要性。在此期间一些事件或进展在采购改革上扮演着重要的引擎：美国的关税和贸易总协定(GATT)以及关贸总协定框架下的乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判在1994年4月《政府采购协议》(GPA)签署和1995年世贸组织创建时掀起高潮。《政府采购协议》介绍了政府采购的多边框架,旨在实现世界贸易更大的自由化和发展。1994年，联合国国际贸易法委员会(UNCITRAL)发布了关于商品采购、建设和服务方面的示范法。这项法律是用来应对许多国家存在不充分且过时的采购立法监管这一事实，这一事实导致采购过程的低效和无效及滥用模式，由此，政府未能等值地使用公共资金。在公众对政府腐败和创新关注度增加的情况下，1993年建立了“透明国际”。在九十年代中期，为应对这些事件，国际发展机构将采购重点从监督借款人遵守政策和程序转移到对系统分析、风险评估和关于如何改善国家系统的政策建议的推进上。技术动力从九十年代初开始制造出电子采购新工具，彻底改变了政府做生意的方式。1993年欧盟(EU)的诞生将国家采购系统的多样性提升到了新高度，这阻碍了自由贸易，因此迫使各国政府集中调整各国采购系统，最终促成欧盟采购指令于2004年3月被采用。在2006年3月，所有主要的多边和双边发展机构、91个国家和一些公民社会组织参与发表了《援助实效问题巴黎宣言》，宣言承诺机构和国家持续努力协调，校准，以及对结果进行管理。它还列出一组可检测的行动和指标来加速这些领域的发展进程。作为2006年宣言的结果，经合组织生产出标准化诊断工具在国际公认的一套商品采购标准这一基础上来评估公共采购系统，政府可以将这一标准作为一个基准点和监测仪器。一个负责制定政策中心独立监管机构；发布应用法规（如指令、指南、模型或标准招标文件）的工具；监测采购业务；以及对采购人员培训和传授知识。尽管人们期望新制度模式会更加有效，会更能满足目前情况和特定机构的需要，却也大大提高了对其能力的要求。它要求执行机构有更高的能力，建立适当的监督，确保政策和程序的一致性。如同所有的制度变迁，因为一些复杂的原因，这种变迁尚未被适应——其中一个原因是改革下设置的大多数的中央监管机构普遍缺乏技术和预算资源以及缺乏必54 要的能显著影响系统性能政治影响力。由于资源的短缺，整个系统里许多采购人员，特别是地方一级的采购人员，对新法规和工具仍然一无所知。一项对采购制度改革影响的背景评估得出这样一个惨淡的结论“关于评估最近在系统效率、透明度以及公信力或结果方面进行的改革所带来的影响，几乎是没有相关信息的。实际上，没有关于这种评估的方法论，也几乎没有实施行动计划的进展记录评估。”桑切斯（2012）虽然应用经济理论和法律理论提供了一个有用的框架，用于思考采购的挑战，然而采购理论和实践之间存在差距，公共管理从业者继续纠结于采购系统的设计和改革。这种差距在发展中国家特别大，其采购能力明显落后于政府的需要。从广义上讲，恰当的采购制度安排的地位和政府进行有效采购的能力，通常至多表现为“正在进行的工作”，就大多数国家而言还远远没有建立一个有效的采购系统。为什么采购对公共投资而言是不可或缺的就这部分的目的而言，我们的焦点具体在于与公共投资支出相关的采购，这尤其包括如图6.1所示的复杂的合同契约特征。大多数国际发展援助被划分为资本支出并用于向公共投资项目提供资金，投资支出的很大一部分在低收入国家。各国也分配大量股票收入，这些收入是从蓬勃发展的自然资源行业的投资中得来，这些投资旨在创建关键开发基础。如果我们被告知资产是通过这种欺诈和贿赂下的支出购买而来，共谋的行业联盟抬高了资产所需成本，或者更糟的是，取而代之的是劣质的替代品或根本就不交货，我们会得出这样的结论：公共投资是一笔浪费的开支，在国家的增长前景上几乎不起作用。2甚至更多的良性因素可能导致公共投资的低价值：例如，许多国家一直在分配资本预算上花费少，部分原因是由于采购过程的延迟，延迟则有助于成本的增加和货币贬值。无论一个公共投资项目项目有多么重要，之前描述的情景和无数其他陷阱都可以破坏它。投资最终是否成功取决于政府采购系统的优点或缺点。最常见的挑战可以划归为经典的委托-代理问题和特定行业中对公平竞争的障碍。委托-代理问题政府采购商品和工程存在这样一个事实，资源由代理（政客和政府官僚）代表本该为主体的公民（以及捐助国的纳税人）在管理，而这些代理可能不完全代表主体的最佳利益。政客们声称代表选民并在广泛的公共利益上作出深思熟虑的决定。很明显从国际经验看来，一旦当选，政客们会受到强烈的金钱刺激使得他们以能加强他们的政治利益的方式行使自由裁量权，从而经常偏离公共利益。现任政党的一个常见的策略是保持政治捐款的垄断性，通过威胁从向反对派候选人捐赠资源的承包商手中撤销他们在市场上的特权，包括采购合55 同。这是由主体与在政府机构下从事采购的代理分离所导致的第一个畸变。另一个畸变-采购部和承包商之间的信息不对称，这导致的进一步的问题便是使采购复杂化。采购流程很容易遇到一系列抽租问题、更加复杂的合同和有限竞争。因为资本投资项目的经济效益往往很大,承包商可能会为能签得合同行贿以此设法使政府官员变得腐败。因此主要要注意确保采购部门的采购流程具有竞争性、透明性；避免利益冲突；反映出对以最低成本高效采购既定质量数量的商品、施工和服务足够的关注。不可避免的是，这些目标需要一个系统来监测和监督，识别和制裁政府官员和企业之间的腐败行为，提供反腐检查。竞争天平上的大拇指第二组问题来源于行业提供商品或服务的本质以及其特点是竞争还是串谋。如果一个行业有进入限制竞争的壁垒，或者如果公司有任何形式的串谋和欺诈行为，那么即使就一个管理良好的采购机构而言也很难控制成本和保证质量。在某些情况下，政府力图通过采购实现多个目标，例如通过当地含量要求促进当地产业发展，这甚至值得称赞。不幸的是,这种限制可能会导致高成本或低质量。此外，公共采购往往吸引了有组织的行业联盟，而且在没有一个健全的体系来检测和惩罚串谋以及确保向公共机构供应商品和服务的公平竞争的情况下，公共投资的效率会极大地降低。一些垄断或彼此串谋的供应商加上一个薄弱的政府采购管理系统，通常与寻租政治精英结盟，从而你会得到一个可能最糟糕结果的公式。在强大的行业联盟用他们的方式向官僚机构提供货币引诱来操控政府合同的地方，软弱的政府和强大的商业利益之间的相互作用会导致高成本的采购和浪费地分配公共资源。当审计流程未能识别这种腐败行为之时或者在政治影响力是用来抑制对串谋的报道或强加刑法的地方，采购过程中的腐败会成为一个根深蒂固的难题。3真实的成本公共投资采购尤为容易有重大效率损失，因为它涉及到大型不连续合同，可以通过不严密的核算和串谋为精英们提供高回报。一些例子会更生动地说明问题的本质：串谋的环境与设计和评估不足相互交织。土耳其的公共投资计划在1990年代末包括5321个项目，成本估计为1500亿美元，还有1050亿美元的未完成的结算。基于2001年分配给所有公共投资的将近50亿美元和在未来数年里预测达到类似的数额，国家计划组织估计，目前的投资组合将超过20年才能完成。尽管成本效益分析过程相当有用，然而采购过程被证明是有问题的：进行投标的项目，就完工成本而言，往往达到评估工具估算成本的三倍（世界银行2001）。成本的增加的一个原因是在设计和施工合同上广泛变更订单。尽管问题是由设计评估阶段不足导致的，采购过程和串谋被视为观察到的投资成本增加的56 重要原因。成本超支势头严重。建筑业透明度倡议（CoST2011）发现就从埃塞俄比亚,危地马拉、马拉维、菲律宾、坦桑尼亚、英国、越南、赞比亚选出的机构而言，它们最后和最初的合同价格之间的差异高达10%-50%，在某些情况下甚至高达100%-180%。甚至像英国这种拥有发达的公共投资管理(PIM)系统的国家，有高达15%的成本超支。初始和最终成本之间的差距通常与项目识别和设计不足以及低效的采购合同和执行（CoST2010）有关。这些研究表明，所有PIM系统都有巨大的效率改善空间，但在低收入和中等收入国家，潜在的效率增长会更为显著。弱小国家的低能力。工程设计和采购在政治弱小的国家会因有限的信息、私营部门的低利和技术复杂性变得复杂。在一个国家，跨越2000公里的丛林的输电线复原，在承包商竞争性采购之前，十几年来无数的努力都毫无作用。采购绩效不佳阻碍发展。最近一个对所有地区约500个由世界银行提供资金的项目的评论总结到差强人意的采购绩效显著影响项目成果的发展，采购绩效不佳导致这些成果三到五倍负差的情况。这些项目的可持续性也受到了不利的影响（世界银行2014）。危在旦夕：公共投资的价值所在类似世界银行这种组织的投资贷款组合可以反映出全球采购问题的现状。2000年10月，世界银行在全球范围内用于道路建设和养护的贷款近560亿元，该数值接近世界银行过去十年内贷款总额的20%，表明开发建设行业内采购管理环节的难度极大（帕特森和乔杜里，2007）。世界银行的评估流程显示，一个国家的一项道路合同在项目设计、规划、授权和管理的36个领域中存在贪污风险；同时，世界银行建议合同各方对59个指标进行监测（世界银行2006年度报告，146-54）。在由世界银行投资且被控在采购环节存在不当行为的29个案例中，主要存在三大类不当行为：串谋、伪造文件和合同诈骗，后者通常存在项目经理的里应外合。如图6.2所示，公共采购系统整合了公共投资管理，因为公共投资管理对论证项目合理性的成本效益计算存在潜在的重大影响。不良采购系统会使公共投资的价值受损（通常会对本期成本和长期成本造成巨大损失），并削弱项目的可持续性。如果公共采购体系薄弱，那么即使项目选择和预算计算再合理（在本卷前几章所提到的项目）也是无济于事。方框6.2道路建设行业的串谋和同业联盟2011年6月，世界银行廉政局发布的一项调查显示，全球各国公路行业饱受诈骗、贪污和串谋的之苦。下文节选了该报告的部分内容（世界银行2011年度报告a），以表明这些问题的范畴以及给发展中国家带来的损失。对孟加拉国的调查显示企业会向项目官员最高支付合同价格15%的钱款以获得项目授权。一名肯尼亚告密者称“串谋行为普遍存在于该国的道路行业”，而肯尼亚公路管理局57 和肯尼亚反贪委员会也证实了一项控告（肯尼亚2004、2007政府报告）。世界银行廉政局的调查员在采访数家柬埔寨企业和政府官员后发现，由政府官员辅助并支持的“同业联盟”控制了道路合同的判授。在菲律宾，“世界银行廉政局的调查员发现大量独立证据表明确实存在一个由政府官员扶持的同业联盟，对道路合同判授存在不良影响（公共工程和高速公路），并对世界银行和其他机构投资的道路建设项目抬高价格（世界银行2011年度报告b，3）。一名印尼被采访者称“印尼的串谋体系已运行32年，很多人认为所谓的‘自由市场’体系与共识合作文化规范相违背”，该观点与印尼竞争法机构（所马蒂，2010）和学术研究（范·克林肯和阿斯皮纳，2011）的报告结论一致。廉政局报告找到了证明世界银行投资项目存在串谋行为的证据，并发现充分证据证明非世界银行投资项目也存在串谋行为。海外发展研究所的工作人员报告称乌干达的道路建设行业内存在一个横跨全行业、抬高道路合同价格的同业联盟（布斯和勾陆巴穆特比，2009）。坦桑尼亚前首相进行调查后揭露了一个横跨道路建设行业的同业联盟（坦桑尼亚联合共和国政府工作报告，1996）。2005年，印度政府副秘书长桑吉特·辛格在一场国际会议中宣称印度各州的道路建设行业均存在行业联盟（辛格，2005）。由尼泊尔政府、亚洲发展银行、英国国际发展部和世界银行联合开展的一项研究显示尼泊尔近年来建筑行业的所有投标项目均存在串谋行为（尼泊尔政府工作报告，2009）。一项由立陶宛竞争机构针对道路建设投标竞标的数据统计分析报告称立陶宛存在企业间串谋行为（立陶宛政府工作报告，2008）；世界银行在2009年针对亚美尼亚公共采购的一项研究报告显示，采购投标过程存在大量串谋行为（世界银行，2009）；斯洛伐克反垄断办公室在2005年揭露了一个由多家道路建设企业参与的行业联盟（经济合作与发展组织，2005）。在2010年举行的第九届世界竞争论坛上，根据哥伦比亚、秘鲁、巴基斯坦和土耳其政府报告，上述各国均存在道路建设行业联盟（经济合作与发展组织，2010）。行业联盟在发达国家的道路建设行业中同样活跃。串通投标在美国的高速公路建设合同拍卖中屡见不鲜，相关的联邦起诉案数量在上世纪80年代达到了历史最高。经济合作与发展组织也证实道路建设行业普遍存在串谋行为。经济合作与发展组织在过去十年内至少召开了5次相关主题会议，并发布了有关如何打击串通投标和建筑行业联盟化的数份文章。58 方框6.2道路建设行业的串谋和行业联盟（接上页）1992年，荷兰国会指出荷兰的整个建筑行业存在联盟化问题（凡·登·赫维尔，2006）；2000年，瑞士竞争委员会指出瑞士东北部地区的道路建设市场受控于一个行业联盟（胡斯拉斯、拉赫亚达和贝斯考那，2009）；2010年，挪威竞争委员会发现两家公司在高速桥梁建设投标中存在串谋行为（挪威政府工作报告，2011）。来源：世界银行2011a表6.12011年全球不同地区、行业在竞争增加10%后公共基础设施采购的预估成本节省（单位：平均节约成本占GDP百分比）地区道电水废合路力务水计行行行处业a业b业理行业c东亚和942215太平洋地区欧洲和43242264中亚拉丁美42006洲和加勒比地区中东和730010北非南亚4172246非洲1124419合计1672225来源：易斯塔什和依米，2011.注：GDP=国内生产总值。a.假设每条道路长度为150千米。b.假设单位装机容量为75兆瓦。c.假设单位污水处理量为50,000立方米。59 易斯塔什和依米（2011）利用发达国家和发展中国家的相关经验，深入讨论了基础设施采购和投资的相关知识。一条符合竞标理论的新准则认为竞争价值是降低采购成本、提高采购质量（克伦佩勒，2000；克里希纳，2002）。尽管不同行业内采购合同的竞标者数量的数据有限，但是作者们指出，在所有投资项目中，道路建设合同的平均竞标者数量（每个合同平均6.2名竞标者）高于水务行业（5.2名）或电力行业合同（4.6名）的平均竞标者数量，并预估竞标者数量每增加10%就有可能使基础设施采购成本降低5-11%。其中，水务行业的成本降低弹性最大，电力行业的成本降低弹性最小，道路建设行业的成本降低弹性约为9%（易斯塔什和依米，2011，49-54）。表6.1显示了各行业、地区在采购竞争增加后的预估成本节省值。采购在公共投资管理集成系统中的作用我们不应把采购视作一个自立体系，而要从广义上理解采购在公共部门内的意义才能有效。从积极角度出发，采购系统为公共行业提供了接触私营部门创新、创意的窗口，可极大的提高公共投资收益和国家从公共项目中的获利。英国政府在最近颁布的一项有关发展国家行政部门办事能力的政策性文件中罗列了几个改进国家采购体系的关键建议（见方框6.3）。我们承认国家行政部门的理念对于任何公共管理流程确实极为重要，但是本文将重点为公共投资管理开发一种符合方框6.3内采购三阶段描述但又远远超越它的采购方式。人们经常错误的认为采购是一项技术性的合同行使行为，在竞标成功者签署合同后，采购行为便已经结束。这种对采购行为根深蒂固的错误概念导致人们只关注于合同签订的过程：详细定义合同的各个步骤，以及用于确定竞标成功的相关机制。尽管这些步骤和机制是成就一个良好采购系统的重要方面，但它们并未涵盖采购体系的方方面面，并且可能造成采购与公共投资全流程分离，带来高昂的损失。方框6.3英国行政部门与采购2013年，英国内阁发布了一项名为《应对变化的挑战：行政部门能力建设计划书》的报告，该报告强调必须通过提升不仅只有采购专员在内的所有公务员的采购技能，以获得更高价值。下文节选了该报告的部分内容：商业交往活动的所有三个阶段均可获得价值：预采购阶段、采购阶段和合同运作阶段。60 今天，我们将重点讨论采购阶段。政策制定和实施涉及的所有公务员必须遵守以下规定：•预采购阶段：在正式开始采购前，应培养更好的技巧来自信、清晰、准确的描述采购需求，并且不过分说明，使整个市场参与者可以有目的、有规划的参与采购竞争。•采购阶段：应理解潜在的经济学和供应商投标和履约的相关情况，包括定价机制、利润、账簿公开以及基本履约条款（如：合同变更、知识产权、合同终止）。了解如何协商价格、采用商业判断与理解采购流程同样重要。•合同运作阶段：应理解并采用商业技能确保供应商的供货符合我方（合同）预期，以维持价值最大化；同时应具备就供应商未及时供货进行协商的能力（包括自信地处理争议的能力）。此外，公务员应具备与大型供应商高级销售代表进行沟通、处理事项的能力，并了解他们的个人情况、专业背景和公司情况。来源：《英国政府工作报告》，2013.7。对采购职能较为综合性、稳健性的理解应横跨项目规划、采购方式选择、合同运行流程和合同管理的各个阶段。尤其对于复杂技术系统的采购来说，采购职能并不止于合同判授，而是与合同履约和管理保持关联。图6.2展示了一体化公共投资管理的全部范畴，并强调了其与预算和采购流程交叉的关键环节和重点。该图明确了采购的关键阶段（规划阶段、方法选择阶段、合同规划阶段、投标评估和合同判授阶段、合同管理阶段、审查和监督阶段和审计报告阶段）。4各阶段均与公共投资管理和预算相关，在管理良好的情况下，可以实现成本降低和项目进程加速。当然，下图中采购所包含的项目并不仅限于资本投资项目；所有类型的政府采购均包含规划、合同判授机制和合同监管。所有类型的采购均涉及各类采购技术方面（包括宣传方式、开标、评标的规则等）。图6.2公共投资管理系统环节61 来源：改编自比利斯卡和佛撒德，2012。此外，《联合国国际贸易法委员会采购示范法》在过去二十年内对采购法律的规定（如方框6.1所述）造成了全球各国采购法律条款的惊人相似性。但是，正如本文前述，公共投资项目的采购（相对于标准货物采购）存在不同的挑战性。一项大型基础设施项目可能涉及多个设计合同判授、独立建设合同和其他技术支持和监督合同。在很多无明确财产权法规、法律体系效率低下或超负荷运转的国家里，土地征用往往存在难题。这些流程都需要相关的技术工程、环境、财务和法律方面的专业技能。在很多情况下，政府不得不为特殊情况定义技术标准。然而，很多问题只有在建设阶段才会显现出来，因此政府必须进行事后评估，并解决与项目承包方之间的潜在争端。担保条款可以在前期工作完成后拓展合同和资产管理的需求，并要求合同各方的持续关注。5与标准商品采购不同，在私营部门中寻找公共商品的范围有限（如：国道、灌溉系统或机场），这就意味着政府必须定义技术标准和机制，以事先确定采购成本和质量；同时还需进行复杂的监控和测量，以确保采购的商品符合预期。相比标准商品采购，资本投资采购的等值概念更为复杂，需确定资产对目标的适用程度以及资产的总寿命成本（在未分析贬值率的情况下，通常无法确定该变量）。一些复杂的公共投资采购可以通过系统性、纪律性方法实现更好的管理，这种方法涉及项目选择、设计、预算和采购流程。有效使用上游公共投资管理和预算的信息可增强采购和项目实施的关键阶段，并提高公共投资的效率。以下段落描述了采购流程的相关元素，62 以及这些元素作为整合系统法的一部分与公共投资管理和预算流程的关联。采购规划良好的采购规划源于投资项目规划，是有效投资的关键要素。在理想的情况下，采购规划应与项目设计和评估并行。一个实现最低成本和合格质量的采购方式可能影响整个项目的预算估值。但是，采购规划通常是采购和公共投资管理与预算体系间最薄弱的环节，其部分原因是采购规划作为公共投资管理的组成部分并未得到足够重视。因此，大多数国家对资本投资的财政拨款通常较少。颇具讽刺意味的是，当政府为存在潜在高收益的公共项目配备稀缺资源时总是无法同步完成采购规划和预算，导致项目延期，资源利用率低下。这种延期会造成成本提高，并进一步削减投资效率。很多国家的政府机构通常不会为高值、复杂的项目制定详细的采购计划，即使采购计划在此类公共投资中有最大增值。采购流程通常在公共投资项目资金拨付后开始，留给负责采购的员工进行需求分析、市场调研和规范制定的时间所剩无几。采购规划通常在一个财年过去几个月后才开始，而合同判授通常发生在半个财年过去之后。预算拨付通常以年度为单位，因此，这种延期年复一年，最终导致计划实施顺延。同时，合同规划将市场结构和供应量考虑在内，可以确保采取适当的合同设计和方法论，并提供足够的成本和预算；这种延期还会降低合同规划的效率。拥有外部筹资的大型资本投资项目是例外6：此类项目的可行性研究通常有采购专家的参与，并将备选的采购选项考虑在内。上游延迟同样会对采购造成影响。在很多国家里，立项和预算资源配置需花费很长一段时间。比如说，在美国，该流程需花费至少3年时间（甘斯勒，2002）。预算配备不足同样会对有效的采购规划造成巨大障碍，对准确估价的项目来说也是如此。当项目偏离绕开经济评估审查的目标时，采购规划的难度会因此加大。投标评估和合同判授公共融资流程的这一阶段对于公共投资效率存在巨大影响。在治理效率低下的情况下，该阶段也会存在大量隐患。对于中低收入国家来说，确保竞争选拔与合理市价仍然是一个不小的挑战。强大的特权阶级通常可以串通投标评估流程，并影响评估小组的人员构成、评估标准、承包方选择、投标方式和合同判授。在此类案例中，投诉和上诉机制通常并不奏效。当国内制造商的生产力有限时，政府通常会坚持选择标准中的本国含量。但是，包括阿尔巴尼亚、墨西哥、波兰、土耳其在内的不少国家已经在增强竞争力方面取得进展，63 在投标评估和合同判授流程的透明度与合规性方面实现了大幅改进。另一方面，正如方框6.4所述，企业签署串谋合约后，通常会造成投资效率和回报受损。方框6.4采购理论的元素大量文献讨论了采购的应用经济学理论（竞争市场与进入堡垒、信息不对称、激励经济学、契约理论和机制设计等）。上世纪80年代让·雅克·拉丰特和让·梯若尔采用买方和卖方之间信息不对称的视角来更好的理解采购和法规问题，其具有开创性意义的伟大著作影响了很多相关文献。拉丰特和梯若尔（1993）描述了使公共采购陷入道德危机、逆选择和不可验证性等方面的问题。随后，易斯塔什和依米（2011）简要描述了相关文献的核心理念：确定投资内包或外包的关键基础（契约理论），是否应该以及如何解除投资项目建设和运营的捆绑，如何选择承包方（拍卖理论），以及是否需要建立一个事后调整机制或签署激励合同。尽管经济学为采购系统设计提供了强大的分析基础，但是一份源于法律理论的文献为采购方法提供了互补性基础。比如说，斯库纳（2002）证明了美国境内采购法稳健性基础关键原则的正当性，包括竞争、系统透明度和采购一体化，这些元素是美国采购体系的关键。采购规范在中低收入国家的扩散可能事与愿违，为投资效率和成本带来负面影响。过度监管可能导致承包方专门研究一个或少数几个行业的投标项目，这将迅速造成市场细分并降低竞争性。除去协定条款、特殊法令和准则外，国家性采购规范在拉美国家有158至508条，在澳大利亚有25条，在加拿大有83条，而英国和新西兰介于两者之间（韦加·马尔他等人，2011）。此外，标后谈判现有禁令的僵化通常会阻碍采购部门满足复杂基础设施采购的战略性需求（如：改变项目设计和规划以适应合同承诺（库格尔，2009）。采购流程的合同判授阶段对于公共投资预算和整体财政可持续性存在重要影响。合同双方签署合同时通常不会验证预算资源。承诺控制的缺失会造成公共财政管理系统功能障碍，削弱采购部门实现有效采购结果的能力。如果财政部不了解合同承诺的真实数额，那么就无法保证在支付到期时找到足够的资源。基础设施项目的未偿承诺通常能达到基础设施部年度营运预算的数倍。“未决账单”同样会使承包方把付款延迟计入投标中，这将进一步增加公共投资的成本。如果无法解决该问题，就可能对整个项目的投资效率产生巨大影响。在其他案例中，采购机构可能故意少报合同价值，使之低于财政部或规划部制定的64 审查界限值。但是，当承包方要求采购机构提供提升合同价值至真实水平的变更单时，这种拿系统当赌注的方式可能导致项目执行阶段存在问题。合同管理采购合同签署后合同管理开始；所有合同规定的服务和产品均已交付、签收并支付款项且合同所有相关文件均已归档后，合同管理结束。在良好的合同管理实践中，合同管理方应制定合同管理方案，明确项目员工在合同管理、追踪、修订和终止中应开展的活动内容。管理方案的细节程度由合同价值和风险决定。合同管理包括监管承包方的履约情况，聘请有资质的工程师或审计师鉴定建筑工程计划阶段的竣工和质量，以及根据合同条款授权款项支付。当承包方要求提供变更单时，合同管理方应派遣一名技术专家及时评估承包方请求；但是，合同管理者应遵循系统性流程以确保文件编制和决策的适当性和透明度。7没有良好的合同管理可能造成支付延迟，或在未验证收到货物或服务或工程进度的情况下授权付款。在极端案例中，资金给付可能在项目开工之前，这对承包方的履约激励机制存在负面影响。如上文所述，（包括现金配售或合同承诺控制的缺失在内的）上游问题甚至可能影响优秀合同管理者的管理成果。采购、公共投资管理和预算系统间缺乏交互会形成恶性循环，每个中断的链接会弱化另一个链接，有损整体投资效益。复杂的大型项目总是需要修改和修订：因合同解读和预料外的问题引起的争议亟待解决，包括土地清理或各级政府间合作的问题等。为了解决上述问题，合同管理可进行前瞻性预测，在事态严重前找到解决方法，否则官僚主义作风只会让人们关注于如何避免因行为不当而受公众谴责，而不是完成项目本身。例如在印度，项目争议导致10-15%的项目停摆，且大量建设资源闲置在停工项目中派不上用场（世界银行，2008）。有效的合同管理可以确保项目进展和资金进展处于正轨并保持同步，并且可以在项目和资金不到位时寻找出路。同时，合同管理还能确保项目质量检查行之有效。在最极端的情况下，由于政府用资源换取投资，资本资产的获取机制可能与公共投资管理和预算相分离，导致承包方必须在承诺偿还的前提下建立资产或过于依赖于政府间交易。在资源富饶、资金短缺、执行采购合同流程经验或能力欠佳的国家里，此类方式可以增值，因此十分盛行。例如，刚果民主共和国、老挝人民民主共和国、蒙古国等国家的资本支出广泛采用此类交易，并且交易条款也缺乏必要的透明度，这让议会和开发商十65 分惊讶。值得注意的是，当政府缺乏复杂采购和合同管理的能力时，这种承包协议不乏是一种理性选择。当然，此类合同的协商过程需透明，并着眼于物有所值。审查与监查本文将合同执行的监查分别处理，但是它在有效合同管理中确实是与生俱来的。合同可能包含逾期或合同履约不良的罚款条款，此类条款要求合同管理者对合同条款的履约情况进行监查和评估。如合同双方未就监查和定期讨论事项协商一致，那么项目很可能脱离正轨，任何可能纠正延迟或履约不良的措施都是于事无补。承包方的监管不力或许正好解释了变更令和成本增加的普遍趋势。例如，哥伦比亚政府允许2008年各种机构签署的公路特许经营合同金额可最高被修改至原始合同金额的两倍；现有公路特许经营合同均被延期，其中一项合同被延长了20年，增加的资金总额是原始合同金额的四倍之多（韦加·马尔他等人，2011）。通常情况下，合同通过变更令进行修改，在极端案例中，合同双方可能会对合同范畴和条款进行重新协商（克鲁格，2009）。合同修改通常不会被保存在财务管理信息系统中，因此也不会强调变更令的财务含义。只有少数国家拥有与一体化财务管理信息系统相连的电子采购体系。对项目进程和质量的监管通常只停留在表面上。例如，蒙古国和秘鲁几乎不进行项目抽查，而且根本没有项目质控。在这种情况下，合同执行的监控十分薄弱，且投资项目将频繁存在重大成本超支现象。审计和报告采购审计在完善的一体化采购体系中非常重要。它不仅可以确保采购的合规性以及财务经营一体性，同时还附加保证采购的商品和服务符合可接受标准。此外，采购审计可明确采购流程的弱点，以便进行有必要的改进。在完善的采购体系中，采购者应根据风险管理策略定期对各政府部门进行采购审计。完整可靠的采购审计报告应包括采购流程涉及的所有信息资料，包括投标评估、财务报告（包括解释成本超支原因的文件）、项目进度和质量报告、项目竣工报告等。审计报告是有效公共投资和支出管理（包括成本提高和支出金额）的基础。另外，对完成的基础设施采购进行准确的记录和报告可以将已创建资产转移至“所有者”政府机构，被计入资产注册，并拥有资产管理计划。66 影响和说明从诊断观点来看，上述方法为诊断现有采购体系的薄弱点和确定公共投资效率的主要影响因素提供了良好的基础。但是，这种方法可能让读者倍受打击，因为作为公共投资管理关键点的整合采购法竟然对管理能力要求如此之高。发达国家确实可以实现对所有公务员的能力培养，以确保他们了解市场和各行各业，与合同方协商并进行采购合同管理，同时确保政府的投资物有所值。但是，对于大多数能力有限的发展中国家政府来说，短期内或许根本无法实现这一目标。改革模式但是，一些案例为我们提供了增强投资项目采购的方法。一些国家已经尝试执行相关战略，通过提升机构的能力来塑造并管理复杂采购，以提升采购效果。加强合同监管英国制定关卡审核流程的目的是帮助政府机构避免项目失败常见原因的发生。8在英国政府商务办公室的支持下，关卡审查集合了各类知识以及公共、私营行业的代表人物，为政府机构的大型采购管理提供关键点的指导和建议。同时，英国组织了六大独立审查环节，包括大型项目的战略评估、商业理由、采购策略、合同安排、机构对资产到位管理的准备状态以及对项目经营和项目交付后的获利审查。尽管尚无针对关卡流程影响的权威著作，但是这些审查有助于节省采购支出、为政府对重要投资项目的采购提供了一种明智的方法。新西兰政府对大型采购项目采取类似的做法足以证明这种审查方式的成功。采购职能相关的组织联盟尽管能力更强的发达国家采取此类方法确实可能取得成功，但是发展中国家依然可以通过一些方法加强采购与项目管理之间的关联，以节约有限的管理能力，并提高投资收益。在大多数国家中，采购职能由担任大量其他职能的政府部门承担。官僚作风、公务员人力资源政策和官僚阶层通常会阻碍决策类型和产出导向，而后者却是优化采购执行或合同管理的关键所在。同时，这些机构也无法将有限的能力联合起来以实现效率最大化。唯一的改进方法是建立一个专门进行采购和大型项目管理的独立国家机构。南非国家道路机构有限公司就是一个专为道路网络管理（包括采购和合约管理）而设置的国家机构。10这家机构的经营模式类似于私营企业，受政府委托负责以商业利益为前67 提执行南非政府的交通政策。该机构内部为单层结构，并实行产出导向型经营模式。其组织结构和流程的设计初衷是提升经营效率和项目管理的有效性。同时，该机构重新调整了投标流程，聘请了独立的评估委员会，将项目管理者和私营企业的代表集合起来。该机构将复杂的市场专业知识融于审查流程中，以审查各类项目建议书，扩展自己的能力，为承包方和咨询者提供更多的自由提出新型方法。该机构以专业知识类型对员工进行分类，以减少组织层级，提升技术优势，并增强风险和合同管理的积极主动性。南非国家道路机构有限公司的成功可以部分归功于其高质量的领导能力。在其成立的前十年里，该机构将南非的道路网络规模扩充了一倍以上（从7000千米扩充至16000千米），并为2010年南非世界杯的举办做好了基础设施的准备工作。在道路网络拓展的同时，该机构也改变了道路建设的财务模式，并重组、改进了采购流程。11南非国家道路机构有限公司成功的另一部分原因是其组织架构。由于从传统官僚主义局限中解脱出来，南非国家道路机构有限公司可以根据绩效导向设置其采购流程。以有限能力为紧急行动做准备巴布亚新几内亚为采购修改组织架构基于其他原因。1994年，腊包尔中心城镇连续发生两次火山喷发，不再适宜人类居住。为此，巴布亚新几内亚政府组建了加塞列灾后重建机构，负责所有灾后重建的项目实施工作（世界银行，2010）。由于将有限的专业技术知识集中于单一项目，加塞列灾后重建机构积累了相应的技能，最终实现了有效的采购管理和执行，并完成了重新安置整个城镇的复杂合同管理。责任集中化同样为捐赠者和其他援助供应商提供了支援和能力开发的重点。十年内，加塞列灾后重建机构在125个重点项目中实现了99个完工项目，并额外开工13个项目（仍在为剩下的13个项目筹资）。事实证明，在能力紧缺、需求迫切的情况下，将责任集中于单一机构进行项目实施管理可以有效提升采购绩效。更改计划采购流程改进的另一个方式是对很可能发生合同修改的大型复杂的公共投资项目进行需求预测。确保合同管理已经为有效项目监控设计了相应流程和绩效标准十分重要。每个公共投资项目必须配备一名工程师负责监管项目的进程和质量。该名工程师应在付款开始前对项目所有工作签字保证，对项目的交付和质量负责，并被授予执行该项责任的独立性和权威性。但是，当重大变更单具有可预测性的时候，应雇佣合格的技术专家或机构对68 项目的合同合理调整、节省成本、尽可能确保项目进度接近于与原始进度等方面及时提供建议。如果项目改动会对成本造成巨大影响，那么就有必要重新考量该项目的可行性。例如，韩国于1999年采用了项目总成本管理系统，要求国家预算部对大型项目采购成本进行持续核查（金姆，2008）。尽管各职能部位可支配项目总成本最高8%的应急费用，但是韩国企划财政部必须核查项目成本的所有增项。项目总成本管理系统还创建了一个触发机制，以确保项目的可行性：项目成本一旦增加超过20%会触发项目可行性再次评估机制（以防止将新注入的资金投入到亏空中去）。项目总成本管理系统会定期核查需求预测的准确性，以确保项目变更不会影响需求预测。需求降低超过30%时会触发项目整体可行性重新评估机制（由韩国企划财政部进行）。自从采用项目总成本管理系统后，存在重大成本超支的项目比利已大幅下降。在1994年至1998年期间，9%以上的项目的总成本增加超过20%。在2002年至2004年期间，这一数值下降至3%以下（金姆，2008）。发展中国家也可采取补救措施。比如说，在项目设计阶段就开展采购规划，这种做法可以在项目批准和预算制定完成后提升投标和合同执行的效率。改善后的上游准备和协作所带来的好处对于大型项目而言十分重要。结论本章着重强调了将采购视作公共投资管理综合方法核心的必要性（采购也是优质公共管理关键因素）。这一重要环节并未得到足够重视，公共投资管理改进中鲜少增强过该环节。同时，本章还为连接采购和公共投资管理制定了一个概念框架（尤其在图6.2的讨论中），并详述了在框架中协调管理带来的利益：•将采购流程的功能和公共投资管理相整合，以评估具体国家里实际采购和公共投资管理的优缺点。•为采购改革提供关键设计原理，以增强弱势环节。•从传统合规型方法改为更为现代、以绩效为基础的采购方法。尽管如此，要想实现上述利益，国家政府必须提升其协作能力和管理能力以适应采购改革，同时为改革提供相应的政治领导。大幅提高能力的重要性。由于人力资源和机构能力的需求居高不下，鲜有国家可以实现采购和公共投资管理的完美结合。尽管如此，有了好的设计原理和高效投资目标的促69 使，各国政府可以通过渐进式改革慢慢提升和激发自身能力。各国政府可以把重点放在提升高值项目的管理能力以实现渐进式发展，而不是涵盖所有的公共投资项目，因为很多项目为低值项目。根据国情实现改革的必要性。值得强调的是，各国政府应根据自身能力进行制度安排。关注机构功能性可以避免“同构模拟”的问题，因为发展中国家盲目模仿发达国家的制度形式并不能实现功能性目标（普里切特、伍尔科克、安德鲁斯，2011）。政治和技术领导阶层必须果断、可信，以推动体制改革。正如公共部门的大多数改革一样，采购改革很少遵循标准蓝图或规划。由于与政治息息相关，体制改革需要可靠、权威的政治领导阶层，以及有能力、有积极性的技术领导阶层。体制改革从体质顶层（通过采用新政策和方法）和底层（通过组织和政府部门发展出带来更好收益的实践）同时开始，最终获得持续的绩效提升。保持公民对于接受公共商品和服务的参与度和兴趣度可推动相关审查和反馈，以减少采购和投资流程中的浪费和欺诈。积极提升合同透明度可以促进政治和政府部门作出回应，并提升采购流程和成效。很多国家都已经采取新的实践方法并提升了采购成效。引入非传统合同方式（如：承包协议、绩效合同和公司合作关系）、提升合同价格和投入成本的透明度或增强合同履约的监管力度都可以改变采购流程；而类似的合同形式还有很多。尽管如此，只有少数国家对公共投资管理体系中的采购实现了持续的绩效改进。一言以蔽之，对整合良好的采购体系维度进行概念化与建立这样一个体系之间存在较大差距。弥补这一差距需要持之以恒的努力，需要从各国和各部门的经验中吸取相关知识并建立知识体系。我们希望本章可以对知识体系的建立作出一定贡献。注：1.新采购方法的术语尚未完全确定。电子逆向拍卖是指购买组织和供应商之间的一种实时在线动态拍卖，双方通过在预定期限内以低价竞拍或报价排序的方式相互竞争以赢取合同。由一个（或多个）合同机构和一名（或多名）供应商共同签署的框架协定制定了相关条款（合同价格和数量），以在合同期间内管理待判授的合同。2.不良采购同样会造成办公用品、教材、药品等商品采购的欺诈和浪费；因此，采购效率低下也可能影响经常性预算并有损政府服务。3.大量文献讨论了政治利益影响采购流程并损害投资收益的方式（坦齐和达吴迪，1997；平托·达青斯基，2002；奥尔肯，2007，2009；奥尔肯和潘德，2012；萨克斯等人，2013）。70 格尔登和米英（2013）研究了30个国家的分配政治。4.请参考韦加·马耳他等人（2011）的文章，以获得采购流程的详细内容。5.商品合同中存在很多此类特征。汽油、电脑的政府采购通常涉及大量资金、复杂的合同条款和先进机制，以监控合同履约。我们已经强调了资本投资项目采购和简单采购的差别，以突出某些元素，但是更为普遍的观点是：现代合同的复杂性表明我们对采购需求的观点有待修正。6.但是，即使是外部（赞助）融资项目通常也难逃采购规划和预算不良的限制。7.澳大利亚为该流程提供了一份明确指南（包括合同变更请求的检查清单在内）。请参考以下网址：http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Files/BPG%20HTML/Developing%20and%20Managing%20Contracts/5_10.html浏览上述检查清单并了解澳大利亚政府拟定的“合同开发和管理的最佳实践指南”。8.英国国家审计署和政府商务部共同编制了一份英国项目失败常见原因表，强调了组织和项目战略重点不一致、缺乏高级领导阶层、缺乏有效股东参与、缺乏项目管理技能和供方市场处理经验等问题。请浏览下列网址了解“项目失败常见原因表”：http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110822131357/http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Project_Failure.pdf。9.欲了解英国商务部关卡审查机制的相关信息，请浏览以下网址：http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110822131357/http://www.ogc.gov.uk/what_is_ogc_gateway_review.asp欲了解新西兰的审查流程，请浏览2011年4月发布的《大型项目批准和担保指南》（http://www.Hm-treasury.uk/d/major.projects.approvals.assurance.guidance.pdf）。10.欲了解南非道路机构有限公司的相关信息，请参见贝内特，2011.11.南非道路机构有限公司的绩效与同时间建立的其他非洲道路机构有所区别。如欲对比不同道路机构的绩效，请参见皮纳德（2012）。12.南非道路机构有限公司卓越绩效并未为同时建立的其他道路机构所借鉴。全球各地均有道路机构，但是很多机构都无法脱离政治控制或创建不同于传统政府部门的独立部门实现单独运转。南非道路机构有限公司的经验表明通过机构重组可以提高资本项目的采购成果。同时，其他机构的经验也表明此类绩效的提升实属意外，而非普遍情况。71'