《法律素养》（第八章）翻译项目报告.pdf

'＇．＇苗－’’／；＾；－；＾；：，＇；短会＇—；’．１４，ｖ／．．、．＇＂—；－＇＇＇，一．：－：＇：丈点巧：再：社辑女與ｙ…务．＞一＇＇二ｒ．；－’．■－言去．？？‘、女．－＂‘．＇？，＊‘’一，一．、入一，－？＊－、．、Ｖ＾．．六？＾一心一二、、，产、？－？＇？．’’．、，、＇．．中…心：號墙禹．婚．攝—三请冷，的，；清难靖＾；、—＇、－■帘斗钟觸．巧觀磋惡據殺撫乃寶錢．＂二、＇＇＇、．、＇巧Ｖ＇沒把＇．．、．再．：＇，寧节谋扳．巧敏：：苗‘＇？－、可气梦／＇－Ｖ，＞：祷＊＊穿響｜講古译专化学位巧±论文冷ｔ毫巧．－．―－－？－．．一一＇、？一，？、？、？与早，．！，．一，＇＇一…－■？机可＇贾和＾、产产、．户ｖｒ？？？－＞■■．．－？ｆ－＇‘、占、％！－、■．？？＇’－一＂＂＊＾一．．■：．－、－－－；：－．．，一、、、＾．．＿＾；．；．ｖ＾《法＃素本》（第，？章Ｉ一一一舶々巧６化々：’．＇一——ＸＸＸ，一．托．－：．二－＼Ｘ－■．．＇．■．－－＇．－入＇＾．．片、、：－、‘．＇、？、、、、■■？．，’？’…．产’？．．．．．．．．―：．、．？，■’，’Ｊ，．．、、、，．，．，．－．＊、《．？Ｊ■＇、，－？－？－？．？，．－．－—－—－■、、、．－．？．、一－、、、、．？？？．．．、．．：？？？．ｒ，．？。，＇Ｖ、、－￣．：导：林说品一皆知：．．；．句：：，‘发嗜，Ｖ：，＇ｖ賓心■？＂＇．－、，指教：；＃师＃东夸期教巧Ｊ六黃：ｉＸ家莫＾节＾狱驾祀摸、．．濟：ｒ专巧，《巧丈矜化名译：讓矜一；记苗．．－…：．－Ｔ，－．．ｆｃｉ．．＾ｆ．＂．．＇．－：：‘＇叫。＇．－＂：璋＞占，．巧巧；：ｖ．心＾ｒ’Ａ？：？＇＾＊，？？４＞＊？■－，１ｆ＞一卢＇也研巧向，英巧签译，々：蟲必度苗霉势巧駐逝巧媒．．￣＇＾’占＾纔、？蘇？濟成斩巧苗与＇＇’－－．：．；？时０Ｖ．：２１６４為．．據慕论义援巧间質年月这該如礎霉：結＇＇＜－，知成？矜吩姆巧考等、苗聲方苗命＾：１６蔡＊撕５麥秦论文巧辩时闻年月吉．一？＾？—．．ＶＫ片？．；京，？、？＇－．－＾＇小、．Ａ才巧一一１、Ｖ、．琴＂、六＾’．軒片２１６０，．论文：０３３－编号．驾心繁马濤舅嗦＇＇—：＇＇＇：￣．－ｃ．ｖｃ巧：ｖｒ－＂—、－－－＇．－＇＇＇－－、■．、，心．＿ＶＶ，Ｖ、一‘．託＾—、－、＾／：器、＾／先，．’．．－，一八＇一一＇．．－戊终Ａ矿ｒ．户，ｆ．．：赁＞鸣衝话：篇ｄ調養薄敏ｙ＇繁说纔＇ｒ—扣＇、＇．＾户户．．．．．户；巧＂範萨记＾．起叙带兴蘇．萝约凌義．’＇義謹嗎麵幽薦誦；喔－．：．．－、舅：—．．：鷄難餐．．截想誦＾＾＾ AReportontheTranslationofLegalLiteracy（Chapter8)byZhangYanAthesissubmittedtotheGraduateSchoolinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofTranslationandInterpretingunderthesupervisionofAssociateProfessorYangZhitingChongqing,P.R.ChinaMay2016 ？Ｖ学位论文独创性声明本人声明所呈交的学位论文是本人在导师指导下进行的研巧工作及取得的Ｌ研巧成果。据我所知，除了文中特别加Ａ际注和致谢的地方外，论文中不包含其他人已经发表或撰写过的研究成果，也不包含为获得四川外国语大学或其一他教育机构的学位或证书而使用过的材料。与我同工作的同志对本研究所做的任何贡献均已在论文中作了明确的说明并表示谢意。学位论文作者签名：旅新签字日期：年（月２日学位论文版权使用授权书本学位论文作者完全了解四川外国语大学有关保留、使用学位论文的规定，有权保留并向国家有关部口或机构送交论文的复印件和电子版，允许论文被查阅和借爵。本人授权四川外国语大学可Ｗ将学位论文的全部或部分内容编入有关数据库进行检索，可采用影印、缩印或扫描等复制手段保存、汇编学位论文。（保密的学位论文在解密后适用本授权书）学位论文作者签名：导师签名：柄坤。签字日期：２＂年＾月２日签字日期；年月之ａ学位论文作者毕业后去向：工作单位：电话：通讯地址：邮编：１ 《法律素养》（第八章）翻译项目报告摘要本文是一篇翻译报告，原文选用的是阿奇·扎里斯基所编《法律素养》一书的第八章。《法律素养》一书系统地介绍了普通法系下的法律结构、法律系统、法律语言等信息，用于法学专业学生的进一步学习，也有助于非法学专业人士了解法律体系，增强法律意识。笔者通过对《法律素养》第八章的翻译，对法律翻译的方法技巧进行了分析和探讨，并对此次翻译实践进行了总结。本报告一共分为五部分。第一部分是翻译项目描述，包括翻译项目的背景和意义。第二部分是对源文本的分析，包括源文本作者信息、内容介绍以及源文本的语言特点。第三部分是对翻译过程的描述，包括翻译工具的选择，指导翻译实践的功能对等理论以及翻译质量控制方法。第四部分是对翻译难点和解决方法的介绍，通过具体实例说明了法律术语、长难句的翻译方法，并探讨了源语言风格再现的问题。第五部分是笔者在翻译实践中获得的翻译经验与教训。关键词：翻译报告；法律翻译；翻译难点；功能对等理论ii AReportontheTranslationofLegalLiteracy（Chapter8）AbstractThisreportisonthetranslationofChapter8inthebookLegalLiteracy,whichiseditedbyArchieZariski.LegalLiteracyprovidesasystematicunderstandingofkeyconceptssuchaslegalstructure,lawsystemandlegallanguage,whichisusedforthelearningoflawstudentsandcanalsohelpnon-lawmajoredstudentsknowaboutlegalstructureandhelpthemtostrengthentheirlawconsciousness.DuringthetranslationofChapter8inLegalLiteracy,theauthormadeanalysisandstudyonthetranslationmethodsandskillsandsummarizedthetranslationpractice.Thistranslationreportisdividedintofivechapters.ChapterOneisthedescriptionofthetranslationproject,includingthebackgroundandsignificanceofthistranslationproject.ChapterTwoistheanalysisofsourcetext,includingtheintroductionabouttheauthor,thecontentandthelinguisticfeaturesofST.ChapterThreeisdescriptionoftranslationprocess,includingtheselectionoftranslationtools,Nida’sFunctionalEquivalenceTheoryusedfordirectingtranslationpracticepreparationandqualitycontrolmethods.ChapterFourisabouttranslationdifficultiesandsolutions.Thedifficultieslieinthetranslationofterminology,longsentences,reproductionofSTlinguisticstyle.ThetranslatoradoptedNida’sfunctionalequivalencetheoryasthetheoreticalguide,ensuringthereadabilityandcoherenceofthetargettext.ChapterFiveconcludeswitharetrospectionofthetranslationprocess.Keywords:translationprojectreport;legaltranslation;translationdifficulties;functionalequivalencetheoryiii AcknowledgementsIwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetoallthosepeoplewhohelpedmeduringthewritingofthetranslationreport.MydeepestgratitudegoesfirstandforemosttoProfessorYang,mysupervisor,forhisencouragementandguidance.Hehashelpedmeduringallthestagesofthewritingofthisreport.Withouthisconsistentinstruction,thisthesiscouldnotreachthepresentform.Second,IwouldliketoexpressmyheartfeltgratitudetotheprofessorsandteachersinTranslationStudieswhohaveinstructedandhelpedmealotinthepasttwoyears.Lastmygratitudewouldgotomybelovedfamilyfortheirlovingconsiderationsandgreatconfidenceinmeallthroughtheseyears.Ialsoowemysinceregratitudetomyfriendsandmyfellowclassmateswhogavemetheirhelpandtimeinlisteningtomeandhelpingmeworkoutmyproblemsduringthedifficultcourseofthereport.iv CONTENTS摘要.............................................................................................................................ⅱAbstract........................................................................................................................ⅲAcknowlegements........................................................................................................ⅳChapter1TranslationProjectDescription................................................................11.1BackgroundofTheProject............................................................................11.2SignificanceofTheProject..........................................................................1Chapter2AnalysisoftheSourceText......................................................................32.1AbouttheAuthor............................................................................................32.2MainContentoftheST..................................................................................32.3LinguisticFeaturesofST...............................................................................42.3.1AnalysisonLexicalLevel...................................................................42.3.2AnalysisonSyntacticLevel...................................................................4Chapter3DescriptionofTranslationProcess...........................................................63.1SelectionofTranslationTools........................................................................63.2GuidanceofTranslationTheoryintheProject..............................................73.3TranslationQualityControl...........................................................................8Chapter4TranslationDifficultiesandSolutions......................................................94.1TranslationDifficulties....................................................................................94.2SolutionstotheDifficulties…………………………………………….…..104.2.1TranslationofTerms...........................................................................104.2.2TranslationofLongandComplexSentences.....................................114.2.3TranslationofPassivevoice...............................................................124.2.4ReproductionofSTLanguageStyle..................................................13Chapter5Conclusion...................................................................................................13Reference....................................................................................................................17Appendix1TheSourceText.....................................................................................18Appendix2中文译文........................................................................................41v Chapter1TranslationProjectDescription1.1BackgroundofTheProjectAccordingtoLorenzoCotula,lawsareusuallypublishedintheofficialgazette,fewpeopleoutsidelegalcircleshaveaccesstolegalinformation.Illiteracy,economicbarriers,languagebarriers,socialtaboosandalackofzealamongthelegalfraternitymayleadtoobstaclesingainingrequisitelevelsoflegalliteracy.Inordertopromotepeople’slegalawarenessandlegalliteracy,someimportantinstitutionsareestablished:Barcouncils,lawyerfederationsandvariousNGOstaketheleadinpromotinglegalawarenessandlegalliteracy.InIndia,aspertheLegalServiceAuthorityAct,1987,theNationalLegalServicesAuthority(NLSA)hasbeendesignatedtotakeappropriatemeasuresforspreadinglegalliteracyandlegalawarenessamongstthepeople.InIndiana,intheUnitedStates,OutreachforLegalLiteracy(OLL)isacommunityserviceprograminwhichlawstudentsteachlawtofifth-gradersinlocalelementaryschools.(Stefanou,Constantin;HelenXanthaki,2008,p.48)However,inChina,thereisnosuchaninstitutiontopromoteallofthecitizens’legalawarenessandlegalliteracy.Non-law-majoredstudentsareonlytaughtwiththemostsuperficialknowledgeoflawbyusingthetextbookofIdeologicalandMoralCultivationandLegalBasisincollege.Therefore,itisnecessaryfornon-law-majoredcollegestudentstohaveintimateknowledgeaboutlawsystemsoastoimprovetheirlegalliteracyundertheimplementationoftherulebylawinChina.1.2SignificanceofTheProjectLegalLiteracyisanintroductorytextwhichhelpsallthecitizenstohaveabetterunderstandingoflawsystemandchallengestudentstoconsidercriticallythesystemtheyarestudying.InChina,mostnon-law-majoredcollegestudentslacklawknowledge,abilityandbelief.Andthereisnosuchatextbookincollege.Therefore,1 thetranslationofLegalLiteracycanhelpthemtoknowbetteraboutthelegalsystemandhelpthemdevelopthebasicsenseoflaw.ThetranslatortranslatedChapter8LegalInterpretation:SkillsandTechniquesforMakingSenseofLawwhichissignificanttoallcitizensinasocietypermeatedbylawbecauseeveryoneshouldknowhowlawseekstoachievejusticeinandforsociety.Therefore,thetranslationofLegalLiteracy,ononehand,willprovideareferencelearningoflegalliteracyforcollegestudents,andontheotherhandwillhelppeopledevelopthebasicsenseoflaw.2 Chapter2AnalysisoftheSourceText2.1AbouttheAuthorLegalLiteracywaspublishedin10,2014byAUPress.TheauthorisArchieZariski,aformerlitigatorinEdmonton,Alberta.Hehastaughtlawandlegalstudiessince1991,includingclassesonmediation,alternativedisputeresolution(ADR),evidence,andlegalliteracy.Heisco-editorofTheMulti-TaskingJudge:ComparativeJudicialDisputeResolution(ThomsonReuters).2.2MainContentoftheSTTounderstandhowthelegalsystemworks,studentsmustconsiderthelawintermsofitsstructures,processes,language,andmodesofthoughtandargument—inshort,theymustbecomeliterateinthefield.(EdgarBodenheimer,2015,p.98)LegalLiteracyfulfillsthisaimbyprovidingafoundationalunderstandingofkeyconceptssuchaslegalpersonhood,jurisdiction,andprecedent,andbyintroducingstudentstolegalresearchandwritingskills.Examplesofcases,statutes,andotherlegalmaterialssupporttheseconcepts.WhileLegalLiteracyisanintroductorytext,italsochallengesstudentstoconsidercriticallythesystemtheyarestudying.Touchingonsignificantsocio-legalissuessuchasaccesstojustice,legaljargon,andplainlanguage,Zariskicritiquescommonlegaltraditionsandpractices,andanalyzeswhatitmeans“tothinklikealawyer.”Assuch,thetextprovidesasoundbasisforthosewhowishtopursuefurtherstudiesinlaworlegalstudiesaswellasthoseseekingabetterunderstandingofhowthelegalfieldrelatestothesocietythatitserves.ThetranslatorchoosesChapter8asthesourcetext.Inthischaptertheauthordetailshowlegalinterpretationisappliedinlegislation,casesandcontracts,whichhelpreadershaveabetterunderstandingoftheskillsandtechniquesformakingsenseoflaw.3 2.3LinguisticfeaturesoftheSTLegalLiteracybelongstothelegaltextwhichhasitsowncharacteristics,suchasaccuracy,preciseness,solemnityandauthority,etc.(LiKexing,2007,p.48)TheauthorwillmakeanalysisonthelinguisticfeaturesoftheSTinlexicalandsyntacticlevels.2.3.1AnalysisonLexicalLevelTheprimarylexicalfeaturesinlegaltextincludethehighlyfrequentuseofthecommonwordswithuncommonmeaningsespeciallybigwordsorarchaicwordsfromOldEnglishandMiddleEnglish,wordsandphrasesfromLatin.Inaddition,italsofrequentlyemploystechnicalterms,wordsandexpressionswithflexiblemeanings.Forexample,inSTtherearesomebasiclegalterminologieswhichareverycommoninlawfieldsuchas“evidence”,“statute”,and“commonlaw”,etc.,butthenon-lawmajoredpeoplemaybenotfamiliarwiththem.SothetranslatorwilllookuplegaldictionarytoconfirmtheirChinesemeanings.Apartfromthis,Therearealotofcommonwordshavingdifferentmeaningsindifferentsubjects.InST,therearesomewordswhicharecommonlyusedbutcannotbetranslatedastheircommonmeanings,suchas“consideration”,“party”and“decision”.Besides,TherearesometerminologieswritteninLatinwordsinST,whichareunfamiliarforthereaders,suchas“mensrea”,“ratiodecidendi”and“obiterdicta”.2.3.2AnalysisonSyntacticLevelThesyntacticfeaturesoflegaltextmainlypresenttheinclinationoftheemploymentofcoordinateconstruction,longandcomplexsentences,complicatedattributivestructures,useofnominalization,modalauxiliaryandthepassivevoice.HerearesomeexamplesinST:HereisanexampleinST:“Itisnaturaltopaytheclosestattentiontothewordingofaparticularsectionoflegislationthatseemsmostrelevanttothecurrentsituation,butthemodernmethodoflegalinterpretationrequiresustoexpandourreadinghorizonsinordertounderstandthesectioninitsentirelegislativecontext.”Inthis4 longandcomplexsentence,therearetwocompoundsentences,oneattributiveclauseandfourinfinitivephrases,whichiscoherentandwellorganized,embodyingthesuperiorityoflongsentences.Hereisanotherexampleinwhichthepassivevoiceisemployed:“Atonetime,judgesfollowedfixedrulessuchastheonestatingthattheliteralmeaningoflegislation,whichisgraspedsolelybylookingatthewordsthathavebeenused,mustbeacceptedandappliedevenifitleadstoanabsurdresultintheparticularcase.”Inthissentence,theuseofpassivevoiceof“mustbeacceptedandapplied”istokeeptheaccuracyandobjectivityinlegaltext.Inthelegaltranslation,thisequivalencecanwellbeachievedwhenthetranslatorexploresdiscoursetranslationonthebasisofgraspingthespiritoflegaltextinthesourcelanguageandbeingfamiliarwithlegaltextwritteninboththesourcelanguageandthetargetlanguage.5 Chapter3DescriptionofTranslationProcessAstheancientsayinggoes“whenaworkmanwishestogethisworkwelldone,hemusthavehistoolssharpenedfirst”,soawellpreparationisamustforthetranslation.Tosucceedinthistranslationproject,thetranslatordidalotofpreparationsbeforetranslation.ThetranslatorfirstreadmanyChinese-versionbooksaboutlawandjurisprudenceinordertohaveacorrectunderstandingofthelegaltermsandcasesquotedintheST;thenthetranslatorthoroughlyreadtheSTmanytimesbeforestartingtheproject;besides,thetranslatorchosethepropertranslationtheorytoguideherpractice.3.1SelectionofTranslationToolsAgoodtranslationdoesn’tonlyneedagoodtranslatorbutalsorelevanttranslationtools.SothetranslatorchosetousethespecializedEnglish-ChineseandChinese-Englishdictionaries,suchasBlack"sLawDictionary,EnglishandChineseLegalLanguageDictionary,andEnglish-ChineseDictionaryofAnglo-AmericanLawandtheinternetdictionaries,suchashttp://dic.youdao.com/,http://ww.lingoes.cn/,http://dict.cnki.net/.Duringtranslating,itisveryimportanttoknowaboutthebackgroundinformationofST.Sothetranslatoralsousedinternettolookforthecasesincommonlawsystemcounties.Forexample,therearealotofactsandcasesintheST,andatfirstalotofthemweredifficultforthetranslatortounderstand.Sotheresearchenginesarenecessary,suchaswww.baidu.comandwww.google.com.Forexample,inchapter8theauthorusedthecaseofAlbertaUnionofProvincialEmployeesv.LethbridgeCommunityCollege,whichconfusedthetranslatoratfirstbecausesheknewnothingaboutthiscase,butaftersearchingitfrominternet,thetranslatorknewaboutthecaseandgotabetterunderstandingofitsmeaning.6 3.2GuidanceofTranslationTheoryintheProjectBasedonthelinguisticfeaturesoftheST,thetranslatorchoseNida’sFunctionalEquivalencetoguidethetranslationpracticeincompletingthisproject.Nida’sFunctionalEquivalenceTheory,widelyappliedintranslation,isaveryimportantmilestoneinthedevelopmentofthetranslationtheoryinthe20thcentury.(LiuJunping,2007,p.67)Nidaarguesthattranslationistobeinthetargetlanguageinthemostnaturalwaytoreproducetheoriginalinformation.Thefirstistoreproducethemeaning,andthenstyle.(Nida,EugeneAlbert,1993,p.104)Nidadefinedtranslationas:“Theso-calledtranslationisthetargetlanguageusedintheclosestandmostnaturalreproductionoftheoriginallanguage,suchasinformationfromlanguagetolanguagestyle.”(Nida,2001,p.52).Nidaputsforwardthattranslationisnottheequivalenceofthelanguage,buttheequivalenceofthefunctionofthelanguage.Hethinksthatthetargetreadersshouldhavethesimilarresponsewiththeoriginalreaders.Inevaluatingatranslation,onefirst“determinestheresponseofthereceptortothetranslatedmessage”,andthencomparesthisresponsewith“thewayinwhichtheoriginalreceptorspresumablyreactedthemessagewhenitwasgiveninitsoriginalsetting”(NidaandTaber,2004,p.31).Whenitcomestoapplyinghistheorytothepracticeoftranslation,NidahasalsodevelopedsomepracticalrulesforhisFunctionalEquivalencetheory.LegalLiteracybelongstolegaltext,so,inrespectofthedistinctivelinguisticfeaturesoflegalEnglish,functionalequivalencetheoryevenprovestoplayavitalroleinguidinglegaltranslationresearch.ThisthesisintendstoreflectontheproblemsinlegaltranslationfromtheperspectiveofthedifferencebetweenlegalEnglishandlegalChineseatlexicallevelandsyntacticallevel.ThelegalEnglishtextsarelexicallycharacterizedbythehighlyfrequentuseofcommonwordswithuncommonmeanings,especiallybigwordsorarchaicwordsfromOldEnglishandMiddleEnglish,wordsandphrasesfromLatin.Intermsofsyntacticalfeatures,legalEnglisharefullofcoordinateconstruction,longandcomplexsentences.Inlegaltranslation,thisequivalencecanwellbeachievedwhenthetranslatorexploresdiscoursetranslation7 onthebasisofgraspingthespiritoflegaltextsinthesourcelanguageandbeingfamiliarwithlegaltextswritteninboththesourcelanguageandthetargetlanguage.SothechoiceofFunctionalEquivalenceisdecidedbythecharacteristicsoflegallanguage.3.3TranslationQualityControlProofreadingisamustfortranslationqualitycontrol.Inordertoguaranteethequalityoftranslation,aftercompletingthefirstdraft,thetranslatorcheckeditverycarefully,includingthespellingmistakes,obscureexpressionandawkwardChineseexpressiontranslation.Afterself-proofreading,firstly,thetranslatoraskedclassmatestohelphercheckittofindouttheinaccuratetranslation.Thenthetranslatorconsultedwiththelearnerswhoaremajoredinlegaltranslationtosolvetheproblemsofinaccuratetranslation.Atlast,thetranslationwasproofreadbysupervisor,becauseonlyinthiswaycouldthetranslationqualitybeguaranteed.8 Chapter4TranslationDifficultiesandSolutions4.1TranslationDifficultiesLegalLiteracybelongstothelegaltext.AndtherearealotofterminologiesandlongsentencesintheST.Duringthetranslation,thetranslatormetalotofdifficulties.Inaddition,thereadersincludetheprofessionalsoflawaswellascommonpeople.Sothequalityofthetranslationisofgreatchallengeforthetranslator.First,thetranslatorencountereddifficultiesinthetranslationofterminology.TherearealotoflegaltermsinST,includingsomeexpressionsinOldEnglishandLatinwords.Besides,therearesomecommonwordswhichhaveuncommonmeaningsinthelegaltext.Thereforethetranslatorwhoisunfamiliarwiththelawfieldhastolookthemupcarefullytofindthecorrectmeaning.Apartfromthis,therearemanylongandcomplexsentencesinST.Sometimes,thetranslatorcouldn’tunderstandthesentencestructureatthefirsttime.Sothecarefulanalysisofthestructuresandattentiontothecohesionofprepositionsandconjunctionsarenecessary.Lastly,thetranslatormadeeffortstokeepthelanguagestyleofTTinlinewiththatofST.AsNidaputs“Theso-calledtranslationisthetargetlanguageusedintheclosestandmostnaturalreproductionoftheoriginallanguage,suchasinformationfromlanguagetolanguagestyle.”(Nida,2001,p.52).Itisnotaneasythingtoproducesucheffectthatreaderscanappreciatethetargettextjustasreadersappreciatingthesourcetext.ThelanguageofSTisaccurate,solemnandpreciseandduetothedifferencesbetweenEnglishandChineseandtheincompetenceofthetranslatorinsomeextent,itisdifficultforthetranslatortoachievethesamelanguagestyleinTT.9 4.2SolutionstotheDifficultiesInviewofthethreetranslationdifficultiesmentionedabove,thetranslatorwillusesomeexamplestoanalyzethecorrespondingtranslationstrategiesandmethodsindealingwiththeproblems.4.2.1TranslationofTermsTheSTbelongstolegaltextandincludesalotoflegalterminologies.Legalterminologywhichhasthefeaturesofaccuracyandprecisenessisthefundamentalunitoflegaltext.Duetoitsaccuracyandprecisenessintheexpressionofaspecificlegalaction,thecorrecttranslationofterminologiesisimportantinthelegaltexttranslation.(WangJie,1997,p.77)Andtheselectionofwordmeaningdirectlydecidesthequalityoftranslation.Theaccurateandprecisetranslationoflegalterminologyrequiresthetranslatortograspnotonlysufficientlegalknowledgebutalsomasterthesubtledifferencesoflegalterminologiesindifferentcontexts.Nowthetranslatorwillexplainthemethodsinthetranslationofterminologiesinthefollowingthreeaspects：Firstly,thetranslationofbasiclegalterminologieswhichareverycommonsothetranslatormustbefamiliarwiththem,suchas,evidence证据statute制定法commonlaw普通法系laborrelation劳动关系Secondly,thetranslationofcommonwordsinthelegaltext.Therearealotofcommonwordshavingdifferentmeaningsindifferentsubjects.InST,therearesomewordswhicharecommonlyusedbutcannotbetranslatedastheircommonmeanings,suchas,CommonMeaningLegalMeaningact行为法令consideration考虑对价10 party聚会当事人decision决定判决opinion意见审判解释Thirdly,thetranslationofLatinwords.TherearesometerminologieswritteninLatinwordsinST,whichareunfamiliarforthereaders,suchas:mensrea意图ratiodecidendi判决理由obiterdicta附带意见4.2.2TranslationofLongandComplexSentencesLegalEnglishischaracterizedbycoordinateconstruction,longandcomplexsentences,complicatedattributivestructures,useofnominalization,modalauxiliaryandthepassivevoice.Inthistranslationproject,thesedifficultiesalsoconfusedthetranslator,especiallyinthetranslationofattributivestructuresandthethepassivevoicesentences.Nida’sFunctionalEquivalencetheorycanwelldealwithsuchsyntacticalfeatures,forexamples:EnglishandChinesearedifferentinstructure.EnglishishypotacticwhileChineseisparatactic;EnglishsentencevaluesexplicitcohesionwhileChinesesentencevaluesimplicitcoherence.（LianShuneng,2010,p.77）Soaccordingtothetheoryoffunctionaltranslation,whentheEnglishattributiveclausewhichisjoinedbyrelativesistranslatedintoChinese,sometranslationmethods,likesynthesization,division,reorganization,etc.mustbeusedforthepurposeofaccordingwiththeexpressionofChinesehabit.(FengQinghua,2002,p.89)Example1:ST:Thisstatementindicatesthatallofthejudgeswhoheardthisappealwereinagreementbecauseonlyonejudgmentwasissuedbythecourt,andthatoneofthem,JusticeIacobucci,wasdesignatedtowritethejudgmenttheotherjudgesconcurredin(agreedwith).TT:这一陈述表明所有审理这一上诉的法官看法一致，因为法院只发布了一11 个判决，然后他们当中的雅各布奇被指定写这个判决，表示其他法官也赞成(同意)。Example2:ST:Itisnaturaltopaytheclosestattentiontothewordingofaparticularsectionoflegislationthatseemsmostrelevanttothecurrentsituation,butthemodernmethodoflegalinterpretationrequiresustoexpandourreadinghorizonsinordertounderstandthesectioninitsentirelegislativecontext.TT:人们会自然而然地密切关注与当前形势最相关法律特定部分的措辞，但现代法律解释方法要求我们扩大阅读视野，以便在整个法律背景下来了解该部分。Intermsoftheattributiveclausewithsimplestructureandhavingstrongrestrictionontheantecedent,itisusuallytranslatedintoanattributivephrase.Intheabovetwoexamples“whoheardthisappeal”and“thatseemsmostrelevanttothecurrentsituation”weretranslatedintoattributivephrases.Example3:ST:Asstated,thisdisputestartedbeforeanarbitrationboard,whosedecisionwasappealedfirsttotheCourtofQueen’sBenchofAlbertaandthentotheAlbertaCourtofAppeal,whosedecisionwasinturnappealedtotheSupremeCourt.TT:如上所述，这一纠纷始于仲裁委员会，其判决首先被上诉到艾伯塔省高等法院，然后是艾伯塔省上诉法院，上诉法院的裁决反过来又被上诉到最高法院。Inthisexample,therearetwoattributiveclausesledbytherelativeadverb“whose”intheEnglishsentenceswhileintheChinesesentencetheyweretranslatedintotwoshortsentencesaccordingtothetranslationmethodofdivision.4.2.3TranslationofPassiveVoiceVoiceoftheverbshowstherelationshipbetweensubjectandpredicate.Therearetwokindsofvoices:activeandpassivevoice,andthedifferencesbetweenthemaresimplyamatterofsyntax(Langacker,2007,p.29).ThelegalEnglishtextputsemphasisontheaccurateandobjectivedescriptionofthelegalaffairsandinorderto12 keeptheaccuracyandobjectivityinthelegaltext,passivevoiceisoftenadopted.TherearetwotranslationmethodsbeingusedduringthetranslationofEnglishpassivesentences:translatingEnglishpassivesentencesintoChineseactivesentencesandtranslatingEnglishsentencesintoChinesepassivesentences.Example1:ST:Inthereasonsthatfollow,IbrieflysetoutthestandardofreviewagainstwhichtheBoard’sdecisiononeachissuemustbeassessed,beforeturningtoanalyzetheissuesthemselves.TT:在分析问题本身之前，对于下述原因我简要地陈述了委员会对每个评估问题的判决所遵循的评审标准。Inthisexample,thepassiveformwasshiftedintoChineseactivesentence,retainingthesubjectintheoriginaltext.Example2:ST:Atonetime,judgesfollowedfixedrulessuchastheonestatingthattheliteralmeaningoflegislation,whichisgraspedsolelybylookingatthewordsthathavebeenused,mustbeacceptedandappliedevenifitleadstoanabsurdresultintheparticularcase.TT:法官曾一度遵循固定的法规，例如只通过查看被使用过的词语把握立法的字面意思，即使在特定案件中会导致荒谬的结果，也必须接受并采用该意。Usually,theEnglishpassiveformistranslatedintoChinesepositiveform.Butinsomecases,itisinappropriatetobetranslatedintopositiveform.Inthissentence,theEnglishpassivesentencewastranslatedintoChinesepassivesentencebyusingtheChinesecharacter“被”tostressthepassivemeaningintheoriginaltext.4.2.4ReproductionofSTLinguisticStyleBecauseofthedifferencesbetweenEnglishandChinese,iftranslatorwantstoachievethesameeffect,thisequivalencemustbechosen.ThelanguageinSTis13 precise,solemnandaccurate,soinordertoreproducethesamelinguisticstylethelanguageofTTshouldalsobeprecise,solemnandaccurate.JustasShakespearesaid“Brevityisthesoulofwit”,theuseoflanguageshalllaystressonconciseness.Andlegallanguageespeciallypaysattentionontheconcisenesstomakelaweasytocomplywith.(WeihofenHenry,1961,p.76)ThelegalEnglishsentencesinthefollowingthreeexamplesaresimpleandshort,sotheTTshouldbeprecisetokeepthesamestyle.Example1:ST:Geteverythinginwriting(oraldiscussionsdonotcount).TT:以书面形式为准(口头讨论不算)。Example2:ST:Applytheliteralmeaning.TT:适用字面意思。Example3:ST:Followagrammaticalinterpretation.TT:遵循文法解释。TranslatingthelegaltextfromSTtoTTrequiresusingthemostnaturalandmostaccurateequivalentwordingtoreproducetheinformationintheoriginaltext.Thereforethelegaltranslationreflectsmoreaccuracy,solemnityandlogicalitythanthetranslationinothertexts.Herearesomeexamples:Example4:ST:Iwouldallowtheappealwithcoststhroughout,setasidethedecisionoftheCourtofAppeal,andrestoretheawardofthemajorityofthearbitrationboard.TT:我允许上诉，撤销上诉法院的判决，恢复多数仲裁委员会的判决。Example5:14 ST:Ididnotintendtoharmanyoneandthereforeshouldnotbefoundguiltyofanoffence;mensreaisrequiredbythisrule.TT:我无意伤害任何人，因此不应该判定有罪；本法规需要有犯罪意图。AccordingtothementionedlinguisticfeaturesoflegalEnglish,andinordertoexpressamoreaccurateview,someconventionalphrasesareusedbyjudgesandlawyers.(SunWanbiao,2003,p.38)TherearealsospecificexpressionsintheChineselegaltextduringtheprocessoftranslation.Herearesomeexamples:Example6:ST:SubjecttotheProvisionsofthisAct,everyPersonsosummonedshallbecomeandbeaMemberoftheSenateandaSenator.TT:根据该法令的规定，所召集的每个人必须是参议院成员或参议员。Example7:ST:Motorvehiclesarenotallowedinthepark.TT:机动车辆不得进入公园。Example8:ST:Everyonehastherighttolife,libertyandsecurityofthepersonandtherightnottobedeprivedthereofexceptinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoffundamentaljustice.TT:按照基本的公正原则，每个人都享有生存、自由和人身安全的权利，且该权利不得被剥夺。Inexample6,theobligationwording“shall”wastranslatedintotheequivalentChinesewording“必须”;inexample7,theprohibitionwordingof“arenotallowed”wastranslatedintotheequivalentChinesewording“不得”;inexample8,theauthorizationwordingof“hastherightto”wastranslatedintotheequivalentChinesewording“享有……的权利”.15 Chapter5ConclusionDuringtheprocessofthetranslationprojectandthewritingofthetranslationreport,thetranslatormetalotofdifficultieswhileshealsolearnedalotthroughthewholeprocess.It’snotaneasythingforanon-lawmajoredstudenttotranslatethelegalEnglishtext.WhenthetranslatorreadtheSTatthefirsttime,shefoundthattherewerealotofprofessionallegalterminologiesthatshenevermetbeforeandthereweresomelongandcomplexsentencesshehadnoideahowtotranslatethemintoChinesecorrectly,however,themostdifficultthingforthetranslatorwastomakethetranslationkeepthesamewithSTinstyle.InordertoachievethesamefeatureswithSTofpreciseness,accuracyandseriousnessinTT,theauthorreadalotofrelateddocumentsonlegaltranslationandChineselegalknowledge.Apartfromthese,theauthoralsometsomedifficultiesintheprocessofwritingthistranslationreportespeciallyinthecombinationoftranslationtheorieswithtranslationpractice.Inordertocompleteaqualifiedpaper,theauthorcarefullylookedupthefunctionalequivalencetheorydescribedinNida’sworksandborrowingsomeexperiencefromexcellenttranslationreportswrittenbyformerschoolmates.Althoughtheauthormetalotofdifficultiesinthisprocess,shealsolearnedalotthroughthewholeprocess.ShehadasystematicrecognitionofNida’sequivalencetheoryandbasicallyunderstoodhowtousetranslationtheorytoguidetranslationpractice.Besides,shealsomasteredsomemethodsindealingwithlegaltranslation,whichmayhelpherinthefutureoccupationasatranslator.Aboveall,shegraduallydevelopedrigorousacademicattitudeduringthetranslationandthewritingofthetranslationreport.16 ReferencesLangacker,R.(2007).TenLecturesonCognitiveGrammarbyRonaldLangacker,Beijing:ForeignLanguageTeachingandResearchPress.NidaE.A.(1993).CultureandTranslation.Shanghai:ShanghaiForeignLanguageEducationPress.NidaE.A.(2001).LanguageandCulture:ContextsinTranslating.Shanghai:ShanghaiForeignLanguageEducationPress.NidaE.A.&CharlesR.T.(2004)TheTheoryandPracticeofTranslation.Shanghai:ShanghaiForeignLanguageEducationPress.NordC.(2001).TranslatingasaPurposefulActivityFunctionalistApproachesExplained.Shanghai:ShanghaiForeignLanguageEducationPress.StefanoC.;HelenX.(2008).Draftinglegislation:amodernapproach.AshgatePublishing.WeihofenH.(1961).LegalWritingStyle.UniversityofNewMexico.冯庆华.(2002)实用翻译教程(增订本).上海：上海外语教育出版社李克兴.(2007）法律翻译理论与实践.北京：北京大学出版社.刘军平.(2007)西方翻译理论通史.武汉:武汉大学出版社.连淑能.(2010)英汉对比研究.(增订本).北京:高等教育出版社.王洁.(1997)法律语言教程.北京:中国政法大学出版社.孙万彪.(2003)英汉法律翻译教程.上海：上海外语教育出版社博登·海默(2015)法理学：法律哲学与法律方法.潘汉典译.北京：法律出版社.17 Appendix1CHAPTER8LEGALINTERPRETATIONSkillsandTechniquesforMakingSenseofLawLegalinterpretationisthelegaltermusedtodescribetheprocessofreadingandgivingmeaningtolaw.Legalinterpretationiscalledlegislativeinterpretation,statutoryinterpretation,orsometimesstatutoryconstruction(fromtheverb“construe,”meaningtoanalyzeorinterpret)whenitconcernslegislationsuchasacts,regulations,andbylaws.Legalinterpretationisalsooftenrequiredwhenreadingprivatedocumentssuchascontractsandwills.Inthosecases,thegenerictermismoreappropriate.Inthischapter,thegeneraltermlegalinterpretationwillbeusedthroughout.Unlikeapoem,themeaningofwhichcanbeleftindefiniteorambiguous,differencesconcerningtheinterpretationoflawmustbedefinitivelyresolvedtoallowittobeapplied(ornot)inaparticularcase.Ajudgeperformsthisfunction,andtheresultingjudgmentmaybecomeaprecedentforthecorrectinterpretationofaparticularsectionoflegislationorthewordingofarule.Thereareanumberofacceptedmethodsandapproachesfordecidingthepropermeaningoflawsthataredescribedbelow.Legalliteracyrequiresabasicunderstandingofsomeoftheseprinciplesoflegalinterpretationthatareusedtoresolvedisputesoverlegalmeaning.Whenfacedwithalegalproblem,wereadjudgmentsforthepurposeofselectingthosethatreflectsimilarsituationsandmaythereforebeusedasprecedentstoguidecurrentdecision-making.Thecarefulreadingandanalysisofreporteddecisionstodiscovertheprinciplesoflawtheysupportiscalledlegalcaseanalysis.Legalinterpretationisoneofthemostcomplextoolsoflegalliteracy,makingitchallengingtolearn.Herearesomeofthereasonsforthedifficultyoflegalinterpretation:•Lawisstatedingeneraltermsbecauseitisnormallyintendedtoapplytomanypeopleinavarietyofsituations;however,evengeneralwordshavelimitsofmeaning,thusrequiringinterpretationinparticularcases.18 •Inanadversariallegalsystem,thereisanincentivetochallengethemeaningofalawifdoingsomightresultinanadvantagetoadisputingparty.•Lawexistswithinadensecontextofinterrelatedideasandconceptsthatallowslegaltermstotakeondifferentmeaningsdependingonthesurroundingwording.•Manylegaltermshavetwoormoredifferent,legallyacceptedmeanings,oneofwhichmustbechosenforthepurposeofaparticularcase.Anindividualcanthusmakeseveraltypesoflegalargumentsabouttheproperinterpretationofawrittenlaw,suchas:•Thislegislationdoesn’tapplytome;itsscopeislimitedtootherpeople.•Ididnotdowhatisprohibitedbythislaw;myactionswerenotwithinthemeaningofthisrule.•Thislawallowsforanexceptioninmycase,whichisimpliedinitswordingorstatedelsewhere.•Ididnotintendtoharmanyoneandthereforeshouldnotbefoundguiltyofanoffence;mensreaisrequiredbythisrule.TheprinciplesoflegalinterpretationIdiscussinthischapterhelpjudgestodecidewhetherthesearegoodargumentsabouthowaparticularlawshouldbeinterpreted.Theresultsoflegalresearchwillrevealmanymaterialsrequiringlegalinterpretation.Apreliminaryevaluationofpotentialauthoritiescanfirstbedoneusingtheindicatorsmentionedinthepreviouschapter.Butbeforepresentinganylegalmaterialstoacourtortribunal,theymustbereadcarefullytogainathoroughunderstandingofwhattheymeaninthelegalcontext.Legalinterpretationistheskillofbringingoutorexplainingthemeaningoflaw.Itisanessentiallinkbetweenlegalresearchforthepurposeoffindingpotentialauthorities,andlegalcommunicationforthepurposeofpersuadingadecisionmakertoacceptthemassuch.Hereiswhatseemstobearathersimpleexampleoflawintheformofarule:Motorvehiclesarenotallowedinthepark.Thisprohibitionseemsstraightforwardinitsmeaning,untilsomeoneaskswhetheritappliestothefollowingsituations:amotorizedlift(cherry-picker)usedtotrimtrees;apoliceofficeronamotorcyclechasingasuspect;orafiretruckcalledtoextinguishawildfire.Inresponsetosuch19 questions,itmightbedecidedthattheruleneedstobeamendedtoread:Motorvehiclesarenotallowedinthepark,butthisdoesnotapplytoemergencyandmaintenancevehicles.ThenagroupofveteransasksforpermissiontoinstallarestoredarmytruckinworkingconditionfromtheSecondWorldWaronapedestalintheparkasawarmemorial1.Again,theremightbeafurtheramendmenttothelaw:Motorvehiclesarenotallowedtobeoperatedinthepark,butthisdoesnotapplytoemergencyandmaintenancevehicles.However,morequestionscontinuetoberaised,suchas:cananelderlypersonuseamotorizedchair(scooter)togetaroundthepark?Whataboutabicyclewithamotorassist?What’sthestatusofamotorizedwheelchairusedbyadisabledperson?Howaboutaremote-controlledmodelairplane?CanIusemySegway?2Thequestionscouldgoon.Shouldwecontinuetoamendthelegislationeverytimesomeonethinksofanewpossibility?Thisseemscumbersomeandinefficient.Adifferentapproachistoallowajudgetodecidewhetherparticularsituationsarecoveredbythelawastheyariseandarebroughtbeforethecourt.Takingthisapproach,lawscanbewritteningeneralterms,relyingonjudgesandtribunalstodecidewhethereachturnofeventsislawfulornotwhenandifithappens.Indoingso,judgesandtribunalsgivemeaningtothegeneraltermsofalaw.Legalinterpretationthushelpstomakewrittenlawsworkableinpractice—itisaneffectiveresponsetotheproblemthatlawsare“incurablyincomplete.”3Incommonlawsystems,legalcaseanalysis—aninterpretiveoperationcorrespondingtolegalinterpretationofstatutes—iscarriedoutinrelationtocasedecisions,butinasomewhatreversefashion.Interpretationoflegislationstartswithgeneralwords,andthendetermineswhethertheyfitorapplytospecificsituations.However,ifthereisnorelevantlegislation,thespecificsituationunderdisputeisthestartingpointfromwhichlegalcaseanalysisproceedsinanefforttofindprecedents.Overtheyearsinacommonlawsystem,itmaybepossibletoobserve20 likeresultsinmanysimilarcases;theseconsistenciesindecision-makingeventuallycometoberecognizedascommonlawrulesorprinciples.Theyarethatpartofthelawfoundinreporteddecisionsanddiscussedinthetextbooksandjournalarticles.Commonlawrulesandprinciplesarecreatedbydrawingoutfrommanyparticularinstancesandgeneralstatementthatsummarizesthetypicaljudicialdecision;thusthemethodisthereverseofstatutoryinterpretation,whichgoesfromthegeneraltotheparticular.Oneexampleofacommonlawruleisthatinordertocreateavalidcontract,allpartiesmustprovideconsideration(somethingofvalue)tooneanother.Overaspanofhundredsofyears,judgeshaveconsideredhowthisruleworksinmanydifferentsituations,andtodayitisgenerallyacceptedaspartofthecommonlawinCanadathattheconsiderationgivenmaybeminimalinvalueandneednotbeproportionatetowhatisgivenbytheotherparty.Thiscommonlawruleforcontractsderivedfromreportedcasesthroughlegalcaseanalysismaybeconciselystatedas:inordertoformacontract,sufficientconsideration(somethingvaluable)mustbegiven,butitneednotbeadequate(ofanyparticularvalue).Aswithmostlegalrulesthereisanexceptiontothisoneaswell.Acomplementaryrulestatesthatasealaffixedtoacontractwilltaketheplaceofconsiderationrequiredtobegiven.Legalcaseanalysismayresultinseveralpossibleconclusionsabouttheprecedentvalueofapreviouscase:itisabindingprecedent,andmustbefollowedbythejudgetoreachthesameresult(thefactsofthecaseareverysimilar,anditwasdecidedinahighercourt);itisanordinaryprecedent,andmaybefollowedbythejudgeifheorsheispersuadedtodoso(thefactsaresimilar,anditwasdecidedinacourtatthesameorlowerlevel);itcanbedistinguishedandthusshouldnotbefollowed(thefactsaresignificantlydifferent,regardlessofthelevelofcourtthatdecidedit);itmaybeusefulasananalogy(thefactsaredifferent,buttheresultisanappropriateguidefordecidingthepresentcase).Legislativeinterpretationandcommonlawcaseanalysisintroduceflexibilityintothelawandallowittoadapttochangesinsociety.Writtenlawscanbeinterpretedtodealwithnoveleventsthatlegislatorscouldn’timaginewhenalawwaspassed.Similarly,thecommonlawcandevelopovertimewithoutrequiringjudgestoforeseeeverypossiblevariationofthespecificcasebeforethem.OneEnglishlawyerwholaterbecameafamousjudge,LordMansfield,arguedinacasethatthecommonlawisableto“workitselfpure”byconstantlyreconsideringandrestating21 itsrulesandprinciplesastheneedarises.4However,themethodsofstatutoryinterpretationandcaseanalysisalsoproduceuncertainty.Inanadversarialsystem,thereisanincentivetopromotefavourablealternativemeaningsoflegislationandtocreativelydistinguishunhelpfulcasesinaidofpartisanargument.Itisoftenhardtopredictwhichargumentontheseissueswillprevail.Iwilldiscusstheproblemofuncertaintyinlegaloutcomescreatedbylegalinterpretationlaterinthischapterandinthenext.Themethodsoflegalinterpretationandcommonlawcaseanalysisaretaughttolawstudents,butthebasicprinciplesofbothmaybelearnedbynonlawyers.Thesewaysofworkingwiththelawarethefoundationsoflegalargument,andwewillexaminetheminthenextchapter.ReadingLegislationJudgesreadstatutesandotherformsoflegislationinordertoapplythelawtodisputesthatcomebeforethem.Theapplicationoflawistheprocessoftryingtomatchfactswithlegalrules.Sometimespartieswillquestionwhetherstatutorylawappliestothem,orwhatthelawrequires—theyargueaboutitscorrectinterpretation.Whenjudgesapplystatutelaw,theirjudgmentsmaybecomeprecedentsforfuturecasesdecidedunderthesamelaw.Inthisway,themeaningofstatutesisclarifiedthroughlegalinterpretation.Therefore,precedentsarenotonlyusefulinrelationtocommonlawrulesandprinciplesbutalsotoissuesoflegislativeinterpretationaswell.Casesthatinvolvetheinterpretationoflegislationareoftencollectedandpublishedtogether.InCanada,oneexampleofthistypeofpublicationiscalledWordsandPhrases,whichincludesjudicialinterpretationsofwordsfoundinparticularstatutes.ItisavailableonlinethroughtheLawSourcecommercialdatabaseandinlawlibraries.Annotatedstatutesarepublishedversionsoflegislationthatincludeannotations—citationstocaseswhichhaveconsideredparticularsectionsofthestatute.TheCanLIICanadianopendatabase(andothersimilaropensourcesaroundtheworld)providesaccesstoprecedentsforlegalinterpretationoflegislationthroughlinkstocasespresentedalongsidethetextofthelaw.Althoughlawdictionariescanbeusefulinunderstandinglegalterminology,itisbesttodiscoverhowwordsinlegislationhavebeeninterpretedintheirspecificcontextbylookingforprecedentsfromthecourts.22 Theprinciplesoflegalinterpretationhaveevolvedovertime.Atonetime,judgesfollowedfixedrulessuchastheonestatingthattheliteralmeaningoflegislation,whichisgraspedsolelybylookingatthewordsthathavebeenused,mustbeacceptedandappliedevenifitleadstoanabsurdresultintheparticularcase.Thisliteralmeaningruleandothersimilarrulesofinterpretationaresometimescalledthecanonsofconstruction.Manyhavecriticizedtherule-basedapproachtolegalinterpretationbypointingoutthatrulesareoftencontradictoryandthereforeoflittleassistanceininterpretation.Tomakethispoint,KarlLlewellyngavetheseexamples:RuleCounterRuleorExceptionApplytheliteralmeaningButnotifitiscontrarytotheintentofthestatuteGiveeffecttoeverywordButnotifitisamistakeorinconsistentwiththerestofthestatuteFollowagrammaticalButnotifitwouldfrustratethepurposeofInterpretationthelawRecently,Canadiancourtshavemovedawayfromtherule-basedapproachtolegalinterpretation,takingamoreflexibleonewhichinCanadahasbeencalledthemodernprinciple(ormethod)ofinterpretation.Thismethodrequiresjudgestopayequalattentiontotheexactwordsofthelegislativetext,theircontextualrelationtothelawasawhole,theintentofthelegislators,andtheoverallpurposeofthelegislation.InthecaseAlbertaUnionofProvincialEmployeesv.LethbridgeCommunityCollege5,theSupremeCourtofCanadaadoptedandapprovedamethodofstatutoryinterpretationdescribedbyElmerDriedger,alawprofessorattheUniversityofOttawa,asfollows:23 ThewordsofanActaretobereadintheirentirecontextandintheirgrammaticalandordinarysenseharmoniouslywiththeschemeoftheAct,theobjectoftheAct,andtheintentionofParliament(para.25)Inthisdescriptionofthemodernmethodofinterpretation,thewordschemereferstohowtheactisorganizedanddesigned,objectreferstotheresultstheactseekstobringabout,andintentionreferstothesocialproblemthelegislatorswantedtosolve.Thisapproachprovidescourtswithmoreflexibilitywheninterpretinglegislation,includingthepowertorejecttheliteralmeaningofthewordsusedifadifferentmeaningwouldbettercarryouttheobjectandintentofthelaw.Themodernmethodofinterpretationrequiresspecificwordstobereadincontext,whichincludesthewholeofthestatuteinquestionandmayextendtootherlegislationaswell.Failingtopayattentiontothesurroundingcontextofspecificwordsinlegislationisoneofthemistakesanovicereaderofthelawcanmake.Itisnaturaltopaytheclosestattentiontothewordingofaparticularsectionoflegislationthatseemsmostrelevanttothecurrentsituation,butthemodernmethodoflegalinterpretationrequiresustoexpandourreadinghorizonsinordertounderstandthesectioninitsentirelegislativecontext.Therefore,legislationshouldberead“fromtheinsideout,”startingwiththewordingofaparticularsectionandworkingoutfromtheretotherestofthestatute,andsometimestootherlegislationaswell.Agoodwaytovisualizetheprocessofreadingstatutesistothinkofitasthereverseofpeelinganonion.Readingshouldstartatthecore(thespecificwordsinquestion)andextendoutwardtothenextlargerpartofthelegislation(thenextlayer)wheretheparticularsectionisfound,andontothenextlayeroverthat,untilreachingtheouter“skin”ofthelegislationasawhole(includingthetitle,andperhapsanintroductorysectionaboutitspurpose).Thereaderwillfindthestructuralcomponents(layers)ofastatute,goingfromthesmallesttothelargestare:subclause,clause,subsection,section,division,andpart.Figure8.1providesanexampleoftheinternalstructureofonesectionofanAct.Anothermistakethatthoseunfamiliarwiththelawcanmakewhenreadinglegislationistooverlooktheexistenceofstatutory(orlegislative)definitionscontainedwithinit.Thesearespecificsectionsoflegislationthatprovidedefinitionsofwordsorphrasesfoundinastatute,24 regulation,orbylaw.Definitionsareoftenincludedwithinlegislationtoassistwithitsinterpretation;theyprescribethemeaningtobeusedbyjudgesandotherswhenreadingit.Statutorydefinitionshavethreemainpurposes:tonarrowthemeaningofwords(e.g.,“inthisact,‘motorvehicle’meansapassengercar”),toexpandthemeaning(e.g.,“inthisact,‘motorvehicle’meansanyvehicleoperatedbymechanicalmeanscapableoftransportingaperson”),ortogiveawordaparticularanduniquemeaning(e.g.,“inthisact,‘motorvehicle’meansacommercialvehicleusedforthetransportationofgoods”).Judgesmustrespectsuchdefinitionswhenapplyingthelaw,butsomeinterpretationmaystillbeneeded—forinstance,isaskateboardavehicleoperatedbymechanicalmeans?Statutorydefinitionsmayapplythroughoutasinglepieceoflegislation,oronlysomepartsofit,andsomedefinitionscanapplytootherstatutes.Whenreadinglegislationfromtheinsideout,youmayencounterdefinitionsthatapplyonlytoacertainlevelofthelegislation,suchasasectionthatstates“Inthispart,thewordpersonmeans....”Manyactshavedefinitionsectionsatthebeginningforwordsorphrasesthatareusedoftenthroughoutthelegislation.Mostjurisdictionsalsohaveaseparatestatutecontainingdefinitionsforwordsthatarefoundinmanydifferentacts,like“day,”“month,”and“he.”InAlberta,thisstatuteiscalledtheInterpretationAct.6Here,forexample,isthesectionofthatactthatexplainshowdefinitionsinallAlbertalegislationaretobereadandusedwhentheyareincluded:Definitionsandinterpretationprovisions13.Definitionsandotherinterpretationprovisionsinanenactment[whichincludesastatute](a)areapplicabletothewholeenactment,includingthesectioncontainingthedefinitionsorinterpretationprovisions,excepttotheextentthatacontraryintentionappearsintheenactment,and(b)applytoregulationsmadeundertheenactmentexcept25 totheextentthatacontraryintentionappearsintheenactmentorintheregulations.Parliamentsandlegislaturesinmanyjurisdictionsprovideonlineguidesandexplanationsofhowlegislationisorganizedandstructured,whichcanbeconsultedwhenreadingtheirlaws.Readingastatute“fromtheinsideout,”startingwiththeparticularwordingyouaremostconcernedwith,revealsthecontextajudgewilltakeintoaccountwhenconsideringthosewordsaccordingtothemodernmethodofinterpretation.YoucanalsoconsultapublicationlikeWordsandPhrases,oranannotatedcopyofthelegislationtodiscoverifthereareanyprecedentsconcerningtheinterpretationofthewordinginquestion.ReadingCasesUnderstandingcontextisalsoimportantwhenreadingacasereport.Aswithlegislation,itiseasyforanovicereaderoflegaljudgmentstogetlostinthedetailsofparticularcases.Becausejudges’legaldecisionsarestructureddifferentlythanstatutes,theyshouldberead“fromtheoutsidein”tobetterappreciatetheircontext.Readingthatwayleadsfromthe“skin”ofajudgmenttothe“meatandbones”containedwithinitsuchasdiscussionoftheparties’arguments,descriptionsoftheevidencepresentedbythem,andthejudge’sconclusionsregardingthesematters.Thusthenameofthecasereflectingthepartiesinvolvedinitisfoundatthebeginning,andtheultimateconclusionororderofthecourtisusuallyfoundattheend.Theheartofthejudgmentcontainsthedetailedreasoningfollowedbythejudgetoarriveattheultimatedecision.Let’sexaminethecomponentsofacasereportintheorderinwhichtheyshouldberead.Thenameofareportedcaseisbasedonthenamesofthepartiesinvolved,anditisagoodplacetostartreadingcarefully.Atthebeginningofthecaseisthestyleofcause,aheadingcontainingthenamesofthepartiesinvolvedinthelitigationandadescriptionoftherolestheyhaveplayed,suchasplaintiffanddefendant.Ifthedecisionwasmadebyanappealcourt,thedescriptionappellantwillbeaddedforthepartywhoappealedthetrialdecisionandrespondentforthepartyopposingtheappeal.Sometimesbothpartiesappealdifferentpartsofthetrialjudgment.Notethatbothaplaintiffandadefendantcanusuallyappealadecisiontheydonotlike.26 Asanexampleofthestructureofatypicalreporteddecision,wewilluseanimportantcasedecidedbytheSupremeCourtofCanada,AlbertaUnionofProvincialEmployeesv.LethbridgeCommunityCollege7(“AUPE”).IfwelookatthereportoftheAUPEcaseasdecidedbytheSupremeCourtofCanada,wefindthisstyleofcauseatthebeginning:BoardofGovernorsofLethbridgeCommunityCollege,Appellantv.AlbertaUnionofProvincialEmployeesandSylviaBabin,RespondentsandCanadianLabourCongress,NationalUnionofPublicandGeneralEmployeesandProvincialHealthAuthoritiesofAlbertaIntervenersThistellsusthatthecollegeappealed,andAUPEopposedtheappeal.Theintervenersarepartieswhoarenotdirectlyinvolvedinanexistingdispute,butwhohaveastronginterestintheoutcomeofthecase,perhapsbecauseitmaybecomeaprecedenttheywillhavetofollow.Intervenersthereforemaybepermittedbythecourttopresentargumentsabouttheissuesinvolvedintheaction.Thenextmajorsectionofthereportafterthestyleofcausereadsasfollows:2003:November4;2004:April29.Present:McLachlinC.J.andIacobucci,Major,Bastarache,Binnie,Arbour,LeBel,Deschamps,andFishJ.J.onappealfromtheCourtofAppealforAlberta27 ThistellsusthatthecasewasarguedbeforethecourtonNovember4,2003andthatthedecisionwasreserved(underconsiderationbythejudges)untilApril29,2004,whenthejudgmentwasreleasedandpublishedbythecourt.Finally,weknowfromthissectionthatthecaseoriginatedinAlberta,andthereforeitwillbethelawofthatparticularjurisdictionthatwillbeconsideredinthejudgment.Thenextsectiondownstatesthecatchwordsorkeywordsassociatedwiththedecision.Thesearelegaltermsdescribingthegeneralareasoflaw(forexamplelaborrelations)andthemainlegalconcepts(suchasjurisdiction)whichthejudgesconsideredwhenmakingthedecision.Thesewordsoftencorrespondtothesubjectheadingsfoundinlegalencyclopedias.HerearethekeywordsoftheAUPEdecision:Labourrelations—Arbitrationboard—Scopeofarbitrationboard’sremedialjurisdiction—Employeedismissedwithoutjustcausefornon-culpabledeficiency—Boardawardingdamagesinlieuofreinstatement—Whetherarbitrationboardcouldawarddamagesinlieuofreinstatementfordismissalfornon-culpabledeficiency—LabourRelationsCode,R.S.A.2000,c.L-1,s.142(2).Judicialreview—Labourrelations—Standardofreview—Arbitrationboard—Employeedismissedwithoutjustcausefornon-culpabledeficiency—Boardawardingdamagesinlieuofreinstatement—Standardofreviewapplicabletoboard’sinterpretationofremedialprovisionandtoboard’saward—LabourRelationsCode,R.S.A.2000,c.L-1,s.142(2).Ifthecaseisacomplexone,itmaydealwithseveralmajorareasoflawsuchas“labourrelations”and“judicialreview”intheAUPEdecision.Nextinthecasereportistheheadnote,abriefdescriptionofthemainlegalissuespresented28 tothecourtandthedecisionsreachedonthem,withasummaryofsomeofthereasonsgivenbythejudges.Theheadnotemaybepreparedbythecourt,orbyapublisherinthecaseofprivatelyprintedcasereports.HereisaportionoftheheadnoteintheAUPEcase:Theappellantemployerhadhiredtherespondentgrievorasaschedulingcoordinatorbutdismissedheronthegroundsthatherworkperformancewasunsatisfactory.Thegrievorandtherespondentuniongrievedthedismissal,allegingdismissalwithoutjustcauseincontraventionofthecollectiveagreement.Thearbitrationboardfoundthat,whilethegrievorwasdismissedfornon-culpableincompetence,justcausefordischargehadnotbeenshownbecausetheemployerhadfailedtocomplywiththeReEdithCavellcriteriasettingouttherequirementsfordismissalofanemployeeongroundsofnonculpabledeficiency.Infashioningtheremedy,themajorityoftheboardconcludedthatitcouldsubstituteafinancialawardunders.142(2)oftheAlbertaLabourRelationsCodeandawardedherdamagesinlieuofreinstatementsincereinstatementwasinappropriateinthecircumstances.TheCourtofQueen’sBenchdismissedtherespondents’applicationforjudicialreview.TheCourtofAppealsetthatdecisionaside,orderedthatthegrievorbereinstatedandreferredthequantumofbackpaytotheboardfordetermination.Thecourtfoundthats.142(2)didnotapplytonon-culpabledismissalsandthat,absentcompliancewiththeReEdithCavellcriteria,theusualandexpectedremedywasreinstatement.Held:Theappealshouldbeallowed.Whentherelevantfactorsofthepragmaticandfunctionalapproachareproperlyconsidered,thestandardofreviewapplicabletothearbitrationboard’sinterpretationofs.142(2)29 oftheLabourRelationsCodeandtotheboard’sawardisthatofreasonableness.Thisheadnotealsogivesussomeinsightintothefactsofthecaseanditshistory.Asstated,thisdisputestartedbeforeanarbitrationboard,whosedecisionwasappealedfirsttotheCourtofQueen’sBenchofAlbertaandthentotheAlbertaCourtofAppeal,whosedecisionwasinturnappealedtotheSupremeCourt.WealsoknowfromthisinformationthatthecaseinvolvesapplicationoflegislationknownastheAlbertaLabourRelationsCode,andthelegalprocessofjudicialreviewinvolvingthearbitration.However,theconclusion(theholding)that“Theappealshouldbeallowed”doesnottellusmuchaboutwhatthedecisionactuallymeansfortheparties,otherthanthattheappellantsucceeded.Thebodyofthejudgmentmustbereadtodiscoverthat.Noteitsbeginningwords:ThejudgementoftheCourtwasdeliveredbyIacobucciJ.—Thisstatementindicatesthatallofthejudgeswhoheardthisappealwereinagreementbecauseonlyonejudgmentwasissuedbythecourt,andthatoneofthem,JusticeIacobucci,wasdesignatedtowritethejudgmenttheotherjudgesconcurredin(agreedwith).Ifoneormoreofthejudgeswhoheardthecasedidnotagreewiththemajority,theywouldprepareadissentingjudgment,givingreasonsfortheirview.Inacasewithadissent,thedecisionofthemajoritywouldappearfirst(givingtheirnames)beforethedissent.Adissentingjudgmentcanneverbeusedasaprecedent.Therefore,itisnecessarynottoconfusethereasonsofthemajorityofjudgeswiththoseoftheminority.Themajority(orunanimous)judgmentcontainstheratiodecidendi(orjustratio),thereasonsforadecisionthatmaybeusedasprecedentinsubsequentcases.Ifthemajoritycommentsonalegalissuebutdoesnotcometoanyconclusionaboutittoreachthefinaldecision,suchstatementsarecalledobiterdicta(orjustobiterordicta).Obiterdictaisnotprecedent-setting.What,then,istheactualoutcomeforthepartiesintheAUPEcase?Tofindthat,lookattheendofthejudgmentwhereyouwillfindthisstatement:30 VI.Disposition58.Iwouldallowtheappealwithcoststhroughout,setasidethedecisionoftheCourtofAppeal,andrestoretheawardofthemajorityofthearbitrationboard.Thisstatementtellsusthatafteralloftheappealsinthiscase,theoriginaldecisionofthemajorityofthearbitratorswasjudgedtobecorrect.Itthusbecomesclearerthatoneofthefundamentalissuesinthisdisputewaswhetherthearbitratorscorrectlyinterpretedlegislation(theLabourRelationsCode)inreachingtheirdecision.ThisinformationhelpstoexplainwhytheAUPEcaseisconsideredanimportantprecedentregardinglegalinterpretationinCanada.Beforebeginningtoreadthebodyofthejudgment,thereisonemorepartofthe“skin”ofthetextthatshouldbenoted.Aftertheheadnotetherearelistsofthecases,legislation,andscholarlywritingsthecourtusedinreachingitsdecision.Thispartofthereportprovidessourcesforfurtherresearchintotheissues.Alsoatthebeginningisabriefhistoryofthecase,withcitationstothedecisionsofthelowercourtsthatheardit.Thejudgmentmaynowbereadindetail,butnotfrombeginningtoendlikeastory.Thedecisionofacourtisajustification,notanarrative.Itattemptstopresentacomprehensive,persuasiveexplanationoftheresult.Thereasoningofthecourtaboutthecorelegalissuesistheparttopaymostattentiontowhenreadingacasetodetermineitsvalueasaprecedent.Therefore,agoodplacetostartreadingisthesectionofthejudgmentthatdescribestheissues:IV.IssuesThisappealraisestwobasicissues.Thefirstconcernsthescopeoftheboard’sjurisdictionunders.142(2)oftheCode,andthesecondconcernstheexerciseoftheboard’sremedialpowerinlightofthatjurisdiction.Inthereasonsthatfollow,Ibrieflysetoutthestandardofreviewagainstwhichtheboard’sdecisiononeachissuemustbeassessed,beforeturningtoanalyzetheissuesthemselves.31 SincethedisputeconcernsthecorrectinterpretationoftheLabourCode,thisstatementprovidesfurtherinformationthatthewordstobeinterpretedrelatetothejurisdictionofthearbitratorsandthepowerstheyaregivenbythelaw.Ifonelooksupthetermstandardofreviewinalegaldictionary,hewilldiscoveritmeansthecriteriacourtsusetodecidewhethertheywilloverturnthedecisionofaquasi-judicialdecision-makingbody.Fromthisbackground,itappearsthattheSupremeCourthadtodecidewhetherthearbitrators’interpretationofthecodewasfaulty.Inmakingthatdecision,theSupremeCourtsetaprecedentforCanadaregardingthecorrectmethodofstatutoryinterpretation.Readingacasereport“fromtheoutsidein”withaquestioningmindyieldsanappreciationofitsimpactonthepartiesinvolved,thesignificanceithasforthedevelopmentofthelaw,anditsvalueasaprecedentthatmaysupportordetractfromaparticularlegalargument.Oncethecontextofthecaseisunderstood—theparties,thelegalissues,andtheresult,itisalsopossibletoreadthereasonsforthedecisionfromacriticalperspective.Dotheypersuadethereaderofthecorrectnessoftheresult?Aretherelegalissuesthatmighthavebeenraised,butwerenot?Whatimpactdoesthedecisionhaveonsocietygenerally?Thesearesomeofthequestionsthatscholarsofcriticallegalstudiesmayraisewhenreadingcases.ReadingContractsJudgesreadcontractstodecidewhetherthepartiesintendedtocreatemutuallegalobligations,andifso,whatthoserequirethepartiestodo.Whentheyarecommercialcontracts,judgesassumeagreementsareintendedtoresultinsomebenefittoeachparty,suchasobtaininggoods,services,ormoney.Onepresumptioncourtsusuallyfollowisthatifyousignadocument,youagreetoeverythingcontainedinit,andyouknowyouareassuminglegalobligationsbydoingso.Thereforewhenreadingcontracts:•Readbeforeyousign,seal,open,orclickonsomething,includingtheproverbial“fineprint”•Readevenwhatyoudon’tsign(judgesassumeyouhavereadwhatyouhavebeengiven,suchasticketsandreceipts)•Readeverything(judgesassumeyouhavereadeverythingmentionedinacontract,evenifitis32 foundinanotherdocumentorplace—thisisknownaswordingincorporatedbyreferenceinthecontract)•Askquestionsinwriting(oraldiscussionsdonotcount—thisisknownastheparolevidencerule,whichexcludesfromthecontractwhatissaidbutnotwrittendown);manycontractsexpresslystatetheycontainallthetermsoftheagreement,rulingoutanythingelse•Getanswersinwriting(oraldiscussionsdonotcount)•Geteverythinginwriting(oraldiscussionsdonotcount)Writtencontractscansufferfromvaguenessorambiguityand“gaps”likelegislation.Toaddresstheseproblems,courtshaveusedprinciplesoflegalinterpretationforcontractsinordertoidentifytheintentofthepartiesatthetimeofcontractingusingonlythewordsofthedocument;toavoidaninterpretationthatdefeatsthepurposeofthecontractevenifthewordsarenotambiguous;toseekaninterpretationthatmakescommercialsense;andtointerpretthecontractasawhole.Theidealcontractdocumentistheproductofameetingofmindswithacommonintentionarrivedatthroughdiligentnegotiationandcarefuljointdrafting.Veryfewcontractsactuallycomeaboutthatway.Mostarestandardformswrittenbyonepartyandacceptedwithoutscrutinyorobjectionbyanother.Someexamplesofthistypeofcontractarepurchaseagreementsfornewvehicles,orleasesofhousesorapartments.Insomejurisdictions,suchagreementsarecalledcontractsofadhesion,meaningthatyouagreetobebound(adhere)withnopossibilityofanychanges.Standardtermsthatareusedroutinelyinmanycontractsofacertaintypearecalledboilerplate,meaningtraditionalwordingadoptedlongagothatisrecycledforthesakeofconvenienceandconservatism.Boilerplateisoftenprevalentinlegalese.Standardformcontractsarefrequentlyusedinconsumertransactions.Insomecommercialmatters,lawshavebeenpassedtolimittheeffectofboilerplatewording,ortoincorporatespecificwordingincontractstoprotecttheconsumer.Oneexampleofthisinterventionbythelawisautomobileinsurance,wheredefinitionsandcontracttermshavebeenstandardizedinmanyjurisdictionsforallinsurancecompanies.Anotherexampleisairlineticketsthatincludewordingandlimitationsprovidedinlegislation.Criticssuggestthatboilerplatewordingservescommercialinterestswellbecauseitstandardizestransactions,thusmakinglegalrightsandresponsibilitiespredictable.Fromsuchaperspective,interferencebylegislatorsandcourtsincontract33 wordingandinterpretationisinefficientandcostlytobusiness.Judgeshavealwayspaidcloseattentiontowordinginastandardformcontractthatprotectsthepartywhowroteitagainstclaimsbythepartyontheothersideofthebargain.Thispartofanagreementsometimestakestheformofanexclusionorexemptionclause.Theusualapproachofjudgeswhenconsideringthemeaningofsuchwordingistointerprettheprotectionnarrowly.Anotherprincipleofcontractualinterpretationthatissometimesappliedbyjudgesinthesecircumstancesistointerpretcontractscontraproferentem.Accordingtothisrule,thepartywhowrotethecontractmustbeartheconsequencesofanyambiguity.Judgeshavealsobeencriticizedbybusinessownersforinterpreting*contractsusingthisprinciple.Specialproblemsofinterpretationcanariseincontractsthatextendovermanyyears,whenthecircumstancesofthepartieschangeconsiderablyfromthetimeoforiginalcontracting.Inmanycases,thepartiesaltertheirdealingswitheachotherovertimewithoutamendingthecontractdocument,ororallyagreetoamendmentsthatarenotputinwriting.Long-termagreementsaresometimescalledrelationalcontractsbecausetheygenerateexpectationsbetweenthepartiesbasedonasenseofrelationshipthatisnotmerelycontractual.Employmentcontractsofthissortaresometimesinterpretedbythecourtswithmoreregardforthereasonableexpectationsofapartythantheliteralwordingofthedocument.However,somelong-termagreementssuchastreatieswithAboriginalpeopleshavenotbeendealtwithinthisspecialway.Ifthepartiesclearlyexpressalloftheirintentionsinwriting,contractswillbelesssubjecttodispute.However,thecourtsretainthepowertointerpretwhatiswritteninthepublicinterest.Contractssupporttheeconomiclifeofsociety,buttheymayalsoleadtoabuseandunfairness.Acriticallegalstudiesperspectivecanbeappliedtocontractdraftingandinterpretationtohighlightneededreforms.CriticalPerspectivesonLegalInterpretationLegalinterpretationpresentsapuzzleorparadoxforthenon-lawyer.Whensomeonebecomesinvolvedinalegaldispute,shemayexpectthelawtobeclearandstraightforward,althoughsheknowsthatherparticularsituationiscomplexandunique.However,whenajudgefinallyhandsdownthedecisionthatresolvestheirclaim,shefindsthatthelawisdescribedas34 complexandunclear,andhercaseisstraightforwardandroutine.Whathascausedthisbewilderment?Partoftheanswerliesinthenatureoflegaldecision-makingthatrequiresbringingtogetherfactsandlaw.Aswesawwhendiscussingframing,thecomplexitiesandidiosyncrasiesofeachcasehavetobefittedintotheconceptualframeworkofthelaw.Afterajudgedecidestheproperlegalcategoriesandcharacterizationsofpeoples’actions,heorshemaydescribetheresultingconsequencesinajudgmentasnecessaryandinevitable.Thecomplexityoflifehasbeenrefinedtoyieldtheclarityoflegalfactsandlawfulresultsthatwecalljustice.Thisformofinterpretationismoreliketranslation,inwhichthemessydetailsofconcreterealityarerepackagedinneatlegalconcepts,butthatisnotthefocusofthischapter.Theuncertaintyoflitigationarisesfromseveralcauses,andamajoroneistheroleplayedbylegalinterpretation.Thescopeofastatuteandthestrengthofaprecedentaredecidedwithinajudge’swidefieldofdiscretion,andtheprinciplesoflegalinterpretationrarelyprescribeasingle,acceptableresult.Criticallegalstudiesscholarsmayaskwhysocietyacceptssuchasystem.Twotypesofresponsehavebeenofferedtoexplainwhyweacceptlegalinterpretationaspartofalegitimatelegalorderdespitetheuncertaintythatitseemstobring.Thefirsttypecanbedescribedasapologetic,andtheother,critical.Anapologeticexplanationoflegaluncertaintyarguesthatitistobeexpectedandisthereforenormal,giventhetaskoflaw.Acriticalexplanationattemptstoshowthatuncertaintyininterpretationrevealsuncomfortabletruthsabouttheplaceoflawinsociety.Theapologeticapproachbeginsbyassertingthatthereisalwaysagenerallyacceptedclearmeaningoflegalwords.Theproblemishowfarwordscanbe“stretched”tofitnewsituations.Thisviewofinterpretationfallswithinthehermeneutictraditionofscholarshipthatseekstodiscoverthetruemeaningofauthoritativetextsinordertoapplythemtocurrentcircumstances.Onelegalphilosopher,H.L.A.Hart,explainedthetaskoflegalinterpretationassortingoutthecoremeaningoflegaltermsthatarewellacceptedfromtheirpenumbraorsurroundingshadowregion,wherethemeaningisuncertain.8RonaldDworkinsuggestsitisthetaskofmembersofthelegalcommunity(lawyers,judges,andofficials)tomakesenseoflawinareasofuncertaintysoastopreserveandextendtheintegrity(coherenceandunity)oflawandthelegalsystem.9Integritycanmakeupforuncertaintyandthuspreservethelegitimacyofthelegalsystem.Anotherwaylaw35 maybelegitimatelyuncertainiswhereunforeseencircumstancesariseforwhichnoexistinglawwasexpresslyintended.Theseareknownasgapsinlaw,andmustbefilledthroughinterpretationusinganalogyandothermethodstoreachadecision.Hereisanexampleofinterpretation,understoodasfindingacoremeaningthatcanbeaffirmedascorrectbymostmembersofthelegalcommunityandacceptedasjustbysociety.TheSupremeCourtofCanada,inthecaseIrwinToyLtd.v.Québec(AttorneyGeneral)10,wasrequiredtointerprettheword“everyone”foundinSection7oftheCharterofRightsandFreedoms.Thatsectionreads,7.Everyonehastherighttolife,libertyandsecurityofthepersonandtherightnottobedeprivedthereofexceptinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoffundamentaljustice.Theissueforthecourtwastodecidewhetheracorporation(IrwinToy)couldclaimthisright.Althoughcorporationshavebeenrecognizedinlawforalongtime,andinmanycaseshavebeengiventherightsandpowersofindividuals,can“everyone”inthislegalcontextincludesuchartificialpersons?Thecourtsaid“no”:...itappearstousthatthissectionwasintendedtoconferprotectiononasingularlyhumanlevel.Aplain,commonsensereadingofthephrase“Everyonehastherighttolife,libertyandsecurityoftheperson”servestounderlinethehumanelementinvolved;onlyhumanbeingscanenjoytheserights.“Everyone”then,mustbereadinlightoftherestofthesectionanddefinedtoexcludecorporationsandotherartificialentitiesincapableofenjoyinglife,liberty,orsecurityoftheperson,andincludeonlyhumanbeings.ThejudgesarerelyingontheirunderstandingofwhatCanadiansocietyconsiderstobethepropermeaningof“everyone”inthisparticularcontext.Thetruemeaningisthereforesaidtobeclear36 (“plain”and“commonsense”).Problemscanarisewiththisapproachtointerpretation,however,inseveralsituations:ifthereisdisagreementonthe“plain”meaningwithinthelegalcommunity;iftherestofsocietydoesnotsharethe“commonsense”ofjudgesorlawyers;or,ifsocietyissodiversethataconsensusregardingmeaningiselusive.Twoothermethodsofinterpretationthatseekthe“truemeaning”oflegislationareknownasoriginalismandtextualism.Originalismininterpretationrequiresajudgetodiscovertheoriginalintentofthelegislatorswhopassedthelaw,andtofollowthatdespiteanysubsequentchangesinsocialconditions.Theapproachoftextualismdemandsthatajudgerelysolelyontheexplicitwordsofthestatute(the“literalmeaning”)andrefusetoconsideranymattersofpolicythatmightenlargeitsscope.Criticshavedescribedthesehermeneuticalstylesofinterpretationasinherentlyconservative,andthereforenotappropriateinarapidlychangingworld.Acriticalexplanationofthepracticesoflegalinterpretationisthat,simplyput,itispoliticsbyothermeans—shapedbyajudge’sinterestinsecuringtheresultthatsheconsidersfairandjust.Interpretationisthusguidedbytheneedtoprovideanacceptablejustificationforthedesiredoutcome.Oneproblemwiththisapproachisthatideasofjusticediffer,evenamongjudges.Thisperspectiveonlegalinterpretationhaslinkstotherhetoricaltraditionofscholarshipthatseekstojustifyactionbyprovidingpersuasivereasonsforit.Judgingbecomescontroversial(andsometimescontested)whenconstitutionsorotherhighlyvisiblestatutes(suchascriminallaws)arebeinginterpreted.Inthesecases,judgesaresometimesaccusedofbeing“activists”andofsteppingoutsidetheirproperroledespiteallthegoodreasonstheyprovide.Whendisputesinvolvepoliticalquestions,thelegitimacyofthecourtasaninstitutionisindangerifjudgesaresuspectedoffollowingtheirownpoliticalagendas.Judgescanthenbecriticizedforillegitimatelymakinglawratherthanmerelyinterpretingandapplyingit.Butthequestionremainsofhowbesttodescribetheprocessoflegalinterpretation—isitthecreationordiscoveryofmeaning?Thecriticalviewofinterpretationacceptsthatjudgesbringtheirownperspectives,includingtheirattitudestowardpublicpolicies,tothetaskofdecidingthemeaningoflaws.Ratherthanjustexpressingaperceivedconsensusinthecommunity,judgesareallowed,andevenrequiredtoactontheirownjudgmentofwhatsocietyneeds.Judicialdecisionsshouldthereforehelptopersuadethepublicofthejustnessofaparticularresult.Thelegitimacyofcourtscanbepreservedbyeffectivejudicialrhetoricintheformofpersuasivereasonsforjudgment.37 OnedecisionoftheSupremeCourtofCanadaprovidesanexampleofrhetoricalconstructionoflegislation.InwhathasbeencolloquiallycalledtheFamousFivecase11,thecourtwasaskedtodecideifthewordpersoninsectionsoftheCanadianConstitutionconcerningtheSenateincludedwomenwithinitsmeaning:23.TheQualificationofaSenatorshallbeasfollows:(1)HeshallbeofthefullageofThirtyYears;(2)HeshallbeeitheraNatural-bornSubjectoftheQueen,oraSubjectoftheQueennaturalizedbyanActoftheParliamentofGreatBritain....24.TheGovernorGeneralshallfromTimetoTime,intheQueen’sName,byInstrumentundertheGreatSealofCanada,summonqualifiedPersonstotheSenate;and,subjecttotheProvisionsofthisAct,everyPersonsosummonedshallbecomeandbeaMemberoftheSenateandaSenator.TheSupremeCourtofCanadastatedinitsdecision:inconsideringthismatterweare,ofcourse,innowise[way]concernedwiththedesirabilityortheundesirabilityofthepresenceofwomenintheSenate,norwithanypoliticalaspectofthequestionsubmitted.Ourwholedutyistoconstrue,tothebestofourability,therelevantprovisionsoftheBNAAct,1867,anduponthatconstructiontobaseouranswer....Thecourtwentontoconsideranotherstatutethatstatedtheword“he”inlegislationshouldbeinterpretedtoalsomean“she.”Here,thecourtquotedfromandagreedwithanearlierjudgment:38 ItissufficienttosaythattheLegislature,indealingwiththismatter,cannotbetakentohavedepartedfromtheusageofcenturiesortohaveemployedsuchlooseandambiguouswordstocarryoutsomomentousarevolutionintheconstitutionofthisHouse.Inotherwords,thecenturies’-oldpolicyofexcludingwomenfrompoliticallifeshouldnotbedisturbedby“looseandambiguous”wordssuchas“heincludesshe.”Sucharevolutionwasbeyondtheimaginationofthesejudges.However,thisdecisionwasappealedtotheHouseofLordsinBritain,whichatthetimecouldstilloverruletheSupremeCourtofCanada.InEdwardsv.A.G.ofCanada12,theLawLords(judgesoftheHouseofLords)reversedthejudgment,andallowedwomentobecomesenators,stating:Theword“person”asabovementionedmayincludemembersofbothsexes,andtothosewhoaskwhythewordshouldincludefemales,theobviousansweriswhyshoulditnot.[andhavingregardto]1.TotheobjectoftheAct,viz.,toprovideaconstitutionforCanada,aresponsibleanddevelopingstate;2.thattheword“person”isambiguousandmayincludemembersofeithersex....womenareeligibletobesummonedtoandbecomemembersoftheSenateofCanada.ThepolicyperspectivesoftheEnglishjudgesandtheirdesiretoseearesultthattheSupremeCourtofCanadadidnotcriticize,butwouldnotsanction,ledtoawatersheddecisionin39 Canadianlaw.Indeed,thisBritishdecisiondescribedtheCanadianConstitutionasa“livingtree,”capableofgrowthanddevelopment—aviewthatclearlydepartsfromoriginalistandtextualistapproachestointerpretation.Thecriticalviewofinterpretationposesafurtherquestion,however,whetherwearehappytoacceptresultswedonotagreewithaswellasthosewedo.Somehavecriticizedthepolicy-orientedstyleofinterpretationasbeingjudiciallaw-making,judicialactivism,orjudicialinterferencewiththewishesofthedemocraticmajorityasexpressedinlegislation.Itisconsideredaliberalapproachtointerpretationincontrasttotheconservativeapproachesoforiginalismandtextualism.ThemodernmethodofinterpretationinCanadaseemstohavecombinedaspectsofseveraloftheseandotherapproaches,butitisclearthatCanada’sjudgespaycloseattentiontothepolicyandpurposeoflegislation.Understandingandskillinusingthetechniquesoflegalinterpretationequipsbothstudentsoflegalstudiesandlitigantstobetterunderstandjudges’reasoningandtopresentcriticalandpersuasivearguments.40 Appendix2第八章法律解释——培养法律意识的方法与技巧法律解释是一个法律术语，用来描述解读法及定义法的过程，当涉及到立法，如法条、法规、地方法规时，法律解释又称为立法解释、法定释义或法定解释（来自动词construe意为分析、解释）。法律解释也用于解读私人文书，如合同、遗嘱等。在这些情况下，“法律解释”这一通用术语更合适，本章将使用此术语。诗歌的含义可以模糊不定，但法律解释与之不同，法律解释中的差异必须彻底解决，以便说明某法律法规是否适用于某项特定的案件之中。法官行使这项职能，最终的判决可能会成为正确解释立法特定部分或一项法规表述的判例。以下会有很多认可的方式方法来确定下述法律规定的正确含义。法律解释原则用于在法律意义上解决纠纷，法律素养要求对此应有基本的了解。在面临法律问题时，我们会阅读已有的判决书以挑选出那些具有相似情形并可能被用来作为先例的判决来指导当前的判决。仔细阅读分析判决报告中的内容并找出其支持的法律原则，这个过程叫做法律案例分析。法律解释是法律素养中最复杂的能力之一，学习起来颇具挑战性。以下是法律解释之难的原因：·法律一般适用于各种人群，所以是一些通用术语，但即使是一般的词语在法律上也有限定的含义，因此在特定案件中需要对此作出解释。·在当事人方，如果能够给当事方带来好处，法律的意义很可能会受到挑战。·法律观点和概念相互关联，语境联系紧密，根据不同的语境，法律术语有不同的意思。·很多法律术语有两个或多个可以接受的法律意思，在特定案件中必须准确选择其中的一个意思。因此个人可以针对成文法的正确解释做出其它类型的法律论证，例如：·这条法律不适用于我，其范围限于其他人。·我并未做出该条法律所禁止的事情，我的行为不在该法律意义的范围内。41 ·我的案件在本法律中属于除外条款，在别处含有表述或说明。·我无意伤害任何人，因此不应该判定有罪；本法规需要有犯罪意图。本章讨论的法律解释原则有助于法官对如何解释某特定法规做出合适的判决。法律研究的结果会显示许多材料要求法律解释。运用上一章提到的指示可以首先对潜在权威做初始评估。但在将任何法律材料提交给法院或法庭之前，须仔细阅读这些材料以便完全理解其在法律环境下的含义。法律解释是一种阐明或解释法律含义的技能，法律研究是为寻找法律权威，法律交流是为说服法官接受他们的观点，而法律解释正是两者之间的关键环节。它是为寻找潜在权威的法律研究与为说服法官接受他们的观点而进行的法律交流的重要环节。以下是一条看似非常简单的法规：机动车辆不得进入公园。这条禁令看起来意思简单明了，直到有人问其是否适用于以下情形：用于修剪树木的电动升降机(车载式吊车)；警察骑摩托车追逐一名嫌疑犯；或者叫一辆消防车扑灭大火。为了应对这些问题，可能需要修改该条款：机动车辆不得进入公园，用于紧急和维护的车辆除外。然后一群老兵请求在公园里允许安置一辆二战时期的复原军队卡车以纪念战争，那么，可能会再一次修改该条法规：禁止在公园驾驶机动车辆，用于紧急和维护的车辆除外。然而，还会举出更多的问题，例如：上了年纪的人可以使用电动椅(小型摩托车)在公园里走动吗？有马达辅助的自行车可以吗？残疾人使用的电动轮椅可以吗？遥控飞机模型可以吗？我可以骑赛格威吗？问题可能还会继续。每当有人想起一种可能我们就需要继续修改一次法规吗？这看起来很繁琐且没有效率。另一种方法是允许法官决定那些发生并被提交法院的特定情形是否被法42 律所涵盖。采取这种方法，法律可以用一般术语书写，如果有事态发生转变，依靠法官和法庭来决定事态发展是否合法。在这一过程中，法官和法庭给一般术语赋予法律含义。因此法律解释有助于使成文法在实践中切实可行——这就是对“法律总不完善”这一问题的有效回应。在普通法系中，案例分析——一种与法律法规解释相一致的解释性操作，是关于案件判决的研究分析，不过是以某种相反的方式。立法解释始于一般词汇，然后决定其是否适合或适用于特定情况。然而，如果没有相关的立法，尚有争议的特定情形在案例分析中会成为找到先例的起点。多年来在普通法系中，有可能在许多类似案件中找到相似的结果；这些一致的判决最终被公认为普通法规则或原则，成为判决报告、教科书和期刊文章中讨论的那部分法律。普通法的规则和原则是通过借鉴总结了典型司法判决的许多特定实例和一般性发言创建的；因此该方法与从一般到特殊的法定解释方法相反。举普通法法规的一个例子：为了创建一个有效的合同，各方必须为彼此提供对价(有价值的)。在短短几百年来，法官已考虑此法规如何在许多不同情况下运用，并且如今在加拿大它被公认为是普通法的一部分——对等的价值可能极小，并且其他方不需要按比例提供。在经过案例分析的报道案例中，在此普通法法规下可能简明地将合同规定为：为了构成一项合同，必须给予充分对价(有价值的)，但不必严格满足任价特定的价值标准。与大多数法律法规一样，在这也有例外。一条补充规则规定合同的印章将会代替提供的对价。案例分析可能会得出几个关于对以前案件中先例价值的结论：法官必须遵循具有约束力的先例，以达到相同的结果(案件事实非常相似的案件由上级法院判决)；普通的先例，如果法官被说服，他或她可能会这样做(案件事实相似，却由同级或下级法院判决)；可以区分但不应照判(案件事实显著不同，无论判决法院的级别如何)；可能用作有用的类比(案件事实不同，但结果可以恰当引导本案判决)。立法解释和普通法案例分析为法律注入了灵活性，并使其适应社会的变化。对于已经通过的法律，成文法可以经过解释以处理立法者无法想象的新奇事件。同样，普通法可以随时间的推移而发展，法官无需预计在他们面前的具体案件的每一个可能变化。曼斯菲尔德爵士（一位英国律师，后来成了著名的法官）认为在这种情况下，需要之时通过不断反思并重申其法规和法则，普通法能够“使其本身明确”。然而，法定解释及案例分析方法也产生了不确定性。在当事人主义中，存在着这样的动机，推出对自己一方有利的可替代的法律解释，创造性地分辨对自己无益的判例，帮助自己辩论。通常很难预测在这些问题上哪种推论会占上风。我稍后将在本章和下一章中讨论由法律解释引起的法律结果不确定性问题。43 法律解释及普通法案例分析的方法是教给法律系学生的，但非律师人员也可以学习两者的基本原则。这些处理法律的方式是法律论证的基础，我们会在下一章探讨。阅读法律法规法官通过阅读法规和其它形式的立法来运用法律解决面临的纠纷。法律适用是试图将事实与法律法规匹配的过程。当事人有时会质疑制定法是否适用，或法律的要求——他们争论其正确的解释。当法官运用制定法时，他们的判决可能会成为未来案件中同一法则下的先例。这样，法规的意义通过法律解释得以阐明。因此，先例并非只对相关的普通法规则和原则适用，对立法解释问题同样适用。涉及到立法解释的案件经常被收集一起出版。例如在加拿大，有一种此类型的出版物被称为词和短语，其中包括特定法规中单词的司法解释，可以通过在线法律资源商业数据库和法律图书馆查到。附说明的法规是发布版本的立法，包括注释——案件的引用，被认为是法律的特定部分。加拿大法律信息研究所公开数据库(及其它类似的世界各地的公开资源)提供了立法法律解释的判例，通过法律文本涉及的案件链接即可访问。尽管法律词典可能有助于理解法律术语，但最好寻找法院的判例来了解立法中使用的词语是如何在特定的语境中被解释的。法律解释原则随时间的推移而演变。法官曾一度遵循固定的法规，例如只通过查看被使用过的词语把握立法的字面意思，即使在特定案件中会导致荒谬的结果，也必须接受并采用该意。字面解释原则和其它类似的解释规则有时被称为经典的阐释规则。很多人批评基于法规的法律解释，指出这些法规往往是矛盾的，因此对解释帮助不大。为了说明这一点，卡尔·卢埃林给出了以下例子:法规反向规则或例外适用字面意思违反法律目的除外每一个词都有法律效力有误或同其它法律相抵触除外遵循文法解释妨碍法律目的除外44 最近，加拿大法院已经抛弃了基于规则的法律解释方法，采取了一种更灵活的方法，在加拿大称其为现代解释原则(或方法)。此方法要求法官对立法文本的确切用词、整体的法律语境联系、立法者的意图和立法的总体目的给予同等关注。在艾伯塔省的省级雇员工会诉莱斯布里奇社区学院案中，加拿大最高法院采用和批准了一种由渥太华大学法学教授埃尔默·德黑格所描述的法定解释方法，如下所述：结合语境与文法和常识理解一条法规中的措辞，符合法规的谋划、目标与目的。在此现代解释方法的描述中，词语谋划指行为是如何组织和设计的，目标指该行为试图带来的结果，目的是指立法者想要解决的社会问题。在解释法律时这种方法为法院提供了更多的灵活性，包括，当采用一种不同的含义会更好地贯彻法律目标和目的时，有权拒绝使用词语的字面意思。现代解释方法要求在上下文中解读具体词汇，其中包含了整条讨论中的法规以及可能扩展其它法规。未能注意到法律法规中特定词语的语境，是初学法律的读者可能犯的错误之一。自然情况下，人们会密切关注与当前形势最相关法律特定部分的措辞，但现代法律解释方法要求我们扩大阅读视野，以便在整个法律背景下来了解该部分。因此，应“从内到外”来解读法律法规，从某一段的措辞入手，从这里延伸到法规的其它部分，有时涉及到其它法律法规。阅读法规过程形象化的一个好办法是将之看做反向剥洋葱。阅读应从核心(所讨论的具体词汇)开始，再向外延伸到法律法规内容更多的部分（即下一层面），找到特定的章节，并到下一层，延伸到整个法律法规的“外皮”(包括标题，也可能包括有关其目的的导言)。读者会发现一项法规的结构形式(层次)，从最小到最大的是:子条、条、小节、节、部、编。那些不熟悉法律的人在阅读法律法规时可能犯的另一个错误是忽略其内在的法定(或立法)定义。提供在法规、条例或附例中发现的单词或短语的定义是立法的特定部分。定义往往被列入立法，以协助解释；当法官和其他人阅读法律时它们指出其在使用的含义。法定定义有三个主要目的：缩小词义(例如，“在本法中，‘机动车’是指客车”)，扩大词义(例如，“在本法中，‘机动车’指任何可载人的机械车辆”)，或为一个词语赋予特别或独特的意义(例如，“在本法中，‘机动车’指用于货物运输的商用车”)。法官在运用法律时必须尊重这种定义，但仍可能需要一些解释——例如，滑板车是机械车辆吗?法定定义可能应用于单一一项立法的所有部分，或仅是其中的某些部分，而且某些定义可以适用于其它法规。从内到外阅读时立法时，你可能会遇到仅适用于某一层次的法律法规45 定义，例如一节中的阐述“在这部分，人字意味着......”许多法规在开头有整个立法中经常用到的单词或短语的释义部分。大多数司法管辖区也有单独的法规，包含了许多不同法规中出现的单词释义，如“天”、“月”、“他”。在艾伯塔省，本法规称为《解释法规》。例如，以下是本法规的一节，解释了艾伯塔省所有立法中的释义是如何被解读和运用的：定义及解释规定13.法令中定义和解释的规定[包括法规]（1）适用于整个法令,包括包含定义或解释的部分条款,意图相反的法令除外；（2）适用于本法令下的法规，意图相反的法令和法规除外。许多司法管辖区的议会和立法机构提供在线指导和立法组织及立法结构的解释，阅读他们的法律时可以咨询。根据现代解释方法，从你最关心的特定措辞开始“从里到外”阅读，揭示了法官考虑这些词时所重视的语境。你还可以查阅像《词和短语》这样的出版物，或者法律法规批注本，看看是否有任何关于措辞问题解释的先例。阅读案例阅读案例报告时理解上下文也很重要。与阅读法律法规一样，阅读法律判决时，初学读者很容易迷失在特定个案的细节上。因为法官的法律判决在结构上与法规不同，为了更好地了解上下文，应“从里到外”阅读。这种方法，从判决的“皮肤”读到“肉和骨头”，包含了如当事人观点的论述、对所提出证据的描述以及法官就这些问题所给出的结论。因而通常反映当事人的案件名称出现在开头，法院最终的结论或命令在结尾。判决的核心包含详细的理由，然后是法官做出的最终判决。让我们按正确的顺序检查一下案例报告的组成部分。报告的案件名称是依据当事方名称建立的，适合开始仔细阅读。案例的开头是诉因类型，标题包含参与诉讼各方的名称和他们所扮演的角色，如原告、被告。如果是上诉法院做出的判决，对审判决定提出上诉的被列为上诉方，反对上诉的被列为被告方。有时双方会对判决46 的不同部分进行上诉。请注意，原告和被告均可以起诉他们不满意的判决。为了列举一个典型的判决报告结构实例，我们将引用一个重要案件——莱斯布里奇社区学院上诉艾伯塔省省级雇员工会，此案由加拿大最高法院判决。如果参看由加拿大最高法院对AUPE的判决报告，我们在开头会发现诉因类型:莱斯布里奇社区学院理事会，上诉人艾伯塔省级雇员工会西尔维娅·巴宾，被告加拿大劳工大会、重要案件——莱斯布里奇社区学院上诉艾伯塔省省级雇员工会，此案由加拿大最高法院判决。省卫生部门，涉事方我们从中可以看出，学院提出上诉，AUPE反对上诉。介入诉讼人是那些不直接参与现有纠纷，但对案件的结果有浓厚兴趣的人，也许此案件可能会成为他们以后不得不遵循的判例。因此法院可能批准介入诉讼人对诉讼中的问题提出争论。以下是诉因风格之后报告的另一个主要部分:2003年11月4日；2004年四月29日。出席人员：麦克莱切林、雅各布奇、梅杰、巴思特罗什、宾尼、阿尔布尔、莱贝尔、德尚和菲什。在艾伯塔省的上诉法院上诉我们从中可以看出法院公布和发表判决，于2003年11月4日在法院开庭辩论，判决推迟到2004年4月29日（由法官慎重考虑）。最后，我们从这部分知道案件起源于艾伯塔省，因此在作出判决时要考虑特定司法管辖区内的法律。下一部分讲的是判决相关的流行语或关键词。这些是法官做判决时所考虑的法律领域的一般术语(例如劳动关系)和主要法律概念(如管辖权)。通常发现这些词语与法律百科全书中的主题词相对应。这里是AUPE判决的关键词:47 劳动关系——仲裁委员会——仲裁委员会司法救助权适用范围——没有正当理由解雇员工，非罪责不足——委员会给予损害赔偿以代替复职——仲裁委员会是否会为罪责不足而解雇员工行为进行损害赔偿以代替复职——劳动关系法，R.S.A.2000c.l-1,s.142(2)。司法审查——劳动关系——审查标准——仲裁委员会——没有正当理由解雇员工，非罪责不足——委员会给予损害赔偿以代替复职——审查标准适用于委员会补救条款的解释和委员会补偿——劳动关系法，R.S.A.2000c.l-1,s.142(2)。如果案件复杂，AUPE判决中可能会涉及到几个法律的主要领域，例如“劳动关系”和“司法审查”。然后是案件报告中的摘要，是对呈递给法院的主要法律问题及其判决的简单描述以及法官所给的原因总结。摘要可能由法院或自费出版案例报告的发行人编写。以下是AUPE案例中摘要的一部分:上诉人雇主雇佣了被申请人发起人作为调度协调人，但以其工作表现不好解雇了她。发起人和被申请人解雇联盟,声称没有正当理由的解雇违反集体协议。仲裁委员会发现,尽管发起人因为无可指责的无能而被解雇,但显然解雇理由不当，因为雇主未能遵守伊迪丝卡维尔标准的解雇要求，该标准中不包括员工不胜任工作。在制定补救措施时,董事会大多数人认为,根据艾伯塔省劳工关系法142(2)的规定可以用经济补偿替代，给予她适当的补偿代替复职，因为在这种情况下复职是不合适的。高等法院驳回了被告的司法审查申请。上诉法院驳回了这一裁决，要求被告复职，决心向董事会退会赔偿。法院发现142(2)并不适用于无罪解雇，而且没有遵循伊迪丝卡维尔标准，因为通常期望的补救办法是复职。保留职位：应该允许上诉。当充分考虑到实际实用方法的相关因素，审核标准适用于仲裁委员会解释142(2)劳动关系法，董事会的补偿是合理的。这个摘要也让我们对案件的事实和历史有了一些了解。如上所述，这一纠纷始于仲裁委员会，其判决首先被上诉到艾伯塔省高等法院，然后是艾伯塔省上诉法院，上诉法院的裁决反过来又被上诉到最高法院。我们也从这一信息中了解到:本案用到了《艾伯塔省劳动关系48 法》以及包括仲裁在内的司法审查法律程序。然而，除了上诉人取得了成功“应该允许上诉”的结论(判决)并没有告诉我们过多关于这一决定实际上对当事人意味着什么，这需要阅读判决的正文来发现。请注意其开篇语:法院的判决是由雅各布奇递交的——这一陈述表明所有审理这一上诉的法官看法一致，因为法院只发布了一个判决，然后他们当中的雅各布奇被指定写这个判决，表示其他法官也赞成(同意)。如果一位或多位审理该案件的法官不同意多数人的看法，他们将起草一份异议判决，并给出理由。当案件出现异议时，多数人可以就异议首先提出判决(附上他们的名字)。有异议的判决永远不可以用作判例。因此，不能混淆多数法官与少数法官给出的原因。多数(或意见一致的)判决包含判决理由，判决理由可作为之后案件的判例。如果大多数法官对于法律问题提出意见，但是没能得出任何结论以作出判决，这类表述称为附带意见(或只是附带或意见)。附带意见不是先例。然后，对当事人来说，AUPE案例会出现什么样的实际结果呢？为了找到答案，看一下判决的结尾部分，你可以发现这样的陈述:六、处置58.我允许上诉，撤销上诉法院的判决，恢复多数仲裁委员会的判决。这句话告诉我们，经过对此案件所有的上诉之后，多数仲裁员所作出的原判决被认为是正确。因此，我们可以更加清楚这起纠纷中的一个基本问题——仲裁员在作出判决时是否对法律（《劳工关系法》)进行了正确的解释。此信息有助于解释为什么AUPE案件在加拿大法律解释中被认为是重要的判例。在阅读判决正文之前，还应注意到文本中“皮肤”的一个部分。摘要后面列出了案例、立法以及法院在作出其判决时使用的学术著作，这部分报告为进一步研究提供了来源。此外，报告开头是案例简史，援用了下级法院的判决。现在可以详细读一下判决，但不是像阅读故事一样从头读到尾。法院的判决有正当理由，不是记叙文。它试图对结果提出全面而令人信服地解释。在看一个案例是否有作为判例的价值时，应着重阅读法院对核心问题的推理。因此，应首先阅读判决中对问题的描述部分:49 四、问题这项起诉提出了两个基本的问题。第一个问题是根据规章的第142（2）节所涉及的委员会管辖权范围，第二个问题是委员会基于管辖权所行使补救权。在分析问题本身之前，对于下述原因我简要地陈述了委员会对每个评估问题的判决所遵循的评审标准。因为纠纷涉及到《劳动法》的正确解释，此论述提供了深入的信息——要解释的词语与仲裁员的裁判权和法律所赋予他们的权利有关。如果有人用法律词典来查术语评审标准，他会发现它是法院用来确定是否会推翻准司法决策机构判决的标准。从这看来，最高法院似乎还须确定仲裁员对规章的解释是否有误。在作判决过程中，最高法院为加拿大开创了一个关于法定解释正确方法的先例。“从里到外”地阅读案例报告时，需要带着质疑的心态充分认识到对各当事人的影响，对法律发展的意义，以及它作为先例的价值——可能会支持或贬低特定的法律论证。理解了案例的背景——当事人、法律问题和判决，仍需要从批判性视角阅读判决理由。他们作出的判决说服读者了吗？还有可能会出现的法律问题吗，但为什么没有？这个判决一般对社会有什么影响？这些是一些批判性法律研究学者在阅读案例时可能提出的问题。阅读合同法官通过阅读合约以确定当事方是否打算创建相互的法律义务，如果是这样，需要各方做什么。如果是商业合同，法官假定协议的目的在于为各方带来某些利益，如获得商品、服务或金钱。法院通常遵循的一个假定是如果你签署一份文件，这意味着你同意里面的所有条款，并且知道这样做要承担法律义务。因此阅读合约时:·在签署、盖章、打开或点击一些内容之前阅读，包括如众所周知的“细则”；·即使不签的也要阅读(法官假设你已经阅读了所给的内容，如票据和收据等)；·全部都要读(法官假定你已经阅读了合同中提到的所有内容，即使其出现在另一文档或别处——这就是所谓的出现在合同中的援引措辞)；·以书面形式询问(口头讨论不算——这就所谓的口头证据规则，口说无凭，书面形式才算数)；许多合同明确指出其包含协议的所有条款，排除了任何其它的东西；50 ·以书面形式作答(口头讨论不算)；·以书面形式为准(口头讨论不算)。书面的合同可能会有模糊或歧义以及像法律一样有“漏洞”。为了解决这些问题，法院使用了合同的法律解释原则，在订立合同时仅使用有文字的文档来确定双方的意向；即使用词准确，也不能出现违背合同目的的解释；寻求具有商业意义的解释；从整体上解释整合同。理想的合同文件是一个目的相同、意见一致的产物，是通过费尽心血的谈判共同认真起草而完成的。其实极少有合同通过这种方式产生。大多数都是由一方采用标准形式起草，然后另一方审查无异议后接受，例如：新车辆、房屋或公寓租赁的购买协议。在某些司法管辖区域，此类协议被称为附和合同，意思是你同意接受(遵守)合同的条款，不可能有任何更改。通常用于某些类型的许多合同的标准条款被称为样板，意思是很久以前就采用的传统措辞，出于方便和保守主义而再次使用。样板也是一个常见的法律用语。标准合同格式常应用于交易。在一些商业问题中，已有法律对样板文件中措辞的影响加以限制，或在合同中纳入具体措辞以保护消费者。这种法律干预的一个例子就是汽车保险，许多司法管辖区的保险公司给出的定义及合同条款已标准化。另一个例子是机票，其措辞和规定限制已列入立法。评论家认为样板措辞符合商业利益，因为它能规范交易行为，从而使法律的权利和责任具有可预测性。从这样的角度来看，立法者和法院干预合同中的措辞和解释对商业来说低效且昂贵。一份标准格式合同的措辞历来深受法官的关注，在另一方反对时以保护起草方。这部分协议有时采用排除或豁免条款的形式。当考虑这类措辞的意思时，法官时常用严格解释保护的方法。有时在这些情况下法官采用的另一个合同解释原则是反起草人规则，根据这一规则，合同起草方必须承担任何模糊引起的后果。法官也会因为采用这种规则解释合同而受到企业主的批评。当随着时间的推移合同双方的情况发生巨大变化后，使用多年的合同可能会出现解释的特殊问题。在很多案件中，缔约方随着时间的推移改变了与对方的交易，但没有修改合同文件，或只是口头上同意修正但未形成书面形式的协议。长期协议有时被称为关系契约，因为当事人双方的预期是基于某种关系，不仅仅是契约。这种就业协议有时由法院更多地根据一方的合理预期来解释，而不是根据文档的字面意思进行解释。然而，例如与原住民的一些长期协定不用这种特殊方式处理。如果缔约双方能够在书面合同中清楚表达他们所有的意图，那么合同就会产生较少的争议。然而，法院保留其中对公共利益的解释权力。合同支撑着社会的经济生活，但它们也可51 能导致滥用和不公平现象的产生。合同的起草和解释可以采用一种批判性的法律研究视角，以突出显示所需的改革。法律解释的批判性视角法律解释对非律师来说是一个难题或悖论。当一个人卷入法律纠纷时，她可能希望法律清晰直白，尽管她知道她面临的情况特殊复杂。然而，当法官作出判决以解决他们的要求时，她发现法律描述复杂难懂，不清不楚，而她的案子简单常见，是什么引起了这种困惑?部分答案在于法律判决（需要结合事实和法律）的性质。正如我们在讨论框架时所看到的，每个复杂独特的案件都要套进法律概念的框架中。当法官对人民行为的性质后果做出判决后，他或她可能会将后果描述为必要且无可避免。生命的复杂性已屈服于清晰的法律事实和合法结果，我们将其称之为正义。这种形式的解释更像是翻译，具体现实的繁琐细节在文字简洁的法律概念下被重新包装，但这不是本章的重点。诉讼的不确定性源于几个原因，但起主要作用的是法律解释。法规的范围和判例影响的强度取决于法官酌处权的范围，法律解释的原则很少可以得出一个单一的可接受的结果。批判性法律研究学者可能会问为什么社会会接受这样一个制度。有两种回答来解释为什么我们接受法律解释作为合法法律秩序的一部分，尽管它似乎带来了不确定性。第一种类型可以称为辩护，第二种是评判。考虑到法律的任务，法律不确定性的辩护解释认为其在预料之中，所以是正常的。批判性的解释试图表明解释中的不确定性揭示了关于法律社会地位的令人不悦的真相。辩护的方法首先声称总会有普遍接受的、明确的法律词汇含义。问题是词语能“延伸”多远以适应新情况。这种解释方法属于阐释学学术传统，这种传统旨在发现真正意义上的权威文本以将其应用到当前情况。法律哲学家哈特将法律解释的任务阐明为：从法律术语含义不明确的半影区或阴影区中挑选出其中被人广泛接受的核心含义。罗纳德·德沃金表明法律界(律师、法官和官员)成员的任务就是搞清法律领域不明确的地方，维护并扩展法律和法律系统的完整性（连贯性和统一性）。完整性可以弥补不确定性带来的不足，从而保护法律制度的合法性。另一种合法的法律不确定性是在不可预见的情况下现有的法律不能明确地为之所用。这些被称为法律空白，必须通过使用类比法和其它方法的解释来填补以做出决定。这里有一个有关解释含义的例子，解释是找到一个为大多数法律界成员认为正确且社会认为公正而接受的核心意思。在欧文玩具有限公司诉魁北克省(总检察长)案件中，加拿大最52 高法院被要求解释权利和自由宪章第7节的词语“每个人”的含义。该节是，7.按照基本的公正原则，每个人都享有生存、自由和人身安全的权利，且该权利不得被剥夺。法院的问题是决定公司(欧文玩具)是否拥有这项权利。虽然公司已经被法律承认了很长时间，并在许多情况下赋予了个人的权利和权力，但是“每个人”在法律方面包括法人吗？法院说“不包括”:⋯⋯在我们看来,本节规定旨在只给人提供保护。对“每个人都有生存、自由和人身安全的权利”这句话的清晰普通解释强调了人的元素。；只有人可以享受这些权利。然后，“每个人”在之后章节中的解读和定义不包括公司和其它不能享有生存、自由和人身安全的非自然人实体，只包括人。法官的解释依靠他们对加拿大社会在这种情形下认为的“每个人”的正确含义的理解，因此，正确含义是明确的（“直白的”，“常识性的”）。然而使用这种方法解释可能在以下几种情况出现问题:如果在法律界对“直白”的含义存在分歧；如果社会上的其他人不具有法官或律师的“常识”；或者，如果多元化的社会难以找到意见一致的含义。另外两种寻求立法“真谛”的解释方法被称为原旨主义和文本主义。在解释中原旨主义要求法官发现通过法律的立法者的原意并遵循原意，不管社会环境之后发生怎样的改变。文本主义的方法要求法官仅仅依靠法规明确的话语(“字面意义”)，不考虑任何可能扩大其解释范围的政策问题。批评者形容这些诠释风格的解释本质上是保守的，因而在这个瞬息万变的世界并不适用。对法律解释实践的批判性解释简单地说是通过其它手段的进行的政治——出于法官的兴趣寻求她所认为公平、公正的结果。因此解释由需求所指导，给与理想结果可接受的正当理由。这种方法的一个问题是，对公正理念的认识有所差别，即使在法官之间也是如此。这种法律解释视角已和修辞传统学术联系在一起，旨在通过提供有说服力的理由证明行为正当的学术修辞传统有关联。当解释宪法或其它高度可见的律例(如刑事法律)时，判断就变得有争议(有时需要争论)。在这些情况下，尽管提供了充分的理由，有时法官也会被指责为“积极分子”，没有发挥自己应有的作用。当纠纷涉及政治问题时，如果法官涉53 嫌遵照自己的政治目的，那么法院作为一个机构的合法性将处于危险之中。然后法官可能被批为非法造法而非解释和应用法律。但如何最好地描述法律解释的过程仍留有问题——是创造还是发现法律条款的含义?批判解释观接受法官在决定法律法规含义的任务中带入他们自己的观点，包括他们对公共政策的态度，不是只表达社会所认为的一致意见，法官被允许，甚至被要求按照他们对社会需求的判断行事。因此，司法判决应有助于说服公众接受某一特定结果的公正性。法院的合法性能够以有说服力的判决理由通过司法修辞得到维护。加拿大最高法院的一项决定为修辞法制建设提供了一个示例。在俗称的著名五案件中，法院被要求决定加拿大宪法关于参议院一节中的人字是否含有女人的意思:23.参议员应具备以下资格：（1）必须年满三十周岁；（2）是加拿大生籍民或是据大不列颠议会法案的入籍公民⋯⋯24.总督应通过加拿大国玺文书，以女王的名义不时为参议院召集合格人员；并根据该法令的规定，所召集的每个人必须是参议院成员或参议员。加拿大最高法院在判决中指出:当然，在考虑这件事时，我们根本不关心参议院是否欢迎女士出席，也没有掺杂任何政治观点。我们的全部责任是尽我们最大的努力解释1867年不列颠北美法案的有关条文，我们的答案也基于此⋯⋯法院接着考虑另一种法规中“他”的解释在立法中也应含有“她”的意思。这里有法院的引述并同意先前做出的判决:这足以说明在这件事上，立法机构不能背离古老的词汇用法或使用的措辞来实行众议院如此重要的一场宪法改革。换句话说，把女人排除在政治生活之外不应被混淆为如“他包括她”等“不精确和模棱54 两可”的字眼。这样的改革超出这些法官的想象。然而，这一判决被上诉到英国上议院，这在当时还推翻了加拿大最高法院的判决。在爱德华兹诉加拿大司法部长案件中，上议院法官撤销了原判，并允许妇女成为参议员，这样说:上述提到的“人”可能包括男人和女人，对于那些问为什么这个字包含女性，答案很明显，为什么不包括呢。[并参照]1.法案的目的是为加拿大提供一部宪法，一部负责任的、发展中的法规。2.“人”这个字的表述模糊不清，可能包括两种性别中的任何一种......女人有资格召到议院成为加拿大参议院成员。英国法官的政策观点，以及他们希望看到的结果：加拿大最高法院不批评，但也不会鼓励，导致了这样的判决出现，成为了加拿大法律上的分水岭。事实上，这个英国的判决将加拿大宪法形容为一棵“有生命的树”，可以成长与发展——显然这种观点背离了原旨主义和文本主义的方法解释。然而，批判性的的解释观提出了进一步的问题——我们是否很高兴地接受了我们不同意的结果以及那些我们所做的事情。有人批评以政策为导向的解释风格是法院制法、司法能动主义或司法干预，带有立法中所表述的民主党多数派的意愿。与保守的原旨主义和文本主义的解释方法相比它被视为一种自由的解释方法。在加拿大现代解释方法似乎已结合了这些和其它解释方法的几个方面内容，但很显然，加拿大法官密切关注立法的政策和目的。对法律解释技巧的理解与运用，可以帮助学习法律的学生和诉讼当事人更好地理解法官的推理以及提供关键且有说服力的论据。55'